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CANDID REASONS

FOR

RENOUNCING THE PRINCIPLES

OF

ANTIPÆDOBAPTISM.

ALSO,

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING A SHORT METHOD WITH THE BAPTISTS.

BY PETER EDWARDS,
Several years Pastor of a Baptist church, at Portsea, Hants.

FIFTH AMERICAN EDITION.

PHILADELPHIA:

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TO THE

CHURCH AND CONGREGATION

MEETING IN WHITE'S ROW, PORTSEA, HANTS.

DEARLY BELOVED,

AFTER officiating among you, as Paſtor and Miniſter, between ten and eleven years, it ſeemed natural to addreſs you in a publication intended to account for that change of ſentiment in me, which has proved the occaſion of our ſeparation.

Two eminent writers, Mr. Booth and Dr. Williams, have both contributed to this: The latter has my acknowledgments; the former my animadverſions. As Mr. B. had no deſign to diſcover the fallacy of the Baptiſt ſcheme, I thought it proper to ſhow in what way his book has operated, and is likely ſtill to operate, contrary to the deſign of the author.

I have preſented the whole ſcheme to the reader in the ſame point of view in which it was exhibited to my own mind. In compoſing it, I have endeavoured to avoid every thing foreign and bitter; that, as the truth has been my object, I wiſhed to ſay nothing that ſhould divert the attention of the reader from it. Wiſhing that you and I may grow in grace and in the knowledge of Chriſt, I remain in the ſame eſteem and love,

Your's, in our common Lord,

PETER EDWARDS.

PORTSEA,
Jan. 12, 1795.

REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABOVE WORK.

By the English Reviewers of religious Publications.

IT is perhaps impoſſible to review a book of a controverſial nature, without giving offence to one ſide or other of the queſtion; even though the greateſt care may be taken to offend neither: And beſides, it is more than probable, that an honeſt reviewer may have an opinion of his own on the ſubject. However, keeping that out of ſight, as far as poſſible, we ſhall endeavour to give a juſt repreſentation of the reaſons here aſſigned for renouncing the principles of Antipædobaptiſm. The writer ſeems to be thoroughly acquainted with the nature and extent of his ſubject, and to have a clear view of all the conſequences that may ariſe from the various arguments urged either for or againſt infant baptiſm; and has certainly given a new turn to the controverſy, while he has brought forward ſome new, and much important matter, in ſuch a form, as undoubtedly calls for the very ſerious attention of thoſe gentlemen who oppoſe infant baptiſm. He writes with great perſpicuity, and reaſons with much force, and with no little effect. He fairly ſtates thoſe intereſting points which are equally admitted on both ſides,—ſuch as theſe; that the baptiſm of believing adults is right and proper—that every individual, who believes, may and ought to be baptiſed—that infants are not capable of believing. The queſtion then is not concerning the baptiſm of adults, nor the baptiſm of believers, nor yet whether infants are capable of faith; for in theſe matters all are agreed; but the queſtion is ſolely this, *Are infants to be baptised, or not?*

That our common readers, for whoſe benefit we chiefly write, may underſtand this ſtatement of the ſubject, and our author's mode of reaſoning, we ſhall ſet before them the following ſpecimen.

The baptiſts ſay, The ſcriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptiſm. Mr. Edwards ſays, Granted freely. The baptiſts affirm, that infants have not faith or

repentance. Mr. Edwards anſwers, Granted freely. The baptiſts then urge, that infants, therefore, are nor proper ſubjects of baptiſm. Mr. Edwards denies this aſſertion and rejects it, becauſe no one ever urged baptiſm on the faith of infants, and becauſe the faith of infants enters not at all into the queſtion: And, were it neceſſary, Mr. Edwards would further illuſtrate the ſubject, in the following manner:—The baptiſts attack the Jews, and ſay, The ſcriptures required faith in order to circumciſion. The Jew anſwers, Granted freely. Then the baptiſts ſay, But male infants of eight days old had not faith. The Jew anſwers again, Granted freely. The baptiſts then go on, and ſay, male infants of eight days old, therefore, were not proper ſubjects of circumciſion. The Jew anſwers with ardour, and juſtly too; I deny that aſſertion, becauſe none ever reſted circumciſion on the faith of an infant eight days old, nor does the faith of infants at all enter into the queſtion. Here then it evidently appears, that, if neither circumciſion nor baptiſm was ever grounded on the faith of infants, the arguments for or againſt the right of infants to theſe ordinances muſt be drawn from ſources that have nothing to do with their faith.

The queſtion therefore is, Are infants to be baptiſed, or not? The baptiſts ſay, No; and then aſſign their reaſons: all of which Mr. Edwards reduces to two. Firſt, *That a perſon, who has a right to a poſitive inſtitute, muſt be expreſsly mentioned, as having that right; but infants are not ſo mentioned, and therefore have not that right.* This argument Mr. Edwards conſiders as a mere aſſumption;----as not allowed by any claſs of men,—nor owned by the baptiſts themſelves, as of any real force, in admitting women to the Lord's Supper. Here ſome things are introduced, reſpecting the controverſy as managed by Mr. Booth, which certainly require an explicit anſwer.

Their ſecond argument is,----*That the ſcriptures require faith and repentance as requiſite to baptiſm; but as infants cannot have theſe, they are not proper ſubjects of baptiſm.* That faith and repentance are required in order to baptiſm, Mr. Edwards allows; but "I aſk," ſays he, "of whom? The anſwer muſt be of adults; for the ſcriptures never require them of infants, in order to any thing. The argument then will be this----The ſcriptures require

faith and repentance of adults, in order to baptiſm. Now you ſee, infants are gone; they have nothing to do with the argument." Then Mr. Edwards goes on to ſhow that the argument is altogether fallacious, and points out wherein its fallacy conſiſts; and this, we think he has completely done, whether he ſupports his main hypotheſis or not. The whole force of the argument, and its conſequences, he expreſſes in a few words: "Infants," ſay the baptiſts, "muſt not be baptiſed, becauſe infants have not faith. 'He that believeth, and is baptiſed, ſhall be ſaved.' Something is ſaid of baptiſm that cannot agree to infants;---faith goes before baptiſm; and as none but adults are capable of believing, ſo no others are capable of baptiſm." But "If infants muſt not be baptiſed," ſays Mr. Edwards, "becauſe ſomething is ſaid of baptiſm which does not agree to infants; then, by the ſame rule, infants muſt not be ſaved, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of ſalvation which does not agree to infants. As none but adults are capable of believing, ſo (by the arguments of the baptiſts) none but adults are capable of ſalvation: For, he that believeth not, ſhall be damned." But the whole of Mr. Edwards' reaſoning, on this point, merits all attention.

However, the queſtion ſtill remains, Are infants to be baptiſed? Mr. Edwards ſays, Yes; and aſſigns the following reaſons: Firſt, God has conſtituted, in his church, the membership of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious rite. This is ſhown at large from the Jewiſh diſpenſation; and it is granted by the baptiſts themſelves, that infant children were admitted members of the Jewiſh church. Next, The church membership of infants was never ſet aſide, either by the authority of God, or of inſpired men; but continues in full force, under the ſanction of God, to the preſent day. This Mr. Edwards proves by a variety of clear and authentic arguments, which will both inſtruct and entertain the reader; while he will find that the right of infants, in this reſpect, under the chriſtian diſpenſation, is acknowledged both by our Lord and his apoſtles. And to talk of their excluſion, without expreſs and poſitive language, would be very abſurd indeed, in a caſe, where ſo much ſtreſs is laid upon poſitive and expreſs language. Here Mr. Edwards puſhes home his reaſoning; "As God has conſtituted infants church members, they ſhould be received to membership, becauſe God has conſtituted it. And

ſince infants muſt be received to membership, they muſt be received without baptiſm, or with it: But none muſt be received without baptiſm; and therefore, as infants muſt be received according to a divine command, they muſt of neceſſity be baptiſed. Hence it is clear, that, under the goſpel, infants are ſtill continued, exactly in the ſame relation to God and his church, in which they were originally placed under all former diſpenſations, and particularly under the Jewiſh church."

After Mr. Edwards has cloſed his main arguments, there follows an Appendix, containing "A ſhort Method with the Baptiſts." Here it muſt be naturally expected, that ſome of the foregoing arguments will be introduced again, for the ſake of the Short Method. It would therefore be abſurd to make it an objection againſt his book, that Mr. Edwards repeats his arguments.---He does ſo, with great propriety, with deliberate deſign, and for a ſpecial end. Till thoſe arguments, which he has repeated, be clearly refuted, the pointleſs darts, thrown by feeble arms, are not worth regarding.

It has been intimated by ſome, that Mr. Edwards, in animadverting on the writings of Mr. Booth, uſes language too ſevere and harſh, and that he has recourſe to unjuſt repreſentations. There is no accounting for the different feelings of men, in points that reſpect more things than they chooſe to own, and wherein they are much intereſted. We preſume not, therefore, to decide on charges of this kind. If Mr. Edwards has indulged himſelf in improper ſeverities, Mr. Booth's anſwer will acquire reputation by a fair and juſt ſtatement of ſuch follies. If Mr. Edwards has really ſaid any thing that is not true, or has been unjuſt in his repreſentations, Mr. Booth, ſo far as his own arguments are concerned, is obliged to him; for his taſk, in anſwering, will be rendered much eaſier, and his refutations cannot fail of being acceptable to a virtuous public. At all events, an anſwer will be expected from Mr. Booth, or ſome of his friends.

THE INTRODUCTION:

Containing a fair statement of the Inquiry.

THESIS I.

THE only thing which, in any diſpute, ſhould engage our attention, is this: "What is truth?" And he who wiſhes to find it, will endeavour to adopt that plan which will bring him ſooneſt to that he ſeeks. There are two things, in all matters of controverſy, which greatly facilitate our ſearch: Firſt, that we ſet aſide all thoſe things about which we are agreed, and fix our attention to that only on which a difference of opinion may fall; and, ſecondly, that this difference be ſtated in a manner the moſt plain and ſimple. To either of which, no perſon who ſeeks the truth can form the leaſt objection.

THESIS II.

As this inquiry lies between thoſe who paſs under the denomination of Pædobaptiſts and Antipædobaptiſts, it will be proper, in order to aſcertain wherein they differ on the ſubject of baptiſm, to give the ſentiments of each. Antipædobaptiſts conſider thoſe perſons as meet ſubjects of baptiſm, who are ſuppoſed to poſſeſs faith in Chriſt, and thoſe only. Pœdobaptiſts agree with them in this, that believers are proper ſubjects of baptiſm; but deny that ſuch only are proper ſubjects. They think, that, together with ſuch believing adults who have not yet been baptiſed, their infants have a right to baptiſm as well as their parents.

I have lately converſed with many Baptiſts, who knew ſo little of the ſentiment of their brethren, that they ſuppoſed adult baptiſm was entirely rejected by Pædobaptiſts; and when I endeavoured, from their confeſſions of faith, &c. to convince my Baptiſt friends

that they held adult baptiſm as well as themſelves, ſome believed and marvelled, but others remained in doubt.

THESIS III.

From this view of the ſentiments of each, it appears that both parties are agreed on the article of adult baptiſm, which muſt therefore be ſet aſide as a matter entirely out of diſpute; for it can anſwer no good purpoſe for one to prove what the other will not deny. Now, ſeeing they are ſo far of one mind, (I ſpeak of the ſubject, not of the mode) the difference between them concerns infants only; and the ſimple queſtion which remains to be decided, is this, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? On this queſtion the whole turns. The Pædobaptiſts affirm, and Antipædobaptiſts deny.

THESIS IV.

The ſimple queſtion being as I have now ſtated it, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? it will clearly follow, that all thoſe places which relate to believer's baptiſm, can prove nothing on the ſide of Baptiſts; and the reaſon is, they have no relation to the queſtion. To illuſtrate this, I aſk a Baptiſt, Is an infant a fit ſubject of baptiſm? No, ſays he. Wherefore? Becauſe the ſcriptures ſay, Repent and be baptiſed—If thou believeſt, thou mayeſt—I interpoſe, and ſay, Your anſwer is not in point. I aſked, Is an infant a fit ſubject of baptiſm? You anſwer by telling me that a penitent adult is ſuch. But as I aſked no queſtion concerning an adult, the anſwer is nothing at all to the purpoſe. If I ſhould aſk whether an infant were a creature of the rational kind, would it be a good anſwer, if any perſon ſhould ſay, that adults were of that deſcription? No anſwer can be good, if it do not directly relate to the queſtion propoſed; for then, properly ſpeaking, it is no anſwer to the queſtion. And therefore, If I aſk whether an infant is a proper ſubject of baptiſm, and another

ſhould bring twenty places to prove the propriety of baptiſing adults; as all this would be nothing to the queſtion, ſo nothing would be proved thereby, either for or againſt.

We may from hence eſtimate the neat ſtrength of each party, as they reſpect one another. The Pædobaptiſt has juſt ſo much ſtrength againſt a Baptiſt, as his arguments weigh on the affirmative, and no more; and the Baptiſt has no more ſtrength againſt him, but as his arguments weigh on the negative. Whatever arguments a Baptiſt may bring, to evince infant baptiſm to be wrong, whether they be many or few, good or bad, it is all his ſtrength; he has not a grain more on his ſide. For as it lies on neither of theſe to prove adult baptiſm (it being a thing profeſſed and uſed by both, and is therefore no ſubject of diſpute) thoſe arguments that prove it can have no place here. This being carefully obſerved, we ſhall ſee which of theſe has the faireſt pretenſion to truth.

THESIS V.

Whatever may, in reality, be the force of argument on either ſide, reſpecting this queſtion, there can be no doubt but that ſide is the true one, on which the arguments are found to preponderate. If the arguments for infant baptiſm are ſtronger than any that can be produced againſt it, then infant baptiſm muſt be right; and ſo the eaſy and ſure way of coming to a deciſion is, to collect the arguments on both ſides, try their validity, and compare them together. This, in the fear of God, I ſhall endeavour to do. Firſt, I will ſet down the arguments againſt infant baptiſm, and examine them as I proceed; and then thoſe which make for it; and after that, I will compare them together in oppoſite columns. By this proceſs, which is the faireſt I am acquainted with, we ſhall ſee whether Baptiſts or Pædobaptiſts have the truth on their ſide.

The whole import of theſe propoſitions is—That both parties agree about adult baptiſm—That when a Baptiſt has proved adult baptiſm, he has proved nothing againſt a Pædobaptiſt—That the only queſtion being this, Are infants fit ſubjects of baptiſm, or are they not? it is evident that thoſe paſſages of ſcripture, which prove adult baptiſm, will not anſwer this queſtion----And, that arguments for and againſt being compared, that ſide is the true one, on which they preponderate.

If any thing can make this matter plainer, and I wiſh it to be made plain, perhaps the introduction of a ſhort familiar dialogue may do it. We will therefore ſuppoſe a converſation between a Baptiſt and a Pædobaptiſt; the Baptiſt ſpeaking as follows:

Bap. I wonder very much you ſhould not agree with me in ſentiment, reſpecting the ſubjects of baptiſm.

Pædo. There is nothing in this to wonder at, ſince we all ſee but in part: it is our happineſs to believe to the ſaving of the ſoul.

Bap. That which makes me wonder is this, that the ſentiment I hold is ſo clearly revealed in ſcripture.

Pædo. What ſentiment is that you hold, and which you ſay is ſo clearly revealed in ſcripture?

Bap. I hold what is commonly called believers' baptiſm; or, that it is right to baptiſe a perſon profeſſing faith in Chriſt.

Pædo. If that be your ſentiment, I grant it is clearly revealed; but in this we are agreed, it is my ſentiment as well as yours.

Bap. But this is not the whole of my ſentiment. I meant to have ſaid, that it is wrong to baptiſe infants.

Pædo. Then you and I differ only about infants?

Bap. If you grant adult baptiſm to be right, it is only about infants we differ.

Pædo. I do grant it. And then do you mean to ſay, that it is clearly revealed in ſcripture, that it is wrong to baptiſe infants?

Bap. I do mean to ſay that.

Pædo. How do you prove it?

Bap. I prove it by Acts viii. 47. If thou believeſt with all thine heart, thou mayeſt.

Pædo. You have indeed proved believer's baptiſm to be right; but I aſked you how you proved infant baptiſm to be wrong?

Bap. Muſt not infant baptiſm be wrong, if believers' baptiſm be right?

Pædo. No more than believers' baptiſm muſt be wrong, if infant baptiſm be right. Would you think I had proved that infants would be loſt, by proving that believing adults would be ſaved?

Bap. Certainly I ſhould not.

Pædo. Why?

Bap. Becauſe the queſtion would be only about infants; and we cannot infer the loſs of an infant from the ſalvation of a believing adult.

Pædo. Very true. Then that which proves infant baptiſm wrong, muſt not be the ſame that proves adult baptiſm to be right.

Bap. I grant it, and think there is ſufficient proof againſt it beſide.

Pædo. This is the very point: You produce your proof againſt it, and I will produce mine for it. If your proof be found ſtronger againſt, than mine for, you have truth on your ſide; if not, the truth is on mine.

Bap. Nothing can be more fair, and I am willing to put it to the teſt.

CHAPTER I.

This chapter will contain arguments against infant baptism.—Of these, there are two only; for whatever may be urged, will fall under one or other of these.

ARGUMENT I.

A person who has a right to a positive institute must be expressly mentioned as having that right; but infants are not so mentioned, therefore they have not that right.

AS the whole force of this argument turns upon the words expreſs and explicit, which Baptiſt writers commonly uſe, the reader, in order to form a juſt opinion upon the ſubject, ſhould clearly underſtand their import. And ſince I ſhall often have occaſion to uſe them, the reader will meet with an explanation of the term *explicit* in another place. At preſent it will be ſufficient to ſay, that both theſe terms ſtand oppoſed to inference, analogy, and implication. And when the Baptiſts ſay there is no expreſs command for infant baptiſm, they mean there is no command "in ſo many words," as "thou ſhalt baptiſe infants," or ſomething equivalent. This being premiſed, I ſay of the argument, it is aſſuming----contracted----falſe. It is very aſſuming, becauſe it ſeems to dictate to the ever-bleſſed God in what manner he ought to ſpeak to his creatures. Since it is no where contained in his word, and he knows beſt how to communicate his mind to men, it little becomes ſuch creatures as we are, to lay down rules by which he ſhall proceed. To ſuch who thus aſſume, it may properly be ſaid, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counſellor? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: To whom be glory for ever. Amen."

It is very contracted, becauſe it ſuppoſes we cannot underſtand what God ſays, but when he ſpeaks to us in one particular way. Certain it is that the moſt important things are ſet forth in ſcripture, in many different ways; and we may come at the truth by an indirect, as certainly as by a direct expreſſion: *e. g.* "When the apoſtle ſays he was caught up into the third heaven, I certainly know, there is a firſt and a ſecond, though I no where had read expreſsly of any ſuch thing." But what is moſt material, I affirm that.

It is very falſe: Becauſe to wave other inſtances, and fix on one only, a ſubject is admitted to a poſitive inſtitute, and that admiſſion is according to truth, and ſo held and practiſed by all, who uſe Chriſtian rites; when yet there is no expreſs law or example to ſupport it, in all the word of God. It is the caſe of women to which I allude, and their admiſſion to the Lord's table.

I acknowledge it is right to admit them, and ſo do all, who uſe the Lord's Supper; but as to expreſs law or example, there is no ſuch thing in ſcripture. If it be ſaid, that women are fit ſubjects of baptiſm----that they are capable of religious advantages----that they have a right to church-membership, and therefore a right to the Lord's Supper, I grant it----And then the argument is falſe; for if women are admitted becauſe they are fit ſubjects of baptiſm, &c. they are admitted by ſomething, which is not expreſs law or example. But the argument I am oppoſing ſays, "A perſon who has a right to poſitive inſtitutes, muſt be expreſsly mentioned as having that right." Now, if women are not ſo mentioned with reſpect to the Supper, the practice of admitting them is wrong, or this argument is falſe. This argument indeed is falſe; the practice is by no means wrong. And to ſhow the fallacy of the Baptiſt ſyſtem at large, I will undertake, in the ſequel, to prove that, upon the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a woman, however qualified, can have no right whatever to the Lord's table.

There is no expreſs command or example for infant baptiſm! This being a favourite argument with Baptiſts, and the caſe of women, in this reſpect, being the ſame as that of infants, they will not ſuffer an inſtance, ſo fatal to their ſyſtem, to paſs by, without making an effort to overturn it. They know very well, I mean the thinking part, eſpecially thoſe who write, that they cannot maintain this argument againſt infants, without producing an explicit warrant for female communion. They therefore affirm, that the ſcriptures afford ſuch a warrant, and that it is found in 1 Cor. xi. 28. "Let a man [*Anthropos*] examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat of the bread, &c." It is certainly here, or no where. I have known many who took this for an expreſs word for women. I did ſo myſelf for ſome years, till Mr. Booth's attempt to prove it convinced me of the contrary.

An expreſs word, in the preſent caſe, muſt be one that ſpecifies the ſex; as Acts viii. 12. "they were baptiſed, both men and women." [*Andres kaigunaikes.*] But I aſk, is *Anthropos* an expreſs word for a woman? Mr. Booth affirms it is. Take it in his own words, vol. ii. p. 73. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding, Does not Paul, when he ſays, Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat, enjoin a reception of the ſacred Supper? Does not the term *Anthropos*, there uſed, often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, without regard to ſex? Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage? When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aner*." This is all about the word, except a quotation, which is not material.

The reader is deſired to obſerve, that, as Mr. B. has undertaken to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, he can derive no help from analogy, or *inference*, or any thing of that kind. The words he

brings for proof muſt contain their own unequivocal evidence, independent of every other conſideration. If this be not the caſe, his explicit warrant is a mere fiction.

Now for the explicit warrant. Mr. B. ſays, "Does not Paul, when he ſays, Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat, enjoin a reception of the ſacred Supper?" True. "Does not the term *Anthropos*, there uſed, often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, without regard to ſex?" True again. Obſerve this, OFTEN STAND! Not always. Does Mr. B. take this for an explicit warrant? What a demonſtration! And how full to the point! But Mr. B. ſays it ſtands ſo in the text. How does he know it? Why he has two evidences of this; a lexicographer, *i. e.* a dictionary-maker, and common ſenſe. Common ſenſe, he ſays, is the beſt of the two. However, I will take them together, and proceed to aſk, How do they know that the term *Anthropos* ſtands in this text as a name of our ſpecies? They muſt know it either from the word itſelf, or from ſome other ground. That they cannot know it from the word itſelf, is evident by this ſingle conſideration, that a boy, who reads his Greek teſtament, may meet with the word a hundred times, where the female ſex can by no means be intended; nay, he may find it uſed ſeveral times, though Mr. B. could not, to diſtinguiſh the male from the female. Where then is its explicitneſs? He ſays it is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies. And is not our Engliſh word *man*, uſed in the ſame way? Would Mr. B. take that to be an explicit word for a woman? If the word *man* be often uſed for a name of our ſpecies, as well as *Anthropos*, then one is juſt as explicit a word for a woman as the other; and ſo Mr. B. might as well have fixed on the Engliſh word for an explicit one, as the Greek. But had he done this, it would have ruined his book; and he has only eſcaped under the covert of a Greek term. If then, it cannot be known from the word itſelf, that females *are intended*, it matters not in what other way we

know it, the Baptiſt argument is entirely ruined and loſt.

But Mr. B. in the next ſentence, will urge the matter further, and boldly affirm, that, "When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aneer*." I know not what Mr. B. expected to prove by this aſſertion; for if it were true, I ſee not how it is to help him in reſpect to his explicit warrant; but as it is falſe, it cannot help him in any form, except it be to make him more cautious in future. This aſſertion, if it proceeded from ignorance, is, in a reader and writer like Mr. B. far too bad; if it did not proceed from ignorance, it is far worſe. I am willing to ſuppoſe the former, and acquit him of the latter.

Againſt this aſſertion of Mr. B. I will now place nineteen inſtances; in every one of which there is a diſtinction and oppoſition of the ſexes, and the word for a man is not *Aneer*, but *Anthropos*. Some of theſe are in the Septuagint, and others in the New Teſtament. Gen. ii. 24. "Therefore ſhall a man [*Anthropos*] leave his father and his mother, and ſhall cleave unto his wife." Gen. xxvi. 11. "And Abimelech charged all his people, ſaying, He that toucheth this man [*Anthropou*] or his wife, ſhall ſurely be put to death." Gen. xxxiv. 14. "And Simeon and Levi, the brethren of Dinah, ſaid, We cannot do this thing, to give our SISTER to one [*Anthropi*] that is uncircumciſed." Deut. xx. 7. "And what man [*Anthropos*] is there that hath betrothed a wife, and hath not taken her?" Deut. xvii. 5. "Then ſhalt thou bring forth that man, [*Anthropon*] or that WOMAN." Jer. xliv. 7. "Wherefore commit ye this great evil againſt your ſouls, to cut off from you man [*Anthropon*] and WOMAN, child and ſuckling?" For other inſtances in the Septuagint, ſee Gen. ii. 18. Lev. xix. 20. Num. xxv. 8. Deut. xxi. 15.—xxii. 30. Eſther iv. 11.

Matt. xix. 10. "His diſciples ſay unto him, If the caſe of the man [*Anthropou*] be ſo with his WIFE, it is

Pædo. How do you prove it?

Bap. I prove it by Acts viii. 47. If ... with all thine heart, thou mayeſt.

Pædo. You have indeed prov... to be right; but I aſked you ... baptiſm to be wrong?

Bap. Muſt not infant ba... ers' baptiſm be right?

Pædo. No more tha... wrong, if infant baptiſ... I had proved that in... that believing adults ...

Bap. Certainly I ...

Pædo. Why?

Bap. Becauſe ... faints; and we ... the ſalvation o...

Pædo. Ver... baptiſm wro... adult baptiſ...

Bap. I g... againſt it ...

Pædo. ... proof ag... your pro... you hav... mine.

Bap ... to put ...

... is admitted to ... is according to ... all, who uſe Ch... expreſs law or ex... the word of God. It is th... and their admiſſio...

... to admit them, and ... the Lord's Supper; but as to expre... there is no ſuch thing in ſcripture. ... that women are fit ſubjects of baptiſm-... capable of religious advantages----tha... a right to churchemberſhip, and there... the Lord's Supper, I grant it----And th... argument is falſe; for if women are admitted b... there are fit ſubjects of baptiſm, &c. they are ... put by ſomething, which is not expreſs law or ... ple. But the argument I am oppoſing ſays, "A ... law who has a right to poſitive inſtitutes, muſt ... purely mentioned as having that right." N... women are not ſo mentioned with reſpect to the ... pute the practice of admitting them is wrong, ... argument is falſe. This argument indeed is falſ... practice is by no means wrong. And to ſhow t... fact of the Baptiſt ſyſtem at large, I will unde... in the ſequel, to prove that, upon the principle ... profeſſing of the Baptiſts, a woman, however ... ſed, can have no right whatever to the Lord's ...

falls upon inferential proof, and ſets a lexicographer and common ſenſe to infer (for they could do no other) that ſo it muſt mean in the text. And laſtly, to make it ſtill worſe, he falls upon an evident falſehood; when he ſays, that, when the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *Anthropos*, but *Aneer*. This is all Mr. B. is pleaſed to give the reader, inſtead of an explicit warrant, preſumption, inference, and falſehood; and if either he, or any of his readers, can ſatisfy themſelves with ſuch an explicit warrant as this, they can neither of them be eſteemed very nice in this article.

But, to ſet Mr. B. and his explcit warrant in a clear point of light, the reader has only to contemplate thoſe two facts, which have juſt paſſed under his eye; namely, that *Anthropos* is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies, as Mr. B. affirms; and likewiſe that it is often uſed to diſtinguiſh one ſex from the other. Now with theſe two facts in view [*viz.* *Anthropos* is often uſed as a name of our ſpecies, and often it is not ſo uſed,] if a queſtion be ſtarted concerning its meaning in any text, let it be 1 Cor. xi. 28. the reader will ſee at once that it is no explicit word, becauſe he will ſtand in need of a third thing, to determine in what ſenſe it is uſed there; whereas, if the word were explicit, nothing elſe would be neceſſary to fix the ſenſe. Now as the facts weigh on both ſides, OFTEN againſt OFTEN, and as the reader wants a third thing to ſettle the import of the word in this text, I aſk, What is this third thing? Lexicographers and common ſenſe, ſays Mr B. Nay, no ambiguity, Sir, we are now talking of explicitneſs. Why did you not ſay, analogy and inference? Shocking! What give up the cauſe at once! But what, I ſay again, is this third thing? Is Mr. B. afraid of telling? I wiſh, however, he would write again, and ſay in plain terms what it is. Is it what you ſpeak of in the latter part of the defence, *viz.* 'that women have the ſame pre-requiſites as men, and that male and female are one in Chriſt?' Very good.—Proceed.—Therefore—I ſay, go on.

It is very contracted, becauſe it ſuppoſes we cannot underſtand what God ſays, but when he ſpeaks to us in one particular way. Certain it is that the moſt important things are ſet forth in ſcripture, in many different ways; and we may come at the truth by an indirect, as certainly as by a direct expreſſion: *e. g.* "When the apoſtle ſays he was caught up into the third heaven, I certainly know, there is a firſt and a ſecond, though I no where had read expreſsly of any ſuch thing." But what is moſt material, I affirm that.

It is very falſe: Becauſe (to wave other inſtances, and fix on one only) a ſubject is admitted to a poſitive inſtitute, and that admiſſion is according to truth, and ſo held and practiſed by all, who uſe Chriſtian rites; when yet there is no expreſs law or example to ſupport it, in all the word of God. It is the caſe of women to which I allude, and their admiſſion to the Lord's table.

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thing in the world more certain. What! Mr. B. h who has written ſo many hundred pages with a vie to expoſe it? Yes, that identical Mr. B. to the re proach of all conſiſtency, does, in that very work when ſad neceſſity compels, even deal in this ſame in ferential reaſoning. I will not evidence this now ſince I have promiſed to notice his whole defence o women in a more proper place.

All I am concerned to do in this place, is to ſhow that this argument of the Baptiſts is falſe. The argu ment is this: "A perſon who has a right to a poſitive inſtitute, muſt be expreſsly mentioned as having tha right; but infants are not ſo mentioned, &c." Tha the argument is falſe, appears from theſe facts:

I. The Scriptures do not countenance it. For as it is not proved by any part of the word of God, be ing neither ſet down in the words, nor yet in the ſenſe of holy writ, and therefore a fiction, invented by men to ſupport a particular opinion; ſo it ſtands directly againſt God's holy word. And this is evident from hence; that though women are expreſsly ſaid to have been baptiſed, they are never ſaid to have received the Lord's ſupper. The Scriptures, therefore, in plain oppoſition to this falſe argument, leave us to conclude their right to the Lord's ſupper from their baptiſm, together with other grounds. Thus it has no ſupport from Scripture.

II. The Baptiſts themſelves do not countenance it; for though they have written whole books on the ſtrength of it, they are compelled to deſert it, and do deſert it, the moment the ſubject is varied. For after they have vapoured ever ſo long, and ever ſo loud, about "no expreſs law---no explicit warrant for in fant baptiſm---infant baptiſm is no where mentioned in Scripture;" let any one put it upon them to prove the right of women to the ſupper, and I will anſwer for it he will hear no more of expreſs law on that head. He will find that all this hollow ſound which ſignifies nothing, will die away, and each will ſhift for himſelf the beſt way he can, and fly for aid to an-

alogy and inference. Women, say they, may be gracious---Women were baptised---Women did eat of the paschal lamb---Women are creatures of God, as well as men, and therefore---Therefore what? Why therefore they should receive the Lord's supper. What now is become of their express law? It is deserted, completely deserted; nor will they adopt it again till infant baptism is resumed. The Baptists, therefore, do not countenance it.

III. Mr. Booth himself does not countenance it; I mean, not always countenance it: For though he has demanded explicit proof for infant baptism, and has contended that if such proof cannot be adduced, the baptism of infants must be wrong, yet, when he comes to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, he is content: Nay, stop—I cannot say he is content—but he is compelled to fly to presuming—to implication—to analogy—to inference—to make out an explicit warrant! All this we engage to prove, and to make a proper use of in the sequel. And I cannot help observing, that if female communion cannot be supported on the principle of this argument, how idle a thing it is to forge a rule to operate against infants only.

Finally, as this argument militates against female communion, as well as infant baptism, they must either both be wrong, or the argument itself must be false. That the argument is false, is sufficiently evident, as it not only has no support from scripture, but lies directly against it; and from what I have observed, in many recent conversations, I do not suppose there is a single Baptist in the kingdom that will even dare to stick to it. For after they had urged this argument upon me, I have turned the question from infant baptism to female communion, and I do not recollect one, either minister or private person, but has, in little more than a quarter of an hour, entirely given up the argument. And if Mr. B. should think proper to take up his pen once more on this subject, I have not a doubt but I should be able to compel

even him, as well as many of his brethren, to relinquiſh it as a falſe argument; and I hope he will take up his pen once again, and vindicate his defence of female communion.

I have been the longer on this argument, becauſe as it is very frequently urged, ſo it contains preciſely one half of the Baptiſt ſtrength. This argument, therefore, being deſtroyed, juſt half their ſtrength is gone. And if any one ſhould be inclined to cry out, "There is no explicit example—there is no expreſs law for infant baptiſm, &c." any perſon has it in his power to quiet him almoſt in an inſtant, ſhould he only aſk him to produce his explicit law, &c. for female communion. Thus much for this bad argument; and I paſs to the other.

ARGUMENT II.

The Scriptures require faith and repentance as requiſite to baptism; but as infants cannot have these, they are not proper subjects of baptism. Infants, say the Baptists, cannot believe, cannot repent; and none should be baptised without faith, &c.

THE moſt expeditious way of deſtroying this argument, would be this. They ſay the ſcriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptiſm. I aſk, Of whom? The anſwer muſt be, Of adults; for the ſcriptures never require them of infants, in order to any thing. Then frame the argument thus:—The ſcriptures require faith and repentance of adults, in order to baptiſm. Now you ſee infants are gone, they have nothing to do with the argument; or if they muſt be brought in, the argument will run thus:—The ſcriptures require faith and repentance of adults, in order to baptiſm; but as infants cannot have theſe, they are unfit ſubjects of that ordinance. Now it is a *glaring ſophiſm;* with adults in one propoſition, and

infants in the other. Were I only to leave the argument thus, and ſay no more upon it, it would not be poſſible to ſave it from perdition; but ſince it is the only remaining half of the Baptiſt ſtrength, I will examine it more at large.

In order to judge of the real worth of an argument, I lay down this rule: "Every argument that will prove againſt an evident truth; or, which is the ſame thing, every argument which will ſupport a falſehood, is clearly a bad argument." This rule is ſelf-evident; for that muſt needs be falſe, which tends to prove a falſehood.

I will proceed by this rule, and attempt to ſhow, I. That this argument is entirely fallacious. II. Point out wherein its fallacy conſiſts.

I. Of the fallacy of this argument. The principle of it is, that infants are excluded from baptiſm, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of baptiſm which will not agree to infants. To ſee therefore the tendency of this argument, whether it will prove on the ſide of truth or error, I will try its operation on theſe four ſubjects.

1. On the circumciſion of infants. That infants were circumciſed, is a fact. That they were circumciſed by the expreſs command of God, is a proof of right. They were actually circumciſed, and it was right they ſhould be ſo. Therefore, that they were proper ſubjects of that inſtitute, is an evident truth. Now on this truth I mean to try the argument, to ſee if it will prove for or againſt it.

Circumciſion, as it was a ſolemn entering into the church of God, did fix an obligation on the circumciſed, to conform to the laws and ordinances of that church. Hence that ſpeech, Acts xv. 24. "Ye muſt be circumciſed, and keep the law:" which would have been juſt, if circumciſion had not been aboliſhed. The apoſtle ſays, Gal. v. 3. "Every man who is circumciſed, is a debtor to do the whole law." His meaning is, if circumciſion be in force, ſo muſt its

obligation too. And Rom. ii. 25. he ſays, "Circumciſion profiteth, if thou keep the law; but, if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumciſion is made uncircumciſion." The ſum of this is, he that was circumciſed became a debtor; if he kept the law to which he was bound, his circumciſion would profit; but if he violated it, his circumciſion became a nullity.

Now I aſk, Did it agree to an infant to become a debtor? Did it agree to an infant to break or keep the law? Mr. Booth ſhall anſwer both. To the firſt he ſays, vol. ii. page 151, "Infants are not capable of contracting either with God or man. That, to ſuppoſe any ſuch thing, inſults the underſtanding and feelings of mankind. For, as biſhop Sanderſon obſerves, In perſonal obligations no man is bound without his own conſent." To the other he anſwers, "The minds of mere infants are not capable of comparing their own conduct with the rule of duty: they have, properly ſpeaking, no conſcience at all." Infants therefore could not become debtors; they could not keep the law. Very well. Then it is clear there was ſomething ſaid of circumciſion, which did no more agree to infants, than if it had been ſaid, Repent, and be baptiſed.

In this reſpect, baptiſm and circumciſion are upon a level; for there is ſomething ſaid concerning both, which will by no means agree to infants. Infants, on the one hand, can neither believe nor repent; and theſe are connected with baptiſm; and, on the other hand, infants cannot become debtors, they cannot keep the law; and theſe are connected with circumciſion. And then if we ſay, as the Baptiſts do, that infants, ſince they cannot believe or repent, muſt not be baptiſed, becauſe faith and repentance are connected with baptiſm; we muſt ſay likewiſe, infants cannot become debtors, they cannot keep the law; and becauſe theſe are connected with circumciſion, they muſt not be circumciſed. And then it follows, that this argument, by proving againſt a known truth, ap*pears a fallacious* argument.

But it may be ſaid, circumciſion of infants was commanded of God, and was therefore certainly right. To this I anſwer, that that is the very principle on which I proceed, and it is that very thing which proves fatal to this argument; for the circumciſion of infants being an evident truth, and the argument before us proving againſt it, it is a plain demonſtration of its abſurdity and fallacy. Now if this argument be ſuch, that had it been uſed by a Jew in the land of Canaan, it would have proved againſt an ordinance of God, I would fain know, if its nature can in any meaſure be changed, merely on its being uſed by a Baptiſt, and in a different climate? I proceed to try it,

2. On the baptiſm of Jeſus Chriſt. The baptiſm of Chriſt is a known fact; and that he was a fit ſubject, is an acknowledged truth. It is likewiſe certain, that, as he was no ſinner, he could have no repentance; and ſince he needed no ſalvation from ſin, he could not have the faith of God's elect; that is, he could not have that faith which the ſcriptures require to baptiſm.

Now the tendency of this argument being to prove, that thoſe who cannot have faith and repentance are unfit ſubjects of baptiſm; and ſcripture informing us that our Lord Jeſus was baptiſed, who could have neither, the dilemma therefore will be this; either the baptiſm of Chriſt was wrong, or elſe this argument is falſe. It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe the firſt, that the baptiſm of Chriſt was wrong; we muſt therefore affirm the laſt, that this argument is falſe: becauſe that argument muſt be falſe, which proves againſt an evident truth.

Again, when it is ſaid in the argument, that the ſcriptures require faith and repentance, in order to baptiſm; I aſk, Do they require them of all, or of ſome only? If it is ſaid, they are required of all; then, as before noted, it proves againſt the baptiſm of Jeſus Chriſt. If it be ſaid, they require them of ſome only; then the argument has no force; for, in that caſe, it would run thus—Faith and repentance are

required only of ſome, in order to baptiſm: And now the conſequent will be, that ſome may be baptiſed without them. And nothing would remain then, but that it be determined, who ſhould be baptiſed without faith, and who with.

View it which way we will, the argument is miſerably bad. The Baptiſts, however, in this caſe, fly to its relief by ſaying, "that Jeſus Chriſt, on account of the dignity of his perſon, was exempted from this rule." How this will mend the matter, I ſee not; for now it is acknowledged to be a rule which will admit of exception. And then I have only to aſk, How many exceptions does it admit, and what are they? Neither would it be better to ſay, that Chriſt was baptiſed, to ſet an example. For then we ſhould have an example of one, who, being incapable of faith and repentance, was baptiſed without them. And in this view, his example will weigh in favour of infant baptiſm. I will try it again,

3. On the ſalvation of infants. That infants may be the ſubjects of ſalvation is univerſally admitted; that thoſe, who die in infancy, are actually glorified, is alſo granted; and yet there is ſomething ſaid concerning ſalvation, which will by no means agree to infants—"He that believeth ſhall be ſaved; he that believeth not ſhall be damned." &c.

What ſhall we ſay in this caſe? Why, the ſame as before. If infants muſt not be baptiſed, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of baptiſm, which does not agree to infants; then, by the ſame rule, infants muſt not be ſaved, becauſe ſomething is ſaid of ſalvation, which does not agree to infants. And then, the ſame conſequence again follows, that this argument, by proving againſt an acknowledged truth, proves itſelf to be fallacious.

And now, ſince it falls in with my preſent deſign, and may ſerve to relieve and inform the reader, I will preſent him with two ſpecimens of reaſoning on the ſame text; one of which concludes againſt infant

baptiſm, and the other for it. The reader may adopt that which pleaſes him beſt.

The firſt ſpecimen ſhall be that of Mr. B. vol. ii. page 309, where he adopts the remark of Mr. Chambers: "What they [the German Baptiſts] chiefly ſupported their great doctrine on, was thoſe words of our Saviour; 'He that believeth, and is baptiſed, ſhall be ſaved.' As none but adults are capable of believing, they argued, "that no others are capable of baptiſm." If theſe had gone one ſtep farther, their argument would have been loſt: *e. g.* As none but adults are capable of believing, none but adults are capable of being ſaved. This with the baptiſts is a favourite text; and they argue upon it from the order of the words. If, ſay they, faith goes before baptiſm; then infants muſt not be baptiſed, becauſe they have no faith.

The other is that of Dr. Walker, out of his Modeſt Plea, page 179. His words are theſe: "If none muſt be baptiſed but he that believes, becauſe believing is ſet firſt; then none muſt be ſaved but he that is baptiſed, becauſe baptiſing is ſet firſt. And then, what better argument can be made for infant baptiſm? They muſt be baptiſed if we will have them ſaved; becauſe they cannot be ſaved without being baptiſed; for baptiſing goes before ſaving. And yet from the ſame text, and by the ſame way of arguing, it may be proved, that no infants are ſaved, but thoſe that believe; becauſe believing is ſet before ſaving: And not only ſo, but whereas it is not ſaid, he that believeth not ſhall not be baptiſed; it is ſaid, he that believeth not ſhall be damned."

The difference between the reaſoning of theſe two, lies in this: The Baptiſts reaſon on a part of the text only, and the Doctor reaſoned on the whole. And to ſhow how miſerably fallacious the reaſoning of the Baptiſts is, I will lay down a plan of their logic on this text, which will produce more concluſions than there are principal words in that part of the verſe. The

place is, Mark xvi. 16. "He that believeth, and is baptiſed, ſhall be ſaved." Now as the Baptiſts reaſon from the order of the words, I will mark them with figures—believeth^{1}—baptiſed^{2}—ſaved^{3}.

The logic is as follows: Take the firſt and ſecond —believeth—baptiſed—and ſay with the Baptiſts—

1. None are to be baptiſed but ſuch as believe, becauſe believing muſt be before baptiſing.—"Believeth^{1}"—"baptiſed^{2}."

This will conclude againſt infant baptiſm.

Next take the firſt and third—believeth—ſaved—and ſay in the ſame way:

2. None are to be ſaved, but ſuch as believe, becauſe believing muſt be before ſaving.—"Believeth^{1}" —"ſaved^{3}"

This concludes againſt infant ſalvation.

Now take the ſecond and third—baptiſed—ſaved —and argue in the ſame manner:

3. None are to be ſaved, but ſuch as are baptiſed^{2}, becauſe baptiſing muſt go before ſaving. "Baptiſed^{2}" —"ſaved^{3}."

This will conclude on the ſide of infant baptiſm, they muſt be baptiſed, or they cannot be ſaved. As Dr. Walker reaſons.

Laſtly, take all three—believeth—baptiſed—ſaved —and ſay:

4. None are to be ſaved but ſuch as believe and are baptiſed, becauſe believing and baptiſing muſt be before ſaving.—"Believeth^{1}"—"baptiſed^{2}"—"ſaved^{3}."

This concludes againſt the ſalvation of believers in Jeſus Chriſt, if they have not been baptiſed. And ſo upon the principle of the Baptiſts, it concludes againſt the ſalvation of all Pædobaptiſts.

All theſe concluſions, ariſing from the ſame way of reaſoning, may ſerve as a ſpecimen to ſhow the falla-

cious mode of arguing againſt infant baptiſm, adopted by the Baptiſts.

Let it be tried once more,

4. On the temporal ſubſiſtence of infants. As the reader may perceive the drift of the reaſoning, on theſe inſtances, I will uſe but few words on the preſent one. Now that infants ſhould be ſupported, not only ſcripture, but nature itſelf teaches. And yet, if we form the Baptiſt argument, on a few places of Scripture, it may be proved, in oppoſition to nature and Scripture both, that infants ſhould actually be left to ſtarve.

We have nothing to do but mention the texts, and apply their reaſoning to them. Iſaiah i. 19. "If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land." 2 Theſſ. iii. 10. "If any would not work, neither ſhould he eat." Take the firſt, and ſay with the Baptiſt in another caſe: willingneſs and obedience are required of thoſe who are to eat the good of the land; but ſince infants can neither will nor obey, they muſt not eat the good of the land. In the ſame way let the other be taken: He that will not work, neither ſhall he eat; infants cannot will to work, then infants muſt not eat.

This argument, in whatever way it is viewed, proves againſt the truth. Is it a truth, that infants ſhould ſubſiſt? This argument proves againſt it. Is it a truth, that infants may be ſaved? This argument will prove the contrary. Was Chriſt rightly baptiſed? According to this argument it could not be. Were infants proper ſubjects of circumciſion? This argument will prove they were not. Then, if it invariably ſupport a falſehood, we are compelled to ſay it is a falſe argument.

II. I will point out wherein this fallacy conſiſts. As this argument, notwithſtanding it is falſe, is uſed by the Baptiſts in general, both learned and unlearned, I will attempt to lay open its fallacy; and thereby put thoſe perſons upon their guard, who may be in *danger of being* ſeduced by it. The judicious reader

may have obſerved, that I ſlightly hinted, at the outſet, wherein its fault conſiſted; but to make it yet more evident what that fault is, of which it is guilty, I will take the liberty of ſaying a few words more.

That particular rule, againſt which this argument offends, is this: "*Non debet plus esse in conclusione quam erat in premissis. Ratio manifestaest, quia conclusio educenda est ex premissis.*" That is, "There ſhould not be more in the concluſion than was in the premiſes. The reaſon is plain, becauſe the concluſion is to be drawn from the premiſes." We will try to make this plain, by examples both of true and falſe reaſoning.

1, In the Baptiſt way of reaſoning. When the Scriptures ſay, "Repent and be baptiſed;" and, "If thou believeſt thou mayeſt," &c. they addreſs only ſinful adults; and then, an argument formed upon them ſhould reach no farther than adults of the ſame deſcription. But the Baptiſts from their fallacious argument on theſe paſſages, by bringing infants into the concluſion, who, as they are not addreſſed, are not at all concerned in the premiſes. This will appear plain by three inſtances on the Baptiſt plan.

The Baptiſt argument runs thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith and repentance; therefore they are not to be baptiſed. Now as the Scriptures require faith and repentance only of adults, we muſt place that word in the argument, and then it will ſtand in this form: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of ADULTS in order to baptiſm; but INFANTS cannot have theſe: Therfore infants are not fit ſubjects of baptiſm. In the ſame way, we may form the two following inſtances, *viz.* The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to ſalvation; but infants cannot have theſe; Therfore infants cannot be ſaved. Again, He [an adult] who will not work, neither ſhould he eat; but *an infant* cannot will to work, therefore an infant *ſhould not eat.* The reader may perceive, that by

placing the word adults in one propoſition, and infants in the other, (which makes it a ſophiſm] there are three things proved in the ſame way, *viz.* That infants cannot be ſaved—that infants ſhould not eat—that infants ſhould not be baptiſed. And ſo, for the ſame reaſon, that an infant cannot be ſaved, that an infant ſhould not eat; it will follow, that an infant ſhould not be baptiſed. For all theſe are equally true, and ſupported by the ſame reaſoning. And it is in the ſame way, that this argument proves againſt the baptiſm of Chriſt, and the circumciſion of infants. We will now view theſe three inſtances,

2. In the Pædobaptiſt way of reaſoning. We will place the ſame word in each propoſition, thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to baptiſm; but ſome adults have no faith, no repentance; therefore ſome adults are not to be baptiſed. Again, The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to ſalvation; but ſome adults do not believe nor repent; therefore ſome adults will not be ſaved. Once more—He [an adult] who will not work, neither ſhould he eat; but ſome adult will not work; therefore ſome adult ſhould not eat. Now by placing the word adult in each propoſition, without which it would be a ſophiſtical argument, the reader may ſee, that as infants can have no place in either, there is nothing to forbid their ſupport, their ſalvation, or their baptiſm. They only prove, that an idle adult ſhould not be ſupported; that an impenitent adult will not be ſaved: and, that he has no right at all to baptiſm.

Once more—As I have nothing in view, ſo much as truth, I have a great deſire to make this matter plain to the meaneſt capacity. For if I am clearly underſtood in this part, my end, on the preſent argument, is attained; and what I have before advanced upon it will be, in a great meaſure, uſeleſs. The reader, therefore, is deſired to obſerve, that the deſign of this argument is to conclude againſt the baptiſm of infants. Then, as infants are to be in the concluſion,

they muſt alſo be in the premiſes; for the rule ſays, "there ſhould not be more in the concluſion than was in the premiſes; becauſe the concluſion is to be drawn from the premiſes."

Now to make the argument of the Baptiſts conſiſtent with itſelf, we muſt place infants in the premiſes as well as in the concluſion; and then the argument will ſtand thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of infants in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith, &c.; therefore infants are not to be baptiſed. The reader may diſcern an agreement, in in the parts of the argument, with each other; it has infants in each part, as well in the premiſes, as in the concluſion. But, then, the fallacy of it is more ſtrikingly evident than before: for the error, which before crept into the middle, does here ſtand in front; it is in this propoſition, the Scriptures require faith and repentance of inafnts in order to baptiſm, which is not true; for infants are never required to repent or believe, in order either to baptiſm or ſalvation. Whereas before, when it was ſaid the Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to baptiſm; but infants have not faith, &c. the error conſiſted in putting in the word 'infants,' who have no concern at all in the requirement.

By placing one thing in the premiſes, and another in the concluſion, which is done by the Baptiſts, in this argument, we may be able to evince any abſurdity, however glaring. This being the manner of the Baptiſt argument, nothing more is neceſſary to take off its force againſt infants, but to make the premiſes and concluſion to correſpond with each other. That is, while it continues to be a ſophiſm, it proves againſt infants; but it ceaſes to prove againſt them as ſoon as it is made a good argument. *e. g.* Faith and repentance are required of adults in order to baptiſm; but infants have not theſe; Therefore infants are not to be baptiſed. This is nothing more than a pure ſophiſm, and, as ſuch, it concludes againſt infants; but all its *force againſt* infants is ſet aſide by making it good,

thus: Faith and repentance are required in adults in order to baptiſm; but ſome adults have not faith and repentance: Therefore ſome adults are not to be baptiſed. The reader may ſee, that now it is a fair argument, all its force againſt infants is gone.

Having ſaid thus much on the fallacy of this argument, I ſhall only add one ſpecimen of its mode of operation; and that is a ſpecimen, in which it will conclude two contrary ways, on one place of Scripture, Rom. ii. 25. "For circumciſion verily profiteth, if thou keep the law, but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumciſion is made uncircumſion."

Now the Baptiſt argument, on the firſt member of this text, will operate thus: Circumciſion verily profiteth, if thou keep the law; but infants could not keep the law: Therefore their circumciſion muſt be unprofitable, that is, as no circumciſion, a mere nullity; and this reflects on the wiſdom of God. But if we form the ſame argument on the other member, it will be no nullity neither, for thus it will run: If thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumciſion is made uncircumciſion: But infants could not break the law; therefore their circumciſion could not be made uncircumciſion, *i. e.* a nullity. Such is this Baptiſt argument, that it will prove infant circumciſion to be ſomething or nothing, according to that part of the text on which it is formed; and it is therefore evidently no more than a ſophiſm.

I have endeavoured to make the reader ſee, not only that this argument is falſe, but wherein that fallacy conſiſts. That it is falſe, appears in this, that in every inſtance it oppoſes a known truth; it oppoſes the circumciſion of infants—the baptiſm of Jeſus Chriſt—the ſalvation of infants—and, their temporal ſubſiſtence. The nature of the fallacy is the placing of adults in the premiſes, and infants in the concluſion; which any perſon, who has the leaſt knowledge of the art of reaſoning, muſt ſee inſtantly to be repugnant to the laws of truth If the method I have taken to ſhow wherein the fault con-

ſiſts, ſhould not be familiar to any reader, it is poſſible he may not apprehend me; if ſo, I would adviſe him to read it repeatedly, and with ſerious attention; for I am not without hope, that even the moſt common capacity, with due attention, will clearly comprehend my meaning. On the other hand I have no doubt, but many will readily enter into the method, and ſee what a fallacious argument is made uſe of to ſupport an opinion, I am compelled to deſert.

Theſe two arguments being taken away, a Baptiſt has nothing left to place againſt infant baptiſm. I have not met with a ſingle perſon, who, when deſired to produce the ſtrongeſt arguments againſt infants, could advance any thing more than what is contained in theſe two. While I thought it right to oppoſe the baptiſm of infants, I made uſe of them againſt it; but when they appeared, as they really are, very erroneous and bad, I gave them up; and from that time have never been able to preach a baptiſing ſermon. I ſaw that the whole ſtrength of the Baptiſt was gone.

By the removal of theſe two arguments, thus much is gained; that whatever can be advanced, on the part of infants, will ſtand with undiminiſhed force. For it will now avail nothing to ſay, with the firſt argument, there is no expreſs law for infant baptiſm; nor will it be of any uſe to affirm, according to the ſecond, that infants have no faith, no repentance: Becauſe the arguments themſelves being fallacious, whatever may be urged from them, will be entirely devoid of force againſt infant baptiſm.

Having now finiſhed what I intended on the arguments, on one ſide, I proceed to thoſe on the other. I am well perſuaded, that the ſcriptures cannot favour both ſides; and had the arguments againſt infant baptiſm been good, I am convinced that nothing in the word of God would have given it any countenance. But ſince the truth muſt be either for or againſt the baptiſm of infants, and the arguments againſt being futile, it is certain the truth muſt lie on *the other ſide.*

CHAPTER II.

Containing arguments on the side of infant baptism.

INFANT baptism is to be proved, in the same way, as female communion. In the case of female communion, all the Baptists I have ever conversed with, on that subject, make use of inference and analogy; and, though in them it is ridiculous, they are not able to prove it any other way. And this method is even adopted by Mr. Booth, as I shall more plainly evince in another place; though glaringly inconsistent with his own principles.

As I am now to advance proof in favour of infant baptism, the simple method I mean to adopt will be the following. In the first place, it is a fact acknowledged by the Baptists themselves, that infants were at an early period constituted members of the church of God. In the next place, I shall produce proof, that they have a right to be so now; and that the constitution of God by which they were made members, has not been altered to this day. In the last place, I shall lay down this dilemma, which will conclude the whole business, namely: As infants by a divine and unaltered constitution have a right to be received as church members, they must be received either with baptism or without it. If they are not to be received without baptism, then the consequent is, that they must be baptised, because they must be received.—I now request the reader's attention to each of these in their order.

ARGUMENT I.

God has constituted in his church the membership of infants, and admitted them to it by a religious rite.

IN this argument it is proper to take notice of two parts.

I. The church-membership of infants.—A church is a society that ſtands in ſpecial relation to God, being inſtituted for religious purpoſes. When the perſons compoſing this ſociety appear openly in ſuch relation to God, it is called a viſible church; and of ſuch an one I now ſpeak. The relation, between God and this ſociety, is formed by God himſelf, by declaring he is, and will be their God. This declaration of God which conſtituted that relation, which indeed did exiſt from the beginning, had an equal regard to adults and infants; "I will be a God unto thee, and to thy ſeed after thee." And hence both young and old, who had been duly entered, were conſidered as children of the covenant and the kingdom, that is, of the church. The rite of circumciſion being performed, the circumciſed was preſented to the Lord; which is a mode of expreſſion to ſignify a public entering into church-fellowſhip.

The caſe as now ſtated, is, I ſuppoſe, commonly admitted. It is granted by Baptiſts, who are the moſt likely of any to deny it, that infants were members of the Jewiſh church. Mr. Booth grants it, vol. ii. 224. So does Mr. Keach, Gold refined, page 113. "That children were admitted members of the Jewiſh church is granted." And indeed it is not poſſible to deny this, without denying that adults themſelves were members, which would be the ſame as denying that God had a church in the world. Infants, therefore, were conſtituted by God himſelf, members of his own viſible church.

II. Infants, in order to viſible membership, were the ſubjects of a religious rite. That circumciſion was a religious rite, is as eaſily proved, as that baptiſm and the Lord's Supper are ſuch. Mr. Booth, in this caſe, is in a ſtrait betwixt two; he is not willing flatly to deny it, nor yet can he prevail on himſelf to acknowledge it. He is very tender upon the ſubject, as if he ſaw ſome formidable conſequence lurking beneath it. See what he ſays, vol. ii. 250. "Baptiſm is an appointment purely religious, and intended for

purpoſes entirely ſpiritual: But circumciſion, beſides the ſpiritual inſtruction ſuggeſted by it, was a ſign of carnal deſcent, a mark of national diſtinction, and a token of intereſt in thoſe temporal bleſſings that were promiſed to Abraham." Now can any living ſoul tell from whence Mr. B. had all this? Was it from the Koran, or Talmud? To ſhow he never took his notion from the Bible, I will ſet the Bible againſt him, and him againſt it.

Booth.	*Bible.*
It was a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings.	It was a token of the covenant between God and Abraham, to be a God to him and his ſeed.
It was a ſign of carnal deſcent.	It was a ſign of circumciſion, *i. e.* of the heart and ſpirit.
It was a mark of national diſtinction.	It was a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith.

Now compare Mr. B. with fact.

Booth.	*Fact.*
It was a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings.	Many had the intereſt without the token, and many had the token without the intereſt.
It was a mark of national diſtinction.	Many other nations had the ſame mark. So it was a diſtinction which did not diſtinguiſh.
It was a ſign of carnal deſcent.	All Abraham's male ſervants, and many proſelytes, were circumciſed. Either theſe were deſcended from Abraham, or Mr. B's ſign was, as one calls it, a ſign of a lie.

See what the love of hypotheſis can do! Could any man have given a poorer account of circumciſion than Mr. B. has done?

But was it not, after all, a truly religious inſtitute? Mr. B. is not willing to deny this altogether. He ſeems to grant, at leaſt by implication, that it was

half a religious rite. "Baptiſm," ſays he, "is an appointment purely religious, for purpoſes entirely ſpiritual." By his uſing the words *purely* and *entirely* as applied to baptiſm, and then comparing it to circumciſion, he ſeems to admit that circumciſion was partly a religious rite. All he will grant in plain terms, concerning the religious nature of this inſtitute, is, that it "ſuggeſted ſpiritual inſtruction;" which is not peculiar to any rite either Jewiſh or Chriſtian. I am ſorry to ſee a man, of Mr. B's. ability, triſle after this ſort. He certainly knew not what to make of it; he ſaw ſomething in its aſpect dreadfully formidable to his ſyſtem, and was afraid of its appearing, in that form, in which it is ſet forth in the word of God. Theſe ſtrokes in Mr. B's. book, and ſuch as theſe, which I intend to notice, convince me more than any thing I have ever read, of the fallacy of the Baptiſts ſcheme.

Leaving Mr. B's. diſtorted account of this ordinance, we will view it as repreſented in the word of God. To ſee, then, whether it is a religious rite, we have only to view it, in its various relations to religion; and circumciſion thus viewed will appear to have been of that deſcription, as truly as baptiſm or the Lord's Supper. Let it be conſidered in its inſti ution—in its application—in its obligation—and connexion with religious things.

1. In its inſtitution. In this view of it, it was a token of God's covenant made with Abraham, in which he promiſed to be a God unto him, and his ſeed after him. And then, as an appendage, he promiſed to give him and his ſeed the land of Canaan for his temporal ſubſiſtence. For earthly things are appendages to the covenant of grace, they are things added, as our Lord expreſſes it, to help a ſaint through this world.

2. We may view it farther, in its application, under the threefold notion of a token, a ſign, and a ſeal. As a token, it is a ratification of God's grant in covenant, to be a God to Abraham and his ſeed. As a *ſign, it denotes* the grace of God on the heart, where-

by it is enabled to love God, to worſhip him, and to have no confidence in the fleſh. Deut. xxx. 6. Rom. ii 28, 29. Phil. ii. 3. And therefore called a ſign of circumciſion, *i. e.* of the circumciſion of the heart. As a ſeal, it applies to the righteouſneſs of faith, *i. e.* the righteouſneſs of Chriſt, by which men are juſtified.

3. We may conſider it, in its connexion. And this is, with the Scriptures, Rom. iii. 2. "To them were committed the oracles of God." With the promiſes, [Rom. xv. 8.] "Now I ſay---that Jeſus Chriſt was a miniſter of the circumciſion for the truth of God, to confirm the promiſes made unto the fathers." With baptiſm, Col. ii. 11. 12. wherein theſe two are ſpoken of as ſtanding on a level with each other, as being each of them of the ſame religious kind.

If we view it in its obligation, we may obſerve, that as it was an entering into the viſible church of God, ſo it bound the perſon, who received it, to a conformity to all other inſtitutes, Gal. iii. 3. Without this conformity it profited nothing, for where this was wanting, it was deemed a nullity. That rite, therefore, which obliges to a conformity to religion, muſt be a religious rite.

When, therefore, we conſider this inſtitute, in its uſe and application, under all theſe views, there can be no doubt of its being a religious inſtitute; becauſe its whole uſe and application are ſo. And as nothing more can be ſaid to prove the religious nature of baptiſm and the Lord's Supper; a man might as well deny theſe to be religious ordinances, as the other. And hence it is, that Mr. B's. conduct is the more to be admired, who, notwithſtanding he muſt have ſeen all this in ſcripture, does, of his own head, (the word of God giving him no authority) transform it into a mere ſecular, political rite. And this is done to deſtroy all analogy between it and baptiſm, for fear that analogy ſhould prove the deſtruction of his ſcheme.

Mr. B. in his preface ſays, *non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis.* This is to intimate to the reader,

that a good cauſe does not need a bad defence. Now, if we are to form a judgment of the cauſe he has undertaken to ſupport, from the means he makes uſe of to ſupport it, we cannot ſuppoſe the cauſe he has taken in hand, is any other than a very bad one. I queſtion if the moſt carnal Jew, that ever ſat in the region of darkneſs and ſhadow of death, could have given a more frigid, degrading account of an inſtitution of God, than he has done. According to him, it was only a ſign of carnal deſcent—a mark of national diſtinction—a token of intereſt in temporal bleſſings—it had a political aſpect—it was performed with political views—and(not knowing very well what to do with it, he introduces a learned word, and ſays) it was adapted to an eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution. Thus he. But one thing he forgot—he has not given all this the ſanction of the ſacred text. Indeed, if it agree to any thing in the Bible, it agrees beſt of all to the circumciſion of thoſe poor Shechemites, who were firſt deceived, and then deſtroyed by the the ſons of Jacob. Gen. xxxiv.

Theſe two parts of the propoſition being evinced; namely, 1. The church-membership of infants; and, 2. their admiſſion to it, by a religious rite; the whole propoſition which I undertake to maintain, and to lay as a groundwork, from which to conclude the baptiſm of infants, is this; God has conſtituted in his church the membership of infants, and has admitted them to it by a religious rite. Before I paſs to the next argument, I will make a remark on each part.

I. From this fact, we learn ſo much of the mind of God, as to be able to conclude, that there is nothing, in a ſtate of infancy, incompatible with church-membership. The reaſon is evident; for had there been any thing unſuitable in ſuch a practice, God who is an infinitely wiſe judge of decency and fitneſs, would never have ordained it. This conduct of the infinitely wiſe God, and the practice of about two thouſand years, ſtand in direct repugnancy to the weak prejudice of Bapſtis; who, from the ſentiment they

have adopted, are led to ſuppoſe that there is nothing in nature more ridiculous, than the idea of infants being church members. This is one inſtance of human depravity; whereby the weakneſs of man ſets itſelf up againſt the wiſdom of God: And as this is the more to be admired in thoſe perſons, who in other reſpects are deſirous of ſubmitting to the whole will of God; ſo it ſerves to ſhow, what a very unhappy influence the admiſſion of an erroneous ſentiment may gain over the mind.

II. It appears from this part of the divine conduct, in plain oppoſition to the views of Baptiſts, that the ignorance, and want of faith, inſeparable from a ſtate of infancy, are no impediments to the adminſtration of a religious ordinance: And this truth ſhould be the more regarded by us as it ſtands ſupported by the high authority of God; and is as a thouſand arguments againſt all thoſe pleas which are drawn from the incapacity of infants. For while we ſee thoſe declared fit ſubjects of a religious ordinance who could know nothing of its nature or uſe; with what prudence or piety can any man preſume to affirm, that infants are incapable of ſuch an ordinance? But if any one ſhould take ſo much authority on himſelf, as to arbitrate againſt the wiſdom of God, he would do well to conſider, that God is true, and every man a liar, *i. e.* that judges differently.

ARGUMENT II.

The church-membership of infants was never set aside by God or man; but continues in force, under the sanction of God, to the present day.

THE force of this and the preceding argument, taken together, may be comprehended by any man of common reaſoning powers. Every one knows, that what was once done, and never undone, muſt of

courſe remain the ſame: and, that what was once granted, and never revoked, muſt needs continue as a grant. There can be no fallacy in all this. Theſe arguments, therefore being fairly maintained, will carry us forward to a dilemma; and that dilemma will bring us home to the concluſion.

In good theory, the proof of this argument ſhould not lie upon the Pædobaptiſt. For if I affirm, and prove, that God did ſettle a certain plan reſpecting church members, and another ſhould come and affirm that that plan was now altered, it ſhould lie on him to produce his proof that ſuch an alteration has taken place; and the reaſon is that whatever God has eſtabliſhed ſhould be ſuppoſed to continue, though we could bring no proof of its continuance, unleſs we are plainly told that he has ordered it otherwiſe. And then, ſince there is not a ſingle text in Scripture to prove that the church-memberſhip of infants is annulled, this argument ſhould remain in force without further proof. However, I will wave this privilege, which I might juſtly claim, and proceed to evince the argument I have laid down.

There was only one point of time, in which it is even ſuppoſed the church memberſhip of infants was ſet aſide; and that was, when the Gentiles were taken into a viſible church ſtate. In that period ſeveral inſtitutions did ceaſe and ſome new ones were ordained. Our only queſtion is, whether the church-memberſhip of infants did ceaſe at the ſame time. It is evident that the mere change or ceſſation of inſtitutes could work no change upon memberſhip, any more than a man's having his clothes changed can produce a change upon the man. All inſtitutes, whether typical or ratifying, that is, all inſtitutes of every kind, are to be conſidered, in reſpect to church members, as means of grace, and nouriſhments for faith, reſpecting Chriſt the mediator, and the unſearchable riches of Chriſt; and then a change taking place in theſe things, will, in itſelf, produce no more

alteration in the members of the church, than a change in a man's diet will deſtroy the identity of the man.

I am now to prove the church-membership of infants, which having been ordained of God, was never annulled, but carried forward into the Gentile church; and ſo conſequently is in force at the preſent time. And this I ſhall proceed to do,

From ſcripture views of God's diſpenſation towards the Gentiles.

Much light might be thrown upon this ſubject, by conſidering thoſe prophecies of the Old Teſtament, which relate to the calling in of the Gentiles. This Dr. Williams has done to great advantage: But my deſign being brevity, I ſhall confine myſelf to paſſages on that ſubject in the New Teſtament.

I. Matt. xxi. 43. "Therefore I ſay unto you the kingdom of God ſhall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof."

The plain meaning of this paſſage is, that as, in times paſt, the church of God, which is his kingdom, was limited to Judea; ſo, in future, he would have a church in the Gentile world. The taking the kingdom from the Jews, and giving it to the Gentiles, denotes,

1. The ceaſing of a regular church ſtate among the Jews. And this actually took place, by the deſtruction of ſome, and the diſperſion of others, who did not receive the Lord Jeſus Chriſt as ſent of God; while thoſe who did receive him, were at length removed from Judea, and by degrees loſt the name of Jew, in that of Chriſtian. Rom. xi. 12.

2. The ſetting up a regular church ſtate among the Gentiles. This, as the ceſſation of the church among the Jews, was gradually brought about. For the Gentiles who came over to Chriſt, joining themſelves to the Jewiſh church, became in time the larger part. So that by the increaſe of the Gentiles, and the breaking off of the worthleſs branches among the Jews, nothing remained but an entire Gentile church.

3. The ſameneſs of the church ſtate among the Gentiles, with that among the Jews. For taking away and giving cannot import a change in the thing taken and given; but a transfer, the paſſing of a thing from one to the other. The kingdom given to the Gentiles was the ſame that was taken from the Jews: for all that was taken from the Jews was given to the Gentiles. Now, if we would know what was to be the church ſtate among the Gentiles, we have only to learn what it had been among the Jews: for in both caſes the church ſtate was the ſame. And then, as it has before been proved, and admitted by the Baptiſts, that the church ſtate among the Jews conſiſted in the memberſhip of adults and infants, the church ſtate among the Gentiles muſt conſiſt of adults and infants too; becauſe the ſame that was taken from the Jews was given to the Gentiles. And ſo it appears from God's diſpenſation to the Gentiles, that the church-memberſhip of infants was not ſet aſide. —I will anticipate two objections in this place, which may be urged on each of the paſſages I ſhall alledge.

1. It may be ſaid, that in this way of viewing the ſubject, all the ordinances and rituals of the Jewiſh church muſt be adopted by the Gentile. To this I anſwer, that theſe things were not of the eſſence of a church ſtate; but only means of grace, and helps to faith for the time being. Neither were theſe taken and given, but annulled; they were not transferred, but aboliſhed. Rituals are to a church, as diet or ornaments are to a man; let the diet be changed, and the ornaments removed, the eſſence of the man will be ſtill the ſame. So the ſtate and eſſence of the church of God, before theſe rituals were ordained, and while they were in force, and after their abolition, was, and is, and muſt be, the ſame. This will be handled more fully in another place.

2. If any ſhould ſay, it does not appear that women in the Jewiſh church were admitted to an initiating rite; and if ſo, there is a difference between the preſent church and the Jewiſh; I obſerve in anſwer, that

this difference does not imply a removing or changing of any thing; but merely that of adding. That whereas the church ſtate among the Jews included males both adult and infant; ſo to the Gentile church, together with theſe, there is, by the expreſs order of God, the ſuperaddition of females.

I would obſerve further, that the addition of females ſeems to me to be very favourable to the argument I am upon; becauſe it is a new proviſion annexed to an old law. Now an alteration made in a law, gives an additional firmneſs to all thoſe parts which are not altered. And the reaſon is, it ſuppoſes that all the unaltered parts are perfectly agreeable to the legiſlator's mind. And ſo, when the Lord expreſsly took away the partition between Jew and Gentile, and male and female; and paſſed over infants without making the leaſt alteration in their caſe; he thereby gave a ſuperadded confirmation, that the church-memberſhip of infants, which had been before eſtabliſhed, was in every reſpect agreeable to his will.

II. Rom. xi. 23, 24, "And they alſo, if they abide not ſtill in unbelief, ſhall be grafted in again: for God is able to graft them in again. For if thou wert cut out of the olive-tree, which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature into a good olive-tree; how much more ſhall theſe which be the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive-tree?"

1. The olive-tree is to denote a viſible church ſtate. 2. The Jews are ſaid to be natural branches, becauſe they deſcended from Abraham, to whom the promiſe was made. "I will be a God unto thee and to thy ſeed." 3. The Gentiles were brought into the ſame church ſtate, from which the Jews were broken off. 4. The apoſtle ſuggeſteth, that the Jews will again be grafted into their own olive-tree. From whence, with a view to my purpoſe, I would notice,

1. The future ſtate of the Jews, who, he ſays, if they abide not in unbelief, ſhall be grafted in again. Grafting in again is the bringing of a perſon or thing into the ſame condition in which it was before. So

the grafting in again of the Jews, is putting them into the ſame church ſtate, in which they were before they were broken off. What was their church ſtate before they were broken off? I anſwer, as before proved, that it conſiſted of the memberſhip of adults and infants. Why then, if it before conſiſted of adults and infants, it will again conſiſt of the ſame: becauſe grafting in again is the placing of perſons ſo grafted, in their former ſtate. And that is in fact the ſame ſtate, in which they would have continued, if they had never been broken off. That is, if it had not been for their unbelief (for which they were cut off) they would have continued, both they and their infants, as members of the church of God. So when it ſhall pleaſe God to give them faith, they will be reinſtated, *i. e.* they and their infants will be members of the church of God again.

In compliance with this idea, I will juſt turn aſide to obſerve, that it is natural for one error to lead to another; and that this is not more evident in any, than it is in the Baptiſts. They grant that infants were members of the Jewiſh church; and this from them is a very conſiderable conceſſion. But a conceſſion like this, leads to a conſequence horribly alarming to their ſyſtem. For if infants were once members of the church of God: then it is evident, they were capable of ſuch memberſhip; and then the queſtion will be, When did they ceaſe to be members? and why are they not ſo now?

To remove this difficulty, the Baptiſts have recourſe to this expedient. For as they cannot ſhow from any place of ſcripture, that infants are expreſsly ſet aſide from church-memberſhip; they fall to degrading the Jewiſh church, its memberſhip and inſtitutions: And when they have done, there is hardly any church or inſtitution left. What was the Jewiſh church? Mr. Booth, vol. ii. 252. "It was an eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution." What was the memberſhip of it? Mr. B. page 251. "An obedient ſubject of their *civil government*, and a complete member of their

church ſtate, were the ſame thing." What was the church inſtitute? Mr. B. page 250, &c. "It was a ſign of carnal deſcent, a mark of national diſtinction; it had a political aſpect and was performed with political views." I wiſh I had a good caſuiſt at my elbow, to explain what kind of church this could be. For had I been Mr. B. I would, to ſave trouble, have fairly denied that it was any church at all. And to ſay the truth of him, he has fairly done all this.

Now, it is a deſperate cauſe, that leads a man to fall upon the very church of God. But this is done to ſhow that there is ſo great a difference between the church that now is, and that which once was (or rather never was) that though infants were members of the one, they have no right, no capacity, to be members of the other.

This is one ſhift to ward off the conſequence I have mentioned. But now we want another ſhift, to eſcape the conſequence that is yet to come. "And they, if they abide not ſtill in unbelief, ſhall be grafted in again." Grafting in again is the bringing of perſons or things into their former condition. Now, if the former Jewiſh church ſtate was all political, as Mr. B. will have it; then the conſequent will be, that when the Jews ſhall confeſs the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and believe with their heart, that God raiſed him from the dead, &c. and ſhall in conſequence be reingrafted into their own olive-tree; they will be all political again! A mere eccleſiaſtico-political conſtitution, wherein an obedient ſubject of civil government, and a complete member of a church, will be the ſame thing!—Well, when this ſhall take place, infant church membership may come about again.

But I return from this digreſſion to notice,

2. The preſent ſtate of the Gentiles. It appears from the text, that the church ſtate is the ſame to the Gentiles, as it had been to the Jews, and as it will be to the Jews, in ſome future period, when it ſhall pleaſe God to graft them in again. And the reaſon

of this is, becauſe each in their turn belong to the ſame olive-tree, *i. e.* the viſible church ſtate. And therefore, as infants made a part of the church before the Jews were cut off, and will again make a part, when they ſhall be reingrafted; they muſt likewiſe make a part among the Gentiles: becauſe the ſame olive-tree, *i. e.* church ſtate, muſt confer the ſame privilege on all who ſhall be in it.

This truth will receive additional confirmation, and the contrary error will be more evident, if we conſider, that ſince infants were once members among the Jews; and when their reingrafting ſhall take place, will be ſo again; ſo, if among the Gentiles they are deemed improper ſubjects of membership, and in conſequence of that, are univerſally rejected, two things will follow: 1. There will be, in the mean time, a very unhandſome ſchiſm in the eccleſiaſtical chain. For though infants were found members in the firſt ages of the church, and will be ſo in the laſt, there will be none to fill up the middle. And, 2. There will alſo be, in future time, a very unpleaſant diſcordancy. For when the Jews ſhall be grafted in again, they will adopt their old practice of receiving infants to membership; while the Gentiles, denying they have any ſuch right, will perſiſt in ſhutting them out; and all this, as ſome ſuppoſe, in the ſpiritual reign of Chriſt.

III. Rom. xi. 17. "And if ſome of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive-tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakeſt of the root and fatneſs of the olive-tree; boaſt not thyſelf againſt the branches."

1. The olive-tree, as before noted, is the viſible church ſtate. 2. The branches are members of the viſible church. 3. Some of theſe were broken off, and ſome remained. 4. The Gentiles who were called of God, were united to this remnant; for they were grafted in among them. From this view of the paſſage, I draw theſe three concluſions:

1. That there was no diſcontinuance of the ancient church ſtate; in its eſſence, it remained the ſame as it had always been. That this is a true concluſion appears from hence; the text informs us that ſome of the branches were broken off; and if only ſome, then not all; and that remnant, continuing in their former ſtate, conſtituted the ſtill exiſting church of God. And then it follows that as the church ſtate continued as before, the memberſhip of infants muſt likewiſe continue: becauſe the memberſhip of infants was a part of that church ſtate. And this is the reaſon, that no new regulation, reſpecting infants, was made, or was neceſſary to be made; for all, who knew what God had ordained reſpecting memberſhip, knew very well what to do with their infants, without any further information on that ſubject. This is the firſt concluſion, viz. that the ancient church ſtate was not diſſolved when the Gentiles were called in. And hence it follows,

2. That the bringing in of the Gentiles did not conſtitute a new church. This paſſage informs us, that when the Gentiles were called in, they became members of the church already conſtituted: "They were grafted in among them," and ſo became one body, one fold; that "with them they might partake of the root and fatneſs of the olive tree." The firſt Gentiles of whoſe calling we read, are ſaid to have been added to the church; but there was no church exiſting to which they could be added, but the ancient Jewiſh church, of which all the apoſtles and diſciples of our Lord were members. If the Gentiles, therefore, were added to the old church, or, as the text has it, were grafted in among them, and with them did partake of the root and fatneſs of the olive tree; then it is evident, that the ancient church continued to exiſt, and no new one was formed at the calling in of the Gentiles. And then I conclude,

3. That infants were in a ſtate of memberſhip, in that very church to which the Gentiles were joined. And this muſt certainly be true; becauſe they were

grafted into that church, of which infants are, by the Baptists themselves, granted to have been members. And then, it is plain that infants made a part of that church, called by some the gospel church, the pure church of primitive apostolic times. This conclusion must needs be admitted, unless any one will affirm, that the ancient church state was entirely dissolved; or else, that the Gentiles were not united to this ancient church. And to affirm either of these, will be to affirm against the word of God in general, and this text in particular. And herein the cause of the Baptists is ruined both ways; for if they maintain, that the old church was dissolved, and the Gentiles formed into a new one, their cause is ruined, by maintaining against the word of God. But if they grant that the Jewish church continued, and that the Gentiles were grafted in among them, which is the real truth; then their cause is ruined that way. For then, as infants were in church-fellowship, in what is called the primitive apostolic church, it follows, that those societies, who admit infants to fellowship, act agreeable to the apostolic pattern; and consequently all those societies, who refuse to admit them, are in an error.

IV. Eph. ii. 14. "For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us."

1. The terms [both and us] in this place, mean Jews and Gentiles. 2. A partition is that which separates one society or family from another. 3. It is said to have been broken down by Jesus Christ, who is called our peace, because he made peace by the blood of his cross. 4. The breaking down of a partition wall, brings the two societies, or families, into one. From this passage, the very same conclusions must be drawn as from the preceding:

1. That the Jewish church continued as before, and was not dissolved at the calling in of the Gentiles; and the reason is, the taking down of a partition implies no dissolution of any society.

2. That the Gentiles were not formed into a new church: becauſe the breaking down of a partition united them to the Jewiſh church, and "made both one."

3. The infants were in actual memberſhip, in that church to which the Gentiles were united; becauſe adults and infants being in fellowſhip among the Jews, the removal of the partition brought adults and infants into union with the Gentiles. And then, the point is clearly gained, namely, that infants hold the ſame place among the Gentiles, as they held before among the Jews.

I again affirm, that the point is evidently carried, unleſs one of theſe three things can be maintained: 1. That God excluded infants before the partition was taken down; or, 2. at the time it was taken down; or, 3. at ſome time after. For if one or other of theſe cannot be ſupported, then infants retain their right to church-memberſhip to this day. Can any one maintain the firſt; that God excluded infants before the partition wall was broken down?—Upon what period will he fix?—And by what ſcripture will he ſupport it?—Will any one affirm the third; that God excluded them after the partition was taken down?—I ſuppoſe not. For that would be granting that the Gentiles continued ſome time, *i. e.* till the excluſion took place in fellowſhip, in that church in which infants were members. And then, I might aſk again, in what time did the expulſion take place? And where is it recorded in the word of God?—But I ſuppoſe, that he who contends for ſuch an excluſion, will affirm the ſecond; that infants were excluded at the time the partition wall was broken down. If ſo, I aſk, who did exclude them? And how was it done? It could not be done by the mere taking down of the partition wall; for the taking down the partition unites thoſe who before were ſeparate, but does not exclude any.

But if they were excluded, it muſt be done either expreſsly or implicitly. The firſt is not true; for there is no expreſs excluſion of infants in all the ſcrip-

tures. And the ſecond will not do for a Baptiſt; for, as he will not admit implicit proof on the ſide of infants, ſo neither can he urge implicit proof againſt them. But let him take the advantage of implication; and ſay, that infants are excluded from church-membership, by all thoſe places which require faith and repentance, &c. in order to baptiſm. To this I reply, that theſe places of Scripture can no more exclude infants from membership, than they exclude them from glory. And the fallacy of all this has been already fully evinced, when the ſecond argument againſt infant baptiſm was conſidered; and to that part for his ſatisfaction, I refer the reader. If, then, they were not excluded before the partition was taken down, nor at the time, nor at any time ſince, they were not excluded at all. And then the conſequence will be, that infants, according to the will of God, are poſſeſſed of a right to church-fellowſhip under the preſent diſpenſation, and to the preſent day.

By theſe four paſſages, all relating to God's diſpenſation towards the Gentiles, it appears, that the church-membership of infants was left undiſturbed, and was carried forward into the Gentile church; where it continues ſtill the ſame as when firſt inſtituted. And the importance of this fact, in the preſent inquiry, is ſo very conſiderable, that whoever admits it, muſt be compelled to admit the right of infants to baptiſm, as a neceſſary conſequence. Now, that God did ordain their church-membership has already been evinced, and granted by Baptiſts; and that to the preſent day, it has never been anulled, is what I am engaged to prove. I will, therefore, in addition to theſe four ſcriptures, which of themſelves clearly prove the fact, bring forward a variety of evidence, which ſerve to corroborate this important truth.

1. There is in the New Teſtament no law whatever to ſet aſide the primitive right of infants to church-membership.

If a law could be found, in the New Teſtament, to repeal that which had been eſtabliſhed in the Old, I

grant freely, that all that has been ſaid on the four places of ſcripture, would ſignify nothing. But if no ſuch law exiſt, the reaſoning on the preceding paſſages will not only remain untouched, but will acquire a livelier force from that very fact. I need not prove to a Baptiſt, that the New Teſtament contains no law, by which infant memberſhip is prohibited; he readily grants it; but adds in reply, that there was no neceſſity that ſuch a law ſhould be framed. Let us examine the thought.

If indeed nothing had been done reſpecting infants, this anſwer would have been a good one; but when the church-memberſhip of infants is conſidered as an ancient eſtabliſhment, the anſwer is nothing to the purpoſe. For as the caſe in reality ſtood, the want of a law to ſet aſide infant memberſhip, left it in its original ſtate, to continue down to the end of time. And how could it be otherwiſe? For who in this world was to alter it? It came down to Gentile times, in all the force an eſtabliſhment can be ſuppoſed to have, or need to have, in order to its continuance. It had the precept of God—It had the partiality of parents—It had the practice of near two thouſand years. If ſuch an inſtitution as this needed no law to ſet it aſide, which is what the Baptiſts affirm: the true reaſon muſt be becauſe it was not the deſign of God it ſhould be ſet aſide. And what could have been a greater proof of the deſign of God to perpetuate it, than taking no meaſures to ſtop its progreſs? So that he, who grants that no ſuch law was made, does in effect admit, that it is now a ſtanding ordinance in the church of God, to receive infants to memberſhip. And then he muſt grant too, that they ſhould be baptized; becauſe there is no other way of receiving them.

But though a Baptiſt admits there is no expreſs law againſt their memberſhip and baptiſm; yet he affirms that the requirement of faith and repentance does of itſelf exclude infants. This is the purport of the Baptiſts' ſecond argument againſt infants, which I have proved to be a mere ſophiſm. For when faith

and repentance are required, in order either to baptiſm or ſalvation; a very eaſy diſtinction will make it plain, that infants are not excluded in either caſe. And this diſtinction is eaſy and obvious to every perſon.

1. It was a very eaſy one to a Jew. For while he knew that infants were received into the church by circumciſion, he likewiſe knew that every adult who was circumciſed, put himſelf under immediate obligation to confeſs his ſins, to bring his ſacrifice, and to conform to all the laws of that church. He was very ſenſible an infant could not do this; and yet he ſaw it right to circumciſe the infant. So when he heard of faith, and repentance, and confeſſion of ſin, reſpecting baptiſm, as a medium of entering into the church; he had nothing to do, but to uſe the ſame diſtinction, and all would be plain and eaſy as before.

2. The diſtinction is eaſy to a Pædobaptiſt. For he knows, that if the perſon be an adult, he muſt diſcover a diſpoſition ſuited to the nature and deſign of the ordinance; but he knows, at the ſame time, that this was never deſigned to affect an infant, and that it can be no bar to his baptiſm, or bleſſedneſs.

3. This diſtinction is eaſy to a Baptiſt. For notwithſtanding he is well perſuaded, that he who believeth not ſhall not be ſaved; yet he knows an infant may be ſaved, though an infant do not believe. All this to him is eaſy and natural, and nothing in the world more plain. If this be ſo eaſy a diſtinction, it may be aſked, why cannot a Baptiſt carry it to baptiſm, as well as to any thing elſe? I anſwer, he can if he pleaſe; for it ariſes from no defect of underſtanding that he does not do it;----but it is an unpleaſant thing to employ a diſtinction, ſo as to deſtroy one's own ſentiments.

In ſhort, it is only conſidering, that an infant is not an adult, and that an adult is not an infant, than which nothing can be more eaſy; and then the requirement of faith and repentance is no more a law *againſt the* membership and baptiſm of infants, than

it is againſt their ſalvation. All I meant here, was to affirm that there is no law, in the New Teſtament, to overrule the church-memberſhip of infants, and this is a corroborating evidence, that their memberſhip, which had been divinely inſtituted, continues the ſame down to the preſent time.

2. The Jews, at large, had no apprehenſion of the excluſion of infants; they neither oppoſe nor approve, which they doubtleſs would have done, if ſuch an excluſion had taken place.

This is a circumſtance which merits particular attention, and has no ſmall influence upon the preſent queſtion. For as every material alteration in old cuſtoms is apt to ſtir up ſome oppoſition; ſo, had ſuch a change as this been introduced, by which the infant offspring would have been put back from their former place in the church of God, it muſt have furniſhed occaſion to a variety of animadverſions: ſome, perhaps, might have been for it, while many would have oppoſed the new plan. That this would have happened, had ſuch a revolution taken place, will appear ſtill more certain, if we conſider the nature of ſuch a change, and the perſons who would have felt themſelves hurt by its introduction.

1. As to the change itſelf, it had a tendency to affect in a very ſenſible part. And this is a clear caſe, whether we conſider the tender age of the ſubjects—or their number—or the privilege to which they were admitted—or the length of time through which the practice had been carried—or laſtly, the divine authority which gave riſe to that practice. Here is a practice of two thouſand years ſtanding. The privilege was that of admitting infants to memberſhip in the church of God—theſe infants formed a number in Iſrael exceedingly great. And this practice did not take its riſe from ſome dark verbal or written tradition; but ſtood ſupported by the lively oracles of God. Such was the cuſtom which the Baptiſts ſuppoſe was anulled about this time.

2. On the other hand, if we take into conſideration the character of thoſe perſons among whom this cuſtom had prevailed, and among whom it is ſuppoſed to have ceaſed, we ſhall have ſufficient reaſon to think it impoſſible that a cuſtom of this nature ſhould be abrogated, and they not oppoſe a ſingle word. As to their character, it is certain, that, a few only excepted, they were, upon the whole, the deadly enemies of Chriſt and his doctrine. They were ſtrongly attached to the forms and ceremonies of religion. They would wrangle for a rite, quarrel for a faſt, and almoſt fight for a new moon. Every one knows what diſturbance they made in the church of God, about ſuch things as theſe.

Now is it poſſible, that ſuch a change could be brought about, and among ſuch a people, in a manner ſo ſtill and ſilent, that in all the New Teſtament we do not read, that they ever ſaid a word about it, for or againſt: No prieſt nor publican; no phariſee, lawyer, or libertine; neither pious nor profane; neither zealous, moderate, or lukewarm, in all the land of Iſrael, oppoſe a ſingle ſentence, or aſk a reaſon why. But ſince this muſt have been a change ſo remarkable; and they, among whom it is ſuppoſed to have happened, not the moſt modeſt; how came they to be ſo ſilent, ſo thy? What made them ſo paſſive, ſo peaceable, ſo complying? Nothing. They were neither complying, paſſive, nor peaceable, nor ſlow to ſpeak, nor ſlow to wrath, when any old forms were invaded; but they were very much ſo about the change in queſtion: And the true reaſon of it is, it never took place. There is another evidence, that the church-membership of infants was never anulled by God or man; and that is this:

3. Our Lord and his apoſtles take ſpecial notice of infants, and, inſtead of excluding them, they ſpeak of them as ſtill poſſeſſing a right to membership in the church of God.

The notice taken of infants, by our Lord and his apoſtles, I call ſpecial; becauſe it is not ſuch as God

takes of his creatures in a way of common providence; as the giving of food to a ſtranger, the ſatisfying the deſire of every living thing, or hearing the cry of a young raven when he calls upon him. Such notice as this, God takes of all his creatures. But that which I now mean relates to matters of another nature, religious matters, the things of the kingdom of God, and our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. The paſſages I ſhall bring are not intended to prove any new inſtitution reſpecting infants, for nothing of this kind took place; but as their church-membership had been long ſettled, I only mean to ſhow that our Lord ſpeaks of them under that idea, as the acknowledged members of the church of God. And hereby I mean to evince, that their membership, which had been long eſtabliſhed, was never annulled to the preſent day. To this end I alledge,

I. Luke ix. 47, 48. "And Jeſus took a child and ſet him by him, and [" when he had taken him in his arms," Mark ix. 36.] he ſaid unto them, Whoſoever ſhall receive this child, in my name, receiveth me: and whoſoever ſhall receive me, receiveth him that ſent me: For he that is leaſt among you all, the ſame ſhall be great." In this paſſage we have three things very obſervable:

1. The ſubject ſpoken of, a little child. There can be no doubt, but this was a child in regard of his age; as the circumſtance of our Lord's taking him in his arms, makes this certain beyond diſpute. And it is alſo evident, that what our Lord ſaid did not apply to this child alone, as though ſomething peculiar to himſelf led our Lord ſo to ſpeak; ſince he makes it a thing general and common to other children. The words of Mark are, "Whoſoever ſhall receive one of ſuch children in my name." He meant, therefore, that child in his arms, and other little children like him.

2. The action reſpecting this child. "Whoſoever ſhall receive this child in my name." To receive a perſon is to treat him ſuitably to his character, place, and ſtation. John i. 11. "He came unto his own, and

inform us that *tekna*, children, means poſterity! Certainly it does, and ſo means the youngeſt infants. The verb *tikto*, from which it comes, ſignifies, to bring forth, *i. e.* the offſpring. And are not infants of that number? But the Baptiſts will have it that *tekna*, children, in this place, means only adult poſterity. And, if ſo, the Jews to whom he ſpoke, unleſs they underſtood him in a way in which it was morally impoſſible they ſhould, would infallibly have underſtood him wrong. Certainly all men, when acting freely, will underſtand words in that way which is moſt familiar to them; and nothing could be more familiar to the Jews, than to underſtand ſuch a ſpeech as Peter's, to mean adults and infants. So that if the Jews, the awakened Jews, had apprehended the Apoſtle to mean only adults, when he ſaid, "To you and your children;" they muſt have had an underſtanding of ſuch a peculiar conſtruction, as to make that ſenſe of a word, which to them was totally unnatural and forced, to become familiar and eaſy.

We ſhould more certainly come at the truth, if, inſtead of idly criticiſing, we could fancy ourſelves Jews, and in the habit of circumciſing infants, and receiving them into the church. And then, could we imagine one of our own nation and religion, to addreſs us in the very language of Peter in this text, "The promiſe is to you and your children;" let us aſk ourſelves, as in the ſight of God, whether we could ever ſuppoſe him to mean adult poſterity only? Or if, inſtead of putting ourſelves in the ſituation of Jews, we ſhould ſuppoſe the Apoſtle to addreſs the members of the eſtabliſhment, in the ſame phraſeology, as he did the Jews, can any perſon doubt, whether they would underſtand him to mean adults and infants? It is certainly impoſſible. And why? Becauſe they have been for ages in the habit of receiving infants into the church. Juſt ſo it was with the Jews when the Apoſtle addreſſed them; and, therefore, they could no more have underſtood him,

as meaniug to exclude infants, than the members of the eſtabliſhment would by the uſe of the ſame phraſe.

I have been endeavouring to prove that both Peter, who ſpoke, and the Jews, who were his hearers, muſt have underſtood the promiſe in the text to mean adults and infants; becauſe ſuch a meaning would be to them the moſt natural and obvious, both from their own habit and practice, and from its exact reſemblance to that promiſe on which their practice was founded and by which their habit was formed. But ſince Mr. Booth and all the Baptiſts will have it to mean no ſuch thing, I ſhall only ſay, as Mr. B. does in his anſwer to Dr. Williams, page 274, "Then Dr. Samuel Johnſon might well ſay, though a man, accuſtomed to ſatisfy himſelf with the obvious and natural meaning of a ſentence, does not eaſily ſhake off his habit, yet a true-bred lawyer never contents himſelf with this ſenſe when there is another to be found. My opponent, ſays Mr. B. to Dr. W. ſeems to have imbibed the ſpirit of Dr. Johnſon's true-bred lawyer; for he cannot be at all content with the obvious and natural meaning, &c." *Mutato nomine*, &c. This is true of Mr. Booth.——I am to prove in the next place,

II. That this promiſe muſt comprehend adults and infants wherever it comes, let it come wherever it may.

The Apoſtle, in applying this promiſe, diſtinguiſhes thoſe to whom it is to apply into preſent and abſent. The firſt claſs were his hearers; the ſecond he deſcribes two ways—all that are afar off—as many as the Lord our God ſhall call. To each of theſe claſſes, viz. thoſe who were preſent, and thoſe who were abſent, he applies the promiſe in the text. To thoſe who were preſent, the promiſe is, to you and to your children:—to thoſe afar off, and the promiſe is to you and to your children;—to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call, the promiſe is to you and to your children. Let the promiſe come to what

perſons ſoever it may, it muſt come to them and to their children; becauſe the promiſe muſt be the ſame wherever God ſhall ſend it. I have already proved that the words [you and children] mean adults and infants; and both being in the promiſe, it muſt therefore belong to each: To you adults and to your infants, who are preſent; to you adults, who are afar off, and to your infants; to as many adults as the Lord our God ſhall call, and their infants. That this is true may be proved by conſidering the eſſence or nature of the promiſe.

There are two things which enter into the eſſence of a promiſe: It muſt contain ſome good—it muſt be made to ſome perſon or perſons. That theſe two belong to the eſſence of a promiſe appears by this, that if either be taken away, there can be no promiſe—*e. g.* I will be a God to thee and to thy ſeed; the good in this promiſe is God himſelf—the perſons were Abraham and his ſeed. If the good be taken away, it will then be no promiſe; I will—to thee and to thy ſeed. The caſe will be the ſame if the perſons are taken away; I will be a God—in either caſe it is no promiſe. So when a promiſe is made to different perſons, one perſon is as eſſential to the promiſe as the other—*e. g.* I will be a God unto thee and to thy ſeed; the promiſe is as much to the ſeed as to Abraham, and as much to Abraham as to the ſeed; becauſe both are eſſential to the promiſe.

Now the apoſtle, expreſſing the eſſence or nature of the promiſe in the text, as it reſpects the objects, ſays, "The promiſe is to you and to your children." Both parts, therefore, belong to the promiſe; it is eſſential to the promiſe that it be—to you;—it is likewiſe eſſential to it that it be to your children. And the caſe being ſo, we cannot take away either part without violating the eſſence of the promiſe. We have no more right to ſay, The promiſe is to you, but not to your children, than the promiſe is to your children, but not to you; for as it was the deſign of God that the promiſe ſhould be to both, it

was his deſign that it ſhould be to their children as truly as to themſelves. And ſo the promiſe muſt be to Peter's hearers and their children—to all that are afar off, and to their children—to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call, and to their children; and the reaſon is, both enter into the eſſence of the promiſe. So when God ſaid, "I will be a God unto thee and to thy ſeed," it would apply, in the ſame form, "to thee and to thy ſeed," to every man and every generation of men of the offspring of Abraham, as long as the promiſe was in force.

Mr. Booth objects to this, in vol. ii. p. 355, and ſays, "Theſe words [as many as the Lord our God ſhall call] are, as plainly as poſſible, a limiting clauſe and extend a reſtrictive force to the term, children, as much as to the pronoun, you or to that deſcriptive language, all that are afar off." To this I reply, that the apoſtle himſelf did not make uſe of that limit which Mr. B. ſays is ſo plain; for the apoſtle actually ſpoke to thoſe who, in Mr. B's ſenſe, were already awakened and called; and then, as plainly as poſſible, diſtinguiſhes between them and their children. Now if the apoſtle addreſſed thoſe who were already called, and extended the promiſe beyond them, even to their children, then the promiſe was not limited to the called. But this the apoſtle actually did, as plainly as words could expreſs it; for he ſpoke to thoſe who were pricked in their heart, and ſaid, "Men and brethern, what ſhall we do?" To theſe he ſaid, "The promiſe is unto you"—and, inſtead of confining it to them only, he extends it to their children alſo; and ſo paſſes over that limit which Mr. B. is pleaſed to lay down. And as the apoſtle extends the promiſe beyond the called, in the firſt clauſe, we muſt follow his example, and extend it beyond the called in the laſt clauſe—Thus the promiſe is to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call, and to their children: And then Mr. B's limiting clauſe will be nothing more than a very lame evaſion.

Notwithſtanding this, there is ſome truth in Mr. B's. idea reſpecting the limiting clauſe, though he himſelf, by miſapplication, has done violence to that truth. That clauſe, "to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call," is really a limiting clauſe, but not in that way Mr. B. ſuppoſes. This, like every other promiſe, has two limits, and theſe two are fixed by two limiting clauſes: One limit determinés how wide the promiſe ſhall extend; the other how far it is to run—the one is a limit of latitude, the other of longitude. The limit of latitude, extends to parents and children—that of longitude reaches down "to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call." And as there is a perfect harmony between theſe two, there is no need to deſtroy the one in order to preſerve the other; for both limits being ſettled and fixed, that of latitude, which extends to parents and children, muſt continue firm, till, through ſucceſſive ages, it comes down to that of longitude, which reaches to as many as the Lord our God ſhall call; that is, as long as God ſhall continue to call, the promiſe ſhall pertain to parents and children.

Mr. B. therefore, was very right in making this a limiting clauſe, for ſo it really is; but he was very wrong when, inſtead of preſerving both, he ſet one limit to deſtroy the other. And as it often falls out that thoſe, who do violence to the ſpirit of a text, are led to utter ſome raſh expreſſion againſt the letter of it, juſt ſo it has fallen out in Mr. B.'s caſe. He has violated one limit in the text, and has ſo expreſſed himſelf as to exceed all limits of truth. In vol. ii. p. 354, he has ſaid, "There is nothing ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting any beſides thoſe who were then awakened." Thoſe who were awakened, are diſtinguiſhed by the pronoun "you;" and it is certain ſomething is ſaid bout the promiſe reſpecting them. But, ſays Mr. B. "There is nothing ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting any beſides." Mr. B. ſhould not have ſaid this *with the text* before his eyes. He ſhould firſt have

eraſed that clauſe of it, "and to your children," and not have let it ſtand to ſtare him in the face, and convict him of falſehood. As ſomething was ſaid about the promiſe reſpecting thoſe who were awakened, and their children both, he might as well have denied it reſpecting the awakened, as to deny it reſpecting their children: But it is often the fate of thoſe who oppoſe truth, to loſe truth and modeſty together.

When any diſpute happens on a place of Scripture, and it cannot be ſettled from the context, the beſt way is to paſs to a ſimilar place, and obſerve (if there be any plain indications) in what manner that was underſtood, and what practice took place upon it. That paſſage, to which the text bears the ſtrongeſt reſemblance, is Geneſis xvii. 7. "I will eſtabliſh my covenant—to be a God unto thee and to thy ſeed. There is no place in Scripture ſo like the text as this; they are both worded in the ſame way—"to thee and to thy ſeed"—to you and to your children. They are both connected with a religious ordinance. By ſeed, which is the ſame as children, was meant an infant of eight days old and upwards: and becauſe a promiſe is made to the ſeed, an infant becomes the ſubject of a religious ordinance. Now, if the language of the text be ſimilar, and if it be connected with a religious ordinance, as that was, what better comment can be made upon it, than what that paſſage ſuggeſts? Why ſhould not the ideas be alike, if the language and circumſtances be ſo? The reaſon why a comparing of Scripture with Scripture aſſiſts the underſtanding, is this: When God uſes the ſame kind of language in two places of Scripture, and the circumſtances are alike, it is plain he means to be underſtood as intending ſimilar things. This is ſo ſure a rule of interpretation, that we are not afraid of venturing our everlaſting intereſts upon it: and, by adopting it in this inſtance, the reſult will be clear-

ly this: That the Holy Ghoſt, by the phraſe, "you and your children," meant adults and infants; that theſe are placed together in the ſame promiſe; and that the promiſe, thus made to adults and infants, is connected with baptiſm. And hence it may be proved,

III. That infants are placed in the ſame relation to baptiſm, as they were of old to circumciſion.

Let any one compare the two places together, *viz.* Gen. xvii. 7, 9, 10. and this now before us, and he will ſee that parents and children are united, in each promiſe, in the ſame way—there the promiſe is, "to thee and to thy ſeed"—here it is, "to you and to your children;"—that the promiſe, in each place, is connected with a religious ordinance: In Geneſis it is connected with circumciſion—in this text with baptiſm;—that, in both places, the ordinance is made to reſult from the promiſe—the one is ſet down as a reaſon for the other; Gen. xvii. 9. "Thou ſhalt keep my covenant therefore;" that is, becauſe God had given a promiſe. So here, "Repent, and let every one of you, of your's, be baptized, for (*gar*, becauſe) the promiſe is to you and to your children." Infants, therefore, in this paſſage, are placed in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they were anciently to circumciſion. This being ſo, I reaſon thus:

When a poſitive inſtitute is connected with a promiſe, all, who are contained in the promiſe, have a right to the inſtitute. I think any one may be compelled to grant this, as it is certainly an undeniable truth; for if parents muſt, therefore, be circumciſed becauſe they are included in the promiſe, then, as infants are alſo included in the promiſe, they too muſt be circumciſed. All this is evinced by the hiſtory of circumciſion, and is indeed a ſelf-evident caſe; becauſe if a promiſe give a right to an inſtitute, the inſtitute muſt belong to all who are intereſted in the promiſe. And, therefore, we may

reaſon thus: If parents muſt be baptiſed becauſe the promiſe belongs to them, then muſt their infants be baptiſed, becauſe the promiſe is to them alſo. This mode of reaſoning is the more certain, as it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the divine procedure; for if you aſk, Who were to be circumciſed? the reply is, Thoſe to whom the promiſe was made. If you inquire again, to whom was the promiſe made? we anſwer, To adults and infants. Again, if you aſk, Who are to be baptiſed? the anſwer is, Thoſe to whom the promiſe is made. But to whom is it made? The apoſtle ſays, "To you and to your children." Now what proof more direct can be made or deſired for infant baptiſm?

From theſe premiſes the reſult is plainly this: That as infants ſtand, in this text, in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they did to circumciſion, their right to the one muſt be the ſame as it was to the other. The caſe, in both inſtances, ſtands fairly thus: The promiſe connects itſelf with the ordinance; that with circumciſion—this with baptiſm. It alſo connects two parties together, infants and parents, and unites them both to that ordinance with which itſelf is connected. It is by virtue of the union of the promiſe with the ordinance, that thoſe who have an intereſt in the one have a right to the other; and when two parties, parents and children, are intereſted in the ſame promiſe, and that promiſe gives a right to the ordinance, it gives the ſame right to both the parties who are intereſted in it. And hence, as parents and children are intereſted in the promiſe, the right of the children to the ordinance is the ſame as that of parents.

I produce theſe three paſſages only to ſhow, that ſpecial notice is taken of infants, and that they are ſpoken of agreeable to the idea of their church-membership. In Luke ix. 47, 48. our Lord propoſes them for reception in his name, and thereby

owns them as visibly related to himself. He indicates that the reception was to be of the same kind as that which might be claimed by his own disciples; and that receiving them, as visibly related to himself, *i. e.* in his name, was showing a proper respect to him, and to his Father who sent him: "Whosoever shall receive this child in my name, receiveth me; and whosoever shall receive me, receiveth him that sent me," &c. In Mark x. 14. our Lord explicitly declares what was the ground of that reception, by expressing their visible relation to the church, and so to himself:—"Of such is the kingdom of God;" as such they were to be brought to him, and no one was to forbid them to come. In Acts ii. 38, 39. infants are placed in the same relation to baptism as they were before to circumcision. The apostle unites them with their parents in the promise, and connects that promise with baptism; thereby copying the divine pattern in Genesis xvii. and allotting them the same station, with respect to baptism, as they had before with regard to circumcision.

In each of these cases infants are spoken of agreeable to that constitution of God, by which they were admitted to church-membership, and to a religious ordinance. And this being all that my argument requires, I shall proceed to notice one thing more, *viz.*

IV. The historical account of the baptism of households, as recorded in the Scripture.

The instances of this kind are three: The family of Lydia, Acts xvi. 15; the family of the jailer, Acts xvi. 33; and that of Stephanus, 1 Cor. i. 16. The case of the jailer and his family is thus described: "And he took them the same hour of the night, and washed their stripes, and was baptised, he and all his, straight-way. And when he had brought them into his house, he set meat before

them, and rejoiced, believing in God, with all his houſe, *eegalliasato panoiki pepisteukos to Theeo.*" He rejoiced domeſtically, believing in God; *i. e. he*, believing in God, rejoiced over his family. Now, as the houſehold of the jailer is expreſſed by the phraſe, "all his, or all of his," it explains the term *Oikos*, houſehold, or family, which is uſed in the two other inſtances: So then, to baptiſe a man's houſehold is to baptiſe all his. This may ſerve as a pattern of primitive practice—he and all his were baptiſed. But whether all believed, or were capable of believing, is not ſaid, no mention being made of any one's faith but his own. And though I do not conſider this hiſtoric account as having force enough of itſelf to evince the baptiſm of infants, yet there are two conſiderations which give it weight on that ſide.

(1.) Its agreement with that practice, in which we are ſure infants were included: I mean the practice of Abraham, and the Jews, with reſpect to circumciſion. This agreement may be conſidered, 1. In the principle which led to the practice. Circumciſion was founded on this promiſe of God, "I will—be a God unto thee, and to thy ſeed." Baptiſm proceeds on this, that the promiſe is to you and to your children: And in this they are both alike. 2. In the practice itſelf. When Abraham received circumciſion, his houſehold were circumciſed with him: So the jailer, when he was baptiſed, all his were baptiſed likewiſe. Now, when we diſcern two caſes alike in principle and practice, and are ſure that infants were included in the one, we then very naturally are led to conclude, that infants muſt be intended in the other.

(2.) Its concordance with the hypotheſis of infant baptiſm. Such accounts as theſe, have a favourable aſpect on the ſentiments of Pædobaptiſts; becauſe on their plan, provided they were placed in

ſages of Scripture, which ſupport the ſentiment of both parties, that is, the propriety of baptiſing an adult profeſſing faith, &c. Theſe, and ſuch like ſcriptures, which for want of room I have not ſet down, prove as much on one ſide as on the other; and, therefore, I have ſaid they are common to both parties. My deſign in placing them at the head of the Scheme, is to detect an error incident to Baptiſts in general; namely, a ſuppoſition that ſuch texts prove only on their ſide, and againſt the ſentiment of Pædobaptiſts. I have obſerved this error, in every Baptiſt with whom I have converſed, both before and ſince my preſent ſentiments have been known. I once aſked a worthy Baptiſt miniſter, what he thought were the ſtrongeſt arguments againſt Pædobaptiſts? He immediately had recourſe to ſuch paſſages as are ſet down in the Scheme. I told him, that theſe were ſo far from being the ſtrongeſt, that they were no arguments at all againſt Pædobaptiſts; but rather proved on their ſide, in common with Baptiſts. My friend wondering at this, I obſerved, that Pædobaptiſts as well as Baptiſts held adult baptiſm; and as theſe paſſages only prove adult baptiſm, they prove nothing more than what is held by both. When I had made the matter ſufficiently plain, our converſation on this ſubject ended. He, however, called on me the next day, and ſaid, I am really ſurpriſed at what you ſaid yeſterday, and could hardly ſleep for thinking of it.

The error I am gaurding againſt, is that of claiming an excluſive right to thoſe Scriptures, which do not excluſively belong to them. It is by means of this common error, that the Baptiſt cauſe is maintained; for it gives it the appearance of ſtrength, when in reality it has none. Mr. Booth ſhall come forward as an example, ſince he is as deeply tinctured with this error as any of his brethren. In

vol. ii. p. 315, he ſays, "The Baptiſts have no need of ſubterfuge to evade the force of any argument formed upon it, [1 Cor. vii. 14.] is plain, I humbly conceive, from the preceding reflections. No, while they have both precept and example on their ſide," &c.—Both precept and example on their ſide! This looks very formidable indeed: But let us examine the phraſe. Pray, Mr. Booth, what do you mean by the Baptiſts' ſide? Do you mean adult baptiſm? If you mean this, it is only paſſing a deception upon the reader; for you muſt know that Pædobaptiſts have no diſpute with you upon that ſubject. You certainly know that they both hold and practiſe adult baptiſm as well as you, and that what you call your ſide is no more your's than it is their's. But do you mean the denial of infant baptiſm? This you ſhould mean, when you diſtinguiſh your ſide from their's; for herein it is, that you and Pædobaptiſts take different ſides, ſeeing they affirm, and you deny, that infants are fit ſubjects of baptiſm. If ſo, then you affirm that Baptiſts have both precept and example for the denial of infant baptiſm, which is indeed properly your ſide. No, Sir, very far from it; you have neither precept nor example, on your ſide, in all the word of God. You have nothing in the world on your ſide, as you are pleaſed to call it, but two poor ſophiſms, *i. e.* a pair of bad, very bad argments, which I have placed together in one column.

But the truth is, when you ſpeak in ſo lofty a tone of the Baptiſts' ſide, as having both precept and example, you only mean that adult baptiſm has theſe. Pray, Sir, do you and Pædobaptiſts take oppoſite ſides on the article of adult baptiſm? If not, why is it your ſide ſo peculiarly? You have ſaid in this quotation, that the Baptiſts have no need of ſubterfuge: Good Sir, what is a ſubterfuge? Is it an evaſion—a deception? Why do you call

that your ſide excluſively, which is no more your ſide than it is the ſide of the Pædobaptiſts? Was it becauſe your own real ſide [the denial of infant baptiſm] was weak? And did you wiſh by a dexterous ſhift, to make it paſs for ſtrong? Pray, Mr. B. is not this a ſubterfuge? It is very extraordinary that you ſhould fly to a ſubterfuge, and in that very place too, where you ſay the Baptiſts do not need any. And whereas moſt diſputants make uſe of ſubterfuges only when they actually need them, you muſt be a genius of a very peculiar caſt indeed, to make uſe of a ſubterfuge, when, as yourſelf ſay, there is in reality no need of any ſuch thing.

By this the reader may perceive how neceſſary it is to keep theſe things clear in his own mind, if he wiſhes to form a judgment on this ſubject according to truth; for though the Baptiſt ſide has in reality no ſtrength at all, yet it acquires the appearance of it from the miſrepreſentation which I have endeavoured to expoſe. I have, therefore, been the more deſirous of placing this matter in a fair light; becauſe, though frequently called to ſpeak on the ſubject, I was not for ſome years aware of the deception. Let the reader keep in view thoſe Scriptures at the top of the Scheme, which weigh equally on both ſides, while I paſs to the two columns, where the arguments of both are placed in oppoſition to each other; and by comparing theſe, we ſhall ſee which is the ſtronger, and, therefore, which is the true ſide of the queſtion.

2. If the reader will turn to the Scheme, he will ſee, on the left column, what is the neat ſtrength of the Baptiſt ſide, and what arguments they produce againſt the baptiſm of infants. I have there ſet down two arguments which are urged by Baptiſts: the one taken from a want of expreſs precept or example to baptiſe infants; the other from their want of capacity to believe and repent, &c. Theſe

two are the only arguments they can produce; and if they are not good, they have nothing good to urge. With reſpect to the firſt, that there is no expreſs command or example for baptiſing infants, the ſame is true reſpecting female communion; and ſo this argument, if it were good, would have a double effect; it would exclude infants from baptiſm, and females from the Lord's Supper. And then the Baptiſts would be right in refuſing to baptiſe infants; but, at the ſame time, they would be wrong in admitting females to the Lord's Supper; but, on the contrary, if women have a right to the Lord's table, though there be no expreſs law or example for their admiſſion, then the argument is good for nothing. I ſhall ſay more upon this, when I come to examine Mr. B.'s defence of female communion.

As to the other argument, I mean that taken from the incapacity of infants to believe and repent, it is nothing more than a ſophiſm. I have diſcovered its fallacy by applying it to different caſes; and in the ſame way that it proved againſt infant baptiſm, it would have proved againſt infant circumciſion—againſt the baptiſm of Chriſt—againſt the temporal ſubſiſtence of infants—and, laſtly, againſt their eternal ſalvation. I have likewiſe ſhown wherein its fallacy conſiſted, *viz.* in bringing more into the concluſion than was in the premiſes: All this the reader may obſerve by recurring to the place where it is examined. The conſequence is that the Baptiſts have nothing to place againſt infant baptiſm, but two unſound, ſophiſtical, deceitful arguments. This is the ſum total of the Baptiſt ſide; but if any Baptiſt think he is able either to maintain theſe two arguments, or to produce any thing better, I ſeriouſly invite him to the taſk.

3. On the oppoſite column I have placed the arguments for infant baptiſm. Their order is the moſt ſimple, and the whole conſiſts of three parts: 1. That God formed a church on earth, and conſtituted in-

ſants members of that church:—2. That the membership of infants, from that time to this, has never been ſet aſide by any order of God; conſequently it ſtill remains:—3. That as infants have a divine right to membership, they muſt be received as members, and as they muſt not be received without being baptiſed, they muſt be baptiſed in order to be received.

Theſe are the arguments in one column, which are to be compared with thoſe two on the Baptiſt ſide in the other; and by comparing them together, the reader may ſee on which ſide the evidence preponderates, and conſequently on which ſide the truth actually lies. There are three parts on the right column, which link into each other, and form a ſtrong chain of evidence, to be placed in oppoſition to two falſe ſophiſtical arguments, which conſtitute the whole force on the Baptiſt ſide, that is, there is ſomething to be placed againſt nothing—ſubſtantial evidence againſt a pair of ſophiſms: And this is to be done, that the reader may ſee which has the ſtronger ſide, and which the true. As far as concerns myſelf, I only ſay I have, after many ſupplications for the beſt teaching, examined, compared, and decided, and am well ſatisfied with the deciſion: The reader, if he be a man fearing God, will go and do likewiſe.—So much for the compariſon; a few words on the evidence, by itſelf, will finiſh this part of the buſineſs.

The nature of this proof, on the ſide of infants, is ſuch, that Baptiſts can only attack it in one part: *e. g.* If I affirm, as in the firſt part, that God did conſtitute infants members of his church, the Baptiſts grant they were once church members. If I affirm as in the third, that every one who has a right to be a church member, has a right to be baptiſed, they are compelled to grant that too. So there remains but one point on which a Baptiſt can form an attack, and that is the ſecond part, wherein I ſay, that the church-membership of infants having been once an inſtitution of God, it was never ſet aſide either by God immediately, or by any man acting under the authority of God. This

is the point then that deſides the queſtion. I will ſpend a few words in vindicating this turning point againſt the *argumentum ad hominem* made uſe of by Mr. Booth.

In ſupport of this I have argued from five topics: God's method of acting in bringing the Gentiles into a church ſtate;—there never was a law of God to ſet their memberſhip aſide:—the Jews, in Chriſt's time, had no apprehenſion of any ſuch thing;—Chriſt ſpoke of infants as actually belonging to the church, and his apoſtle placed them in the ſame relation to baptiſm as they had been in to circumciſion;—and St. Paul, in conformity to this ſcheme, baptiſed families, particularly the jailer and all his, ſtraightway. Each of theſe is already ſet forth, and evinced in its proper place.

But what do the Baptiſts place againſt this evidence? Mr. Booth, in anſwering Dr. Williams on this ſubject, does neither produce one ſcripture to prove that the church-memberſhip of infants, which he grants to have exiſted once, was ever ſet aſide; nor does he anſwer thoſe ſcriptures which the Doctor had alledged to evince the continuance of their memberſhip. What then does Mr. B. do? Whoever will be at the pains to read his books, will find his mode of reaſoning to be of this kind. He inſtances a variety of things belonging to the Jewiſh church, ſuch as its being national—its prieſthood—its tithes—its various purifications—its holy places, holy garments, &c. and then argues moſt erroneouſly, that as theſe things are done away, the memberſhip of infants muſt be done away too. This, I ſay, is the mode of his arguing, and indeed the only argument he brings, as may be ſeen by any one who reads his works with care. Now this reaſoning of his is guilty of a very egregious abſurdity, and a very material error in point of chronology.

I. A very egregious abſurdity. Mr. B. ſeems to conſider the various rites, &c. of the Jewiſh church

as to infants, only concludes againſt an infant prieſthood, which was not the thing he intended.

Prieſts, we ſaid, were ſervants to miniſter to the church in holy things; and if ſo, there is a wide difference between the prieſthood being changed, and the conſtitution of the viſible church (namely, the members who conſtitute it) being eſſentially altered. The ſame may be ſaid of all the inſtances mentioned by Mr. B.; theſe might all be changed or abrogated, and yet no eſſential alteration take place in the church, that is, in the members of it. I am very ſuſpicious that Mr. B. to make out a better concluſion, meant to paſs it upon the reader, that the apoſtle's expreſſion, "*the prieſthood being changed*," and *that* of his, "*the conſtitution of the viſible church being eſſentially altered*," were of the ſame import, and conveyed preciſely the ſame idea. If this was really his deſign, it is not much to his honour; it muſt proceed from a greater love to hypotheſis than to truth, or, as I rather think, it aroſe from that abſurd idea which he ſeems to entertain---that the prieſthood, rites, and ordinances, which were given to the church, were eſſentially the ſame with that church to which they were given. And it is on this abſurd principle that his oppoſition to the continuance of infant memberſhip is carried on: he turns the prieſthood into a church, and every inſtitute into an infant, and then contemplates the change of the one, and the removal of the other. In the change of prieſthood he ſees nothing but an eſſential change in the church, and fancies the removal of inſtitutes to be the removal of infants. And now he will adopt the principle of the ſacred writer:---The prieſthood is changed, therefore the church is eſſentially altered; this inſtitute is taken away, there goes an infant; that inſtitute is abrogated, there goes another infant; and now all the inſtitutes are gone, and now all the infants are gone; and then, ſays he, "no valid inference can be drawn from the memberſhip of infants under the former diſpenſation, to a

ſimilarity of external privilege under the new covenant."---We will now leave Mr. B. in poſſeſſion of his abſurdity, and take notice of,

II. A very material error in point of chronology. With reſpect to chronology, moſt perſons know, that from the time of Abraham to that of inſtituting the prieſthood, the Moſaic rites, &c. we may reckon about four hundred years. During this ſpace of time, the church, in which infants were members, was not national; it had no levitical prieſthood, there was no inſtitution of tithes, nor was the Moſaic code of rites yet formed. All we know of the church is, that its members conſiſted of adults and infants, who were initiated by the ſame rite; that ſacrifices were offered; and, it is probable, that the father of the family, or ſome reſpectable perſons, did officiate in their aſſemblies as a prieſt. Here is a congregational church, a ſimple worſhip, and ſome creditable officiating prieſt.

If we carry our views forward, we ſhall ſee that church, which at firſt was congregational, become a national church; the worſhip that was once ſimple, under the direction of the Moſaic code; and inſtead of a prieſt choſen by the pople, a regular prieſthood is ordained of God. Now, whether we view the congregational or national form, the ſimple or complex worſhip, the irregular or regular prieſthood, we ſee no alteration in the conſtitution of the church, much leſs an eſſential one, as it reſpected the members of which it was compoſed. If, therefore, the paſſing from congregational to national, from a ſimple to a complex worſhip, from an irregular to a regular prieſthood, produced no eſſential alteration in the church members, then ſhould all this be reverſed, ſhould there be a change from national to congregational, from a complex to a ſimple worſhip, from a regular to an irregular prieſthood? Every man in his ſenſes muſt ſee that this can no more alter the eſſence of the church, than the other did.

All this is plain enough to any man except Mr. B.; for, according to his mode of reaſoning, there muſt

any thing ſhort of precept, or precedent, recorded in Scripture, and relating to the very ordinance.

Queſtion 4. Can this right of females be proved from their church-membership?

Anſwer. Mr. B. ſays it cannot. Vol. i. p. 22. "Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Teſtament, that when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worſhip, he left either the ſubjects of it, or the mode of adminiſtration, to be inferred by the people, from the relation in which they ſtood to himſelf, or from general moral precepts, or from any branch of moral worſhip." In the anſwer to Dr. Williams, p. 441, Mr B. ſays, "But had our Author proved that infants are born members of the viſible church, it would not thence have been inferible, independent of a divine precept, or an apoſtolic example, that it is our duty to baptiſe them. For as baptiſm is as a poſitive inſtitute," &c.

Note. Mr. Booth ſays, we cannot infer the right of a ſubject to a poſitive ordinance from the relation he ſtands in to God, not even from church-membership; conſequently the membership of a female gives her no right to the Lord's table.

Queſtion 5. Can the right of females to the ſupper, be proved from their baptiſm?

Anſwer. No, ſays Mr. Booth. Vol. i. p. 22. "Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Teſtament, that when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worſhip, he left either the ſubjects of it, or the mode of adminiſtration, to be inferred by the people, from the relation in which they ſtood to himſelf, or from general moral precepts, nor yet from any *other well-known poſitive rite.*" Page 23. "We cannot with ſafety infer either the mode, or the ſubject of it, [a poſitive ordinance] from any thing ſhort of a precept or a precedent recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance." This is the burthen of Mr. B.'s ſong.

Note. Baptiſm is a well-known poſitive rite; and Mr. B. denies that the mode or ſubject of one rite could be inferred from another; conſequently baptiſm can infer no right to the Lord's ſupper: For, upon Mr. B.'s word, we cannot infer either mode or ſubject from any thing ſhort of precept or example relating to that very ordinance. Now, as the right of females to the Lord's table cannot, upon the principles of the Baptiſts, be proved from any of the preceding topics, there remains nothing to ſcreen them from that conſequence which I am now faſtening upon them, but ſome expreſs command or explicit example. I come in the laſt place, to inquire,

Queſtion, 6. Can the right of women to the Lord's table be proved from any expreſs law or example in holy Scripture?

Anſwer. Here Mr. B. affirms;—and I deny.

It will be neceſſary here to give the reader a complete view of Mr. B's. defence of female communion. This defence is very ſhort; but on his principles, it is the moſt curious, moſt diverting, moſt mean, that (I think) was ever offered to the public. It is in vol. ii. p. 73, 74. and is as follows:

"In regard of the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding: Does not Paul, when he ſays, Let a man examine himſelf, and ſo let him eat, enjoin a reception of the ſacred ſupper?—1. Does not the term *anthropos*, there uſed, often ſtand as a name of our ſpecies, without regard to ſex?—2. Have we not the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in this paſſage?—3. When the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthropos*, but *aneer*. This diſtinction is very ſtrongly marked in that celebrated ſaying of Thales: the Græcian ſage was

thankful to fortune that he was *anthropos*, one of the human ſpecies, and not a beaſt—that he was *aneer*, a man, and not a woman.—4. Beſides, when the apoſtle delivered to the church at Corinth what he had received of the Lord, did he not deliver a command—a command to the whole church, conſiſting of women as well as men? When he further ſays, We, being many, are one bread and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread; does he not ſpeak of women as well as of men?—5. Again, are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally as capable as men?—6. And are not male and female one in Chriſt?"—This is the whole of the defence, and I confeſs I have been often diverted in reading it; I thought it a curioſity, as it came from the pen of Mr. B. who is ſo great an enemy to all inference and analogy reſpecting poſitive inſtitutes.

The whole of this defence I have divided into ſix parts, and theſe, for the ſake of greater plainneſs, are diſtinguiſhed by ſtrokes and figures. Mr. B. in theſe ſix parts, aims at three diſtinct arguments: The firſt is taken from the word *anthropos*, man, which includes the three firſt parts; the ſecond is taken from Paul's addreſs to the church as a body, and takes in the fourth part; the third is from the condition and qualification of females, and comprehends the two laſt parts.

Since Mr. B. offers this defence to the public as proving an explicit warrant for female communion; we muſt, therefore, firſt of all, lay down the preciſe idea of the term explicit. Explicit denotes that which is direct, open and plain; and which immediately ſtrikes the mind without reaſoning upon it; *e. g.* Acts viii. 12. "They were baptiſed, both men and women." Here the reader inſtantly diſcerns both ſexes, without inferring from any other place. And hence the term explicit is oppoſed to impli-

cation, *i. e.* any thing included under a general word. And it is likewiſe oppoſed to inference, *i. e.* proof drawn from ſome other place. An explicit warrant, therefore, is ſuch as ſtrikes at once; and precludes the neceſſity of implication, reaſoning, or inferring from ſome other topic. Such a warrant Mr. B. inſiſts upon for infant baptiſm; and this brings him under the neceſſity of producing the ſame for female communion. Which if he be unable to do, all he has ſaid againſt infants will literally ſtand for nothing, and his books on that ſubject will be even worſe than waſte-paper.—Now for the explicit warrant for female communion.

1. We begin with the argument from the word *anthrōpos*, man, concerning which Mr. B. ſays three things to evince an explicit warrant. And firſt, Does not the term *anthrōpos*, man, often ſtands as a name of our ſpecies without regard to ſex? What a lame ſet out towards an explicit warrant! OFTEN ſtand as a name of our ſpecies! That's admirable on our ſide! This is what the learned call preſumptive evidence, and this is what Mr. B. produces towards an explicit warrant. Does he think preſumptive and explicit are the ſame? Whatever advantage Mr. B. may wiſh to take, yet I would not grant this, were I in his place, leſt ſome Pædobaptiſts ſhould take an advantage of it too. This preſumptive mode of arguing on a poſitive inſtitute will not do Mr. B. much credit; he muſt certainly put on a better appearance than this.

Well, then, in the ſecond place; "Have we not," ſays Mr. B. "the authority of lexicographers, and, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of common ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage?" 1 Cor. xi. 28. The authority of lexicographers! and common ſenſe! Here is help for the learned, and the unlearned, that both may be able, after conſultation had, to pick out an explicit warrant! For my own part, I do not much like the labour of turning over lexicographers at the beſt of times, and eſpecially for

an explicit warrant; *i. e.* a warrant that ſtrikes the mind at once. I rather think Mr. B. if he wiſhed people to labour for that which ſhould be had without any labour at all, ſhould have ſent his inquirers to commentator's as well as to lexicographers, to know how the apoſtle uſed the word in queſtion. But ſuppoſe we depend on the authority of theſe lexicographers, it may ſtill be proper to aſk, How it is they know in what manner the apoſtle uſed this word? Do they know by analogy, or by inferring from other premiſes? Ah! Mr. B.! I fear theſe gentry would betray you. And to give you your due, you do not ſeem to place much confidence in them; for you ſay, that the authority of common ſenſe is incomparably more.

Common ſenſe! Hardly one in five hundred is able to conſult a lexicographer, and therefore Mr. B. in order to make his explicit warrant explicit, furniſhes help to the unlearned. Well, common ſenſe, ſince it pleaſes Mr. B. though you do not underſtand Greek, to ſubmit to your determination, whether *anthrōpos* be an explicit word for a woman; and ſo, whether there be any explicit warrant for female communion; I will take the liberty of aſking a few queſtions. Do you know what Mr. B. means to prove from 1 Cor. xi. 28. Let a man, *anthrōpos*, examine himſelf, &c.? Yes, he means to prove an explicit warrant for female communion. Very well. What is an explicit warrant? It is that, the ſenſe of which you inſtantly perceive, without the neceſſity of reaſoning upon it, or inferring it from ſome other part. Can a warrant be deemed explicit, if it be not founded on explicit words? Certainly not; for the words conſtitute the warrant. If the word *anthrōpos*, man, be uſed ſometimes for a male infant of eight days old, John vii. 22, 23; and perhaps a hundred times in the New Teſtament for a male adult only; and nineteen times in the Septuagint and New Teſtament, to diſtinguiſh the male from the female, when both are named; would you, after all this, conſider it an explicit word for a wo-

man? No, it is impoſſible. Mr. B. ſays, he has your authority for underſtanding it as a name of our ſpecies, *i. e.* comprehending male and female, in this place; but if this word be not an explicit word for a woman, how do you know that women as well as men are included in it? I conclude it from this, that women as well as men were baptiſed; that they were received into the church; and therefore muſt be implied in this word.—So, ſo! You conclude it by analogy, implication and inference! Theſe are fine materials for an explicit warrant. *Cito in cellam abi*, and take your authority with you, leſt Mr. B. ſhould flog you in his next publication for talking ſo much like a Pædobaptiſt.

But if the authority of lexicographers and common ſenſe will not bring the buſineſs home, Mr. B. is determined to make uſe of his own authority. He has no other way of preſerving the credit of his book; and, therefore, he will even riſk his own reputation, rather than loſe his explicit warrant. He ventures in the third part to ſay, that, "when the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the word for a man is not *anthrōpos* but *aneer*." This is Mr. B's. own, and he himſelf is accountable for it. The aſſertion is made uſe of, to give a colour to his explicit warrant; and it was, no doubt, the neceſſity of his caſe that drove him to this. He had preſſed the Pædobaptiſts, through a great part of his 875 pages, to produce an explicit warrant for infant baptiſm; and having thereby forged a chain for himſelf, he is now entangled in his turn. It is ſufficient for me in this place to ſay, that this aſſertion of Mr. B. is utterly falſe. I have already preſented the reader with nineteen inſtances out of the Septuagint and New Teſtament, which lie directly againſt him. Mr. B. in order to paſs off this aſſertion of his with a better grace, has given us a quotation, though not at all to the point, from Diogenes, out of his Life of Thales. What I have to ſay reſpecting the quotation, is this, that had Diogenes, or any one elſe, affirmed the ſame as Mr. B. (which he has

not, nor Thales neither) I would have linked them together as two falſe witneſſes. And I ſay farther, it ſeems a marvellous thing, that Mr. B. ſhould be ſo well acquainted with Thales, and his biographer Diogenes; and at the ſame time ſo exceſſively ignorant of his own bible.

This is Mr. B.'s firſt argument to prove an explicit warrant; and the parts of which it is compoſed are three. It is ſaid, indeed, "a threefold cord is not eaſily broken." But Solomon did not mean ſuch a cord as Mr. B.'s his is what people commonly call a rope of ſand, which will by no means endure ſtretching. Here we have, in this part a preſumption to begin with; next, implication and inference; and laſtly, a broad falſehood to cloſe the whole. This is Mr. B's. method of making up an explicit warrant! And every one knows, that when preſumption takes the lead, it is no wonder if falſehood ſhould bring up the rear.

2. I come now to take notice of his ſecond argument, taken from Paul's addreſs to the church as a body; and which takes in the fourth part of his defence of female communion. His words are theſe: "Beſides, when the Apoſtle delivered to the church at Corinth what he had received of the Lord; did he not deliver a command—a command to the whole church, conſiſting of women as well as men?" When he further ſays, "We being many, are one bread and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread; does he not ſpeak of women as well as men?" This is Mr. B.'s way of producing an explicit warrant; did he not deliver a command to the whole church, conſiſting of women as well as men? and did he not ſpeak of women as well as men? It was Mr. B's. place to ſhow by *explicit* words, that he did ſpeak of women as well as men; but ſince he has only propoſed his queſtions, and has not himſelf affirmed any thing, he ſeems willing to throw the work of inferring off from himſelf upon the reader. Mr. B. is an artful diſputant; he knew that reaſoning by inference, which he

had ſo often exploded, would be highly unbecoming in him; and therefore to avoid that, he puts it into the form of a queſtion, as if he would ſay, I leave you my reader, to draw the inference.

If by the command in this argument Mr. B. means theſe words, "Let a man examine himſelf, &c," he had ſpoken upon it in his way before: and if it had contained any explicit warrant for female communion, it was certainly in his power to ſhow it: There could, therefore, be no neceſſity to produce it again, and eſpecially in the obſcure manner he has done. But if that be the command he intends, I defy him to ſhow one explicit word for female communion in any part of it. He has, indeed, in what he thought fit to advance upon it, ventured a preſumption, an inference, and a falſehood; of all which I have ſpoken ſufficiently already.

But I rather think he means ſome other command, becauſe he introduces it with the word, "beſides," as if intending ſome freſh matter. And if ſo, I know no more than the pen in my hand, what command it is he drives at. But be it what it may, he aſks, whether it was not to women as well as men? And I, on the other hand, declare I neither know what it was, nor to whom it was directed. It certainly was his duty to have ſpecified what the command was; and if it was a command to receive the Lord's ſupper, he ſhould then have proved that females were as explicitly named therein as males. Does Mr. B. think, that, after all he has ſaid about expreſs commands, he himſelf is to take any thing for granted; or to form a concluſion by a gueſs? It muſt be abſurd in a man like him, who, when he pretends to produce an explicit warrant, talks to his readers about ſome unknown command; and then, inſtead of ſpecifying what this command was, and ſhowing that women were expreſsly named therein; leaves him, in the beſt way he can, to conjecture the whole.

Mr. B. having expreſſed himſelf plainly on the firſt argument, did thereby lay himſelf open to detection and it became an eaſy buſineſs to expoſe him for his pre-preſumptive argument, his inference and his falſehood: but he has ſaved himſelf from that in his ſecond argument merely by the obſcurity of his language. Saved himſelf, did I ſay, by the obſcurity of his language? No, far from it. A man renders himſelf ſufficiently ridiculous, who comes full of his explicit warrant for female communion, and then ſays to his reader, Did not the Apoſtle deliver a command to women as well as to men? and did he not ſpeak to women as well as to men? When it was his buſineſs to ſhow that that he did, and to bring explicit words to prove it.

3. I advert laſtly to Mr. B.'s third argument, which is taken from the condition and qualifications of females; and comprehends the two laſt parts. Thus he expreſſes himſelf: "Again, are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper of which women are not equally capable as men?" And are not male and female one in Chriſt?—I have no reaſon to complain of the ambiguity of this argument any more than that of the firſt; it is ſufficiently plain, that even he that runs may read it. I ſhall, therefore, only briefly obſerve upon it, that

The mode of reaſoning, which Mr. B has openly adopted in this place, is that of analogy. The analogy lies between the male and the female, thus: That the one has the ſame pre-requiſites for the Lord's table as the other, and both the one and the other are in Jeſus Chriſt. From hence ariſes an inference: If both have the ſame relation to Chriſt, and the ſame pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, then the female muſt, by juſt conſequence, have the ſame right to the holy ſupper as the male.

Well ſaid, Mr. B.! This is ſo neat, that I could almoſt find in my heart to forget that explicit warrant which you had ſpoken of ſome time ago. Now you *talk like* a logical man—and a generous man too;

for your laſt is better by far than your firſt. It muſt be much better to be thus open, than to hazard your reputation by any thing forced, or any thing falſe. You ſee what a good thing it is to have analogy and inference ready at hand, and how admirably adapted they are to help at a dead lift. We ſhould not deſpiſe any help, as we know not how ſoon we may need it; and, to give you your due, you have been neither too proud nor too ſtubborn to make uſe of this. You may be the more eaſily excuſed for what you have ſaid againſt analogy and inference, for as you are a Baptiſt, what you have ſaid was a matter of conſiſtency; but now you are become a patron of female communion, the caſe is altered, and you are altered with it. But, at the ſame time, this is no more than what all the Baptiſts, with whom I have converſed on the ſubject, have done; and if it will be any comfort to you in this caſe, I can tell you, with great certainty, that I have met with many of your fraternity who have been as great changelings in this buſineſs as yourſelf. At preſent I only blame you for this, that, under the colour of explicit proof, you ſhould introduce, and endeavour to paſs off, nothing better, but ſomething far worſe, than inferential reaſoning.

I would juſt remark on what Mr. B. has advanced in ſupport of explicit warrant, that the defence he has ſet up carries in it its own conviction. I mean with reſpect to the number of particulars—the manner in which they are propoſed, and the matter of which they conſiſt.

Now it is the nature of an explicit warrant to ſhow itſelf inſtantly to the mind of the reader; and its own evidence is the ſtrongeſt it can have: The conſequence is, that he who really produces one, neither can, nor does he need, to ſtrengthen it by any reaſons he can advance; *e. g.* Were I called upon to produce an explicit warrant for female baptiſm, I would only alledge thoſe words in Acts viii. 12. "They were baptiſed both men and women." Theſe words ſtrike the mind at once, and no reaſoning whatever can add

any thing to their ſtrength or evidence; but Mr. B. by introducing ſix particulars, ſhows plainly that neither of them is explicit, and that it is not in his power to produce any explicit warrant at all: For had any one of theſe been explicit for female communion, he might very well have thrown away all the reſt.

In this view there is another thing remarkable in his defence, and that is, that every ſentence but one runs in the form of a queſtion to the reader. Inſtead of advancing his explicit proof, Mr. B. comes to the reader *in forma pauperis*, with his petition in his mouth, as if he would ſay, O generous reader, grant me what I aſk, or—my cauſe is ruined! I have been driving againſt infant baptiſm with all my might, crying out, No explicit warrant, no explicit warrant for infant baptiſm in all the word of God! And now, as I am called upon myſelf to give an explicit warrant for female communion, I beſeech thee, indulgent reader, to admit my preſumption, falſehood, implication, inference and analogy, for explicit proof, and thus in pity ſave my ſinking reputation: And your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever——. I ſaid that every ſentence in this defence but one was put in the form of a queſtion. Now what is ſtill more remarkable is this, that that one ſentence, which is the only affirmative in the whole defence, ſhould be the very falſehood againſt which I have already produced nineteen inſtances.

If we paſs from the number of parts which are contained in this defence, and the manner in which they are preſented to the reader, and come to the matter of it, we may ſay of that, that there is not a ſingle article in it, but what is either falſe, or preſumptive, or inference, or analogy, or implication. Every part is reducible to one or other of theſe; and there is not one explicit word for female communion throughout the whole. Such a defence as this would not have done very well in the hands of a Pædobaptiſt; but when adopted by a Baptiſt, it is ridiculous in himſelf, and an inſufferable abuſe of, and a bur-

leſque upon, his reader. In ſhort, there is no explicit warrant to be had.

Now to the point. I was to prove that, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a woman, however qualified, can have no right at all to the Lord's ſupper. We have ſeen, on the one hand, that it is not poſſible to produce an explicit warrant for female communion, and, on the other, Mr. B. affirms that they ſhould not be admitted without one; the reſult, therefore, is, that, according to Mr. B.'s mode of reaſoning, no woman has any right at all to communicate at the Lord's table: And as Mr. B. agrees with Baptiſts in general in this point, the ſame is true of the principles and reaſonings of them all.—This is the firſt conſequence which I undertook to make good among the Baptiſts, and from which they have only two ways of clearing themſelves. They muſt either give up their mode of reaſoning againſt infants, or, if they do not chooſe this, they muſt produce the ſame expreſs proof for female communion as they require for infant baptiſm.

As Mr. B. has plainly aſſerted that there can be no argument for female communion but ſuch as is founded on poſitive precept or example, recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance, it lies upon him to come forward and produce his warrant, or give up female communion. If I were to anſwer his book, I would turn the inquiry from infant baptiſm to female communion, and then put it upon him to make good his concluſion for the right of females upon the very ſame principles which he employs againſt infants. And I do now in good earneſt put this upon him, and heartily invite him to the taſk, being verily perſuaded that if this ſubject were thoroughly ſifted, it would be the ſpeedieſt method of adjuſting the debate.

When I had compared what Mr. B. has ſaid againſt infants with what he has ſaid in defence of women, I have been ready to ſuſpect that he deſigned his book ſhould operate on the Pædobaptiſt ſide;

for, when ſpeaking againſt infant baptiſm, he carries his demand of expreſs, unequivocal, and explicit proof ſo high, and enlarges upon it ſo much, as if, by making it exceedingly remarkable, he wiſhed ſome one to compare the whole with his defence of female communion, and perceived that the moment this was done, the cauſe of the Baptiſts would fall. And had Mr. B. been a perſon whoſe character for integrity was not known, it would have been a matter of ſome difficulty with me to determine whether he did not deſign, in a covert way to run down the Baptiſts ſide: But knowing him to be a man of good reputation, I readily acquit him of this; yet I think, at the ſame time, that his book, though written on the Baptiſt ſide, will do more towards overturning the Baptiſt ſentiment than any one that has been written for many centuries.

Thus much for the firſt conſequence, viz. that, according to the reaſonings of the Baptiſts, no woman has any more right to the Lord's ſupper than an infant has to baptiſm. But they, not liking this conſequence, are induced to ſet up a defence of female communion on the ground of expreſs warrant; and in doing this, they prevaricate, diſcard their own principle, reaſon by analogy and inference, and fall into ſelf-contradiction: This is the ſecond conſequence I have before mentioned, and which I will now plainly evince.

Mr. Booth, in vol. ii. p. 509, expreſſes his ſurpriſe at the inconſiſtency of Pædobaptiſts with each other. "But is it not," ſays he, "I appeal to the reader, is it not a very ſingular phenomenon in the religious world, that ſo many denominations of proteſtants ſhould all agree in one general concluſion, and yet differ to ſuch an extreme about the premiſes whence it ſhould be inferred?" To this I only ſay, if it be a very ſingular phenomenon for a number of perſons to be inconſiſtent with each other, it muſt be a more ſingular one ſtill for one man to differ from himſelf. We will take a view of Mr. B. in a double capacity----as

a patron of female communion, and as an oppoſer of infant baptiſm.

Mr. B.'s defence of female communion does not take up one clear page; the falſehood, and the quotation made uſe of to ſet it off, make up more than one third of the defence; ſo there are only nineteen lines remaining: I will, therefore, ſelect ſome paſſages from his oppoſition to infant baptiſm, and place them againſt what he has advanced, in theſe nineteen lines, in defence of female communion. I do this to ſhow that a Baptiſt cannot maintain that ground on which he oppoſes infant baptiſm---that he is compelled to deſert his own principle, and does actually prevaricate, and contradict himſelf; from which, as well as from other topics, it will appear, that the cauſe of the Baptiſts is a loſt cauſe. I ſhall now introduce Mr. B. in his double capacity.---

I. When Mr. B. is an oppoſer of infant baptiſm, he ſpeaketh on this wiſe: Vol. ii. p. 228, "This being the caſe, we may ſafely conclude that all reaſoning from data of a moral kind, and the ſuppoſed fitneſs of things, is wide of the mark." Vol. i. p. 227. "But when our divine Lord, addreſſing his diſciples in a poſitive command, ſays, 'It ſhall be ſo,' or when, ſpeaking by an apoſtolic example, he declares, 'It is thus,' all our own reaſonings about *fitness*, expediency, or utility, muſt hide their impertinent heads."

But when Mr. B. becomes a defender of female communion, he expreſſeth himſelf thus: Vol. ii. p. 73, 74. "In regard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for admitting women to the holy table, we reply by demanding---Are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?' Thus Mr. B. He only aſks the queſtion, and leaves the inference to the reader. This is artfully done, for fear he ſhould ſeem to prove a right to a poſitive inſtitute by inference.

The reader is deſired to obſerve, that Mr. B. in oppoſing infant baptiſm, will admit of no reaſoning from moral data, or the ſuppoſed fitneſs of things, and ſays

that all ſuch reaſoning is wide of the mark. And he likewiſe ſays, "that all our reaſonings about fitneſs—muſt hide their impertinent heads." But, in defending female communion, he aſks, "Are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" Here Mr. B. the patron of female communion, adopts the ſame reaſoning which Mr. B. the oppoſer of infant baptiſm, had declared to be wide of the mark. As the patron of females, he will reaſon from the fitneſs of things—"are there any pre-requiſites for the holy ſupper, of which women are not equally capable as men?" As the oppoſer of infants, he inſiſted that all ſuch reaſonings ſhould hide their impertinent heads. If the patron of females and the oppoſer of infants be the ſame perſon, he muſt be guilty of a miſerable prevarication; for he attempts to paſs off that reaſoning upon others, which he himſelf declares to be wide of the mark; and will needs bring thoſe heads of reaſoning to light, which he brands with the name of impertinent, and ſays that their impertinent heads muſt be hid. This in and out proceeding of the patron of females and oppoſer of infants I ſubmit to the judgment of the reader, and leave the patron and oppoſer to ſettle the matter the beſt way he can.

II. Again, Mr. B. when oppoſing infant baptiſm, ſays, vol. i. p. 23. "Seeing baptiſm is really and entirely a poſitive inſtitution, we cannot with ſafety infer either the mode or the ſubject of it from any thing ſhort of a precept, or a precedent, recorded in Scripture, and relating to that very ordinance." Vol. ii. p. 227. "Baptiſm, being a branch of poſitive worſhip, depends entirely on the ſovereign will of its Author; which will, revealed in poſitive precepts, or by apoſtolic examples, is the only rule of its adminiſtration." And in vol. ii. p. 44, he ſays, "The inquirer has nothing to do but open the New Teſtament, and conſult a few expreſs commands and plain examples, and conſider the natural and proper ſenſe of the words, and then, without the aid of commentators, or the help of

ical acumen, he may decide on the queſtion before
n." A little after he ſpeaks of expreſs commands
l expreſs examples, which is his uniform mode of
preſſion when oppoſing infants.

But when Mr. B. comes to defend female commu-
n, he expreſſes himſelf thus: Vol. ii. p. 73. "In
ard to the ſuppoſed want of an explicit warrant for
nitting women to the holy table, we reply by de-
nding---Does not the term *anthrōpos*, there uſed,
en ſtand as a name of our ſpecies without regard to
? Have we not the authority of lexicographers,
l, which is incomparably more, the ſanction of com-
n ſenſe, for underſtanding it thus in that paſſage?
hen the ſexes are diſtinguiſhed and oppoſed, the
rd for a man is not *anthrōpos* but *aneer*."

The reader is requeſted to notice, that Mr. B. as
oppoſer of infant baptiſm, contends for precept,
ſitive precept, expreſs commands, or expreſs exam-
s, and ſays, in his index, that the law of inſtitutes
uſt be expreſs, &c. but, as a defender of female com-
nion, he takes up with an ambiguous word, a mere
eſumptive proof---"Does not," ſays he, "the term
thrpōos often stand as a name of our ſpecies?" and
s preſumption he attempts to ſtrengthen by a falſe-
od, of which I have already ſpoken. As an oppoſer
infants, he ſays the inquirer may decide the queſ-
n without the aid of commentators, or the help of
itical acumen; but, as a patron of females, he firſt
rniſhes his reader with an ambiguous word, and
en ſends him to lexicographers to have it manufac-
red into a poſitive one. Since it was not in Mr.
's power to form a poſitive precept out of an ambi-
uous word, without the aid of a little inference, he
ry artfully throws it into the hands of lexicogra-
ers and common ſenſe to effect this buſineſs for
m. And one cannot ſufficiently admire how tena-
ous he is of expreſs precept when an oppoſer of in-
nts, while at the ſame time, as the patron of females,
is ſo very complying, that he can even admit pre-
mptive evidence to paſs for an explicit warrant.

tute, and a civil government! Now, though there is not a word of truth in all this; yet this honour Mr. B. ſhall have, and it is an honour I cannot always give him, that in this he is actually conſiſtent with himſelf: He has ſecularized the church and the inſtitute together.

I will not now contend with Mr. B. whether he has given a true account of the ancient church, and its members; it is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to take notice of what he has affirmed. Yet I could wiſh, ſhould he write again upon the ſubject (as I hope he will) to ſee a fuller account of that church, the complete members of which were only obedient ſubjects of the civil government. I have never, in my ſmall reading, met with a definition of a church like this; it is enough for me now that Mr. B. has. My buſineſs is not to diſpute, but to take it upon his word. I only ſay, that if ſuch a church did ever exiſt, whatever it was, it could be no church of God. And as there was no better church, *i. e.* a civil government, in any other part; there was not, on Mr. B.'s principles, for many centuries, a church of God, properly ſo called, in all the world.

"An obedient ſubject of their civil government, and a complete member of their church ſtate, were the ſame thing." The ſame thing! If, then, the complete member was no more than an obedient ſubject; the church ſtate could be no more than a civil gogernment: For, according to Mr. B. they were preciſely the ſame thing. What might be the reaſon of all this? Mr. B. ſhall inform us himſelf; it was, "Becauſe by treating Jehovah as their political ſovereign, they avowed him as the true God." As it is not my buſineſs in this place to oppoſe any thing Mr. B. ſays, I ſhall only take the liberty to explain. What is a political ſovereign? He is one who reigns over others in civil things; that is, he governs and regulates the affairs of this preſent world. This is the reaſon then, that an obedient ſubject of civil government, and a complete church member, were the

ſame thing, becauſe all that God had to do with them was, as a political ſovereign, to regulate the affairs of the preſent world.

But where would have been the harm of ſuppoſing the ever-bleſſed Jehovah to have been more, infinitely more, than a political ſovereign? And that he gave his word and ordinances to lead to the faith of Chriſt? That he ſent his prophets to bear witneſs, that through his name whoſoever believed in him ſhould receive remiſſion of ſins? That he formed a people for himſelf, to ſhew forth his praiſe? Where, I ſay, would have been the harm of ſuppoſing this? None at all, in reality; the harm would only have been to Mr. B.'s ſyſtem. For had Jehovah been a religious ſovereign, he would have had a religious community, and that community would have been a religious church, *i. e.* a church profeſſing godlineſs; and then, an obedient ſubject of civil government would not have been a complete member; and then, their inſtitute would have been a religious inſtitute; and then —what then? And then Mr. B.'s ſyſtem would have gone to ruin. But he wiſely foreſeeing this, takes meaſures to ſecularize the whole. He begins at the head, and goes down to the inſtitute. Jehovah muſt be a political ſovereign, that the church may be political; the church muſt be political, that the memberſhip may be ſo too; the memberſhip muſt be political, that the inſtitute may be political alſo. So all was political; a political ſovereign, a political church, a political member, and a political inſtitute. And now Mr. B. has gained his point; for ſure enough, there can be no analogy between a church and no church; and conſequently no argument can be drawn in favour of infant memberſhip from a church which never was, to a church that now exiſts. Yes, he has gained his point, he has run down infant baptiſm; but, at the ſame time, he has eradicated the church of God. Nay, he was under a neceſſity of eradicating the church of God, that infant baptiſm might be run down. This has given me a notion for infant baptiſm

far different from what I ever had. And, if I could ſay, that any one thing has ſatisfied my mind reſpecting it more than another, it has been this: I ſaw that infant baptiſm could by no means be overthrown, without overthrowing the church of God. And for this conviction I am indebted to that very book, on which I have taken the liberty to animadvert. Nothing, therefore, in nature can be plainer than this conſequence, that the ſyſtem of Mr. B. has ſubverted the church of God.

Theſe are the three conſequences which riſe out of the Baptiſt ſyſtem, and which, I have ſaid, will operate to ruin that ſyſtem out of which they ariſe: Namely,

1. That, according to the principles and reaſonings of the Baptiſts, a women, however qualified, can have no right to the Lord's table.

2. That the Baptiſts, in oppoſing infant baptiſm, and defending female communion, do vary their mode of reaſoning, contradict themſelves, and prevaricate moſt wretchedly.

3. That according to their principles and reaſoning, God had no church in this world for many centuries.

I ſhall now cloſe the Appendix by an appeal to the reader; and this I mean to do in three queſtions.

1. Are theſe conſequences real? To anſwer this queſtion I need only appeal to the Appendix itſelf. There the reader may ſatisfy himſelf reſpecting their reality. As to the firſt, it is there evident, that there is no explicit command for female communion; and, according to the Baptiſt ſyſtem, they are not to communicate without: The conſequence is, that they have no right to communicate at all. With regard to the ſecond, I have placed Mr. B.'s defence of female communion againſt his oppoſition to infant baptiſm; and what repugnancy, prevarication, and ſelf-contradiction, are diſcoverable in theſe two, I have preſented to the reader. The third ſpeaks openly for it-

ſelf, that the beſt church in the world for many centuries, was nothing elſe but a civil government.

2. Do theſe conſequences riſe out of the Baptiſts ſyſtem? For an anſwer to this I might refer the reader to the former part of the Appendix; where he may ſee in what way they actually do ariſe out of their ſyſtem. Their ſyſtem deſtroys the right of females to the Lord's ſupper, by demanding explicit proof for infant baptiſm; becauſe there is no ſuch proof for female communion. Their attempt to prove the right of females to commune, involves them in the moſt mean prevarication and ſelf-contradiction. And in overthrowing the argument for infant baptiſm taken from the memberſhip of infants in God's ancient church, they overthrow the very church itſelf. In this way, theſe horrid conſequences owe their birth to that bad ſyſtem.

3. Are ſuch conſequences as theſe which riſe out of the Baptiſt ſyſtem, ſufficient to ruin that ſyſtem out of which they riſe? To this I anſwer, that if any conſequences are ſufficient to ruin a ſyſtem, theſe are they. It is a rule in reaſoning, that that argument which proves too much deſtroys itſelf. The ſame is alſo true of a ſyſtem; the ſyſtem that proves too much muſt follow the fate of its kindred argument, and prove its own deſtruction. This ſyſtem, it is true, proves againſt infant baptiſm; but there it does not ſtop, it carries its force ſtill farther, it proves againſt female communion, and againſt the exiſtence of God's church; and to complete the whole, it proves againſt the author who patronizes it. So that if infant baptiſm fall, they all fall together; female communion falls, the church of God falls, the author himſelf, Mr. B. falls, and all by the ſame fatal ſyſtem. For if this ſyſtem make infant baptiſm a nullity, it makes female communion a nullity too; and turns the church itſelf into a civil government, and turns the patron of it into a ſelf-contradictor. This, if any thing can be, is proving too much; and, therefore, that ſyſtem

which is productive of such consequences, must itself be destroyed by the consequences it produces. And I appeal to the conscience of any reader whether these consequences have not been proved, and whether they are not sufficient to destroy any system.

I call this a short method with the Baptists, because, whatever course they may take, it will serve to ruin their scheme. If, on the one hand, these consequences are suffered to remain as they do now in Mr. B.'s book, their scheme will be ruined this way. For that system can have no pretension at all to truth, which in its consequences militates against female communion, and the very existence of the church of God; and moreover exhibits the patron of it under the shape of a shifter, prevaricator, and self-contradictor. But if, on the other hand, they alter their mode of defence so as to avoid these consequences, their scheme will be ruined that way: For then, they will lose those very arguments by which they endeavour to support it. So that let a Baptist, Mr. B. for instance, take which way he will, his scheme will either be overwhelmed with its own consequences, or it will fall for want of arguments.

Thus much I say at present concerning the Appendix: And shall now commit it into the hands of God, the eternal patron of truth, and to every reader's judgment and conscience in his sight.

A CASE

Submitted to the consideration of Baptists.

BEFORE I enter on the mode of baptism, I would take the liberty of proposing to my Baptist friends a plain case; not so much a case of conscience as a case of criticism. That on which this case is founded is as follows: It is well known that under the present dispensation there are two instituted ordi-

nances; the one in Scripture is expreſſed by the term *deipnon*, a ſupper, the other by *baptisma*, baptiſm. The proper and obvious meaning of *deipnon* is a feaſt or a common meal, Mark, vi. 21; John xxi. 22; the proper meaning of *baptisma* is ſaid to be the immerſion of the whole body. The caſe then is this:

If, becauſe the proper meaning of the term *baptisma* baptiſm, is the immerſion of the whole body, a perſon who is not immerſed, cannot be ſaid to have been baptiſed, ſince nothing ſhort of immerſion amounts to the full import of the word baptiſm. If this be true, I ſhould be glad to know that as *deipnon*, a ſupper, properly means a feaſt or common meal, whether a perſon who, in the uſe of that ordinance, takes only a piece of bread of half an inch ſquare, and drinks a table-ſpoonfull of wine, which is neither a feaſt nor a common meal, and ſo does not come up to the proper meaning of the word, can be ſaid to have received the Lord's ſupper?

Mr. Booth, I preſume, ſaw this in Mr. Piries' book, but has not taken any notice of it; I therefore requeſt ſome Baptiſt friend to turn his attention to it.

OF THE MODE OF BAPTISM.

IT appears to me, from the following circumſtance, that the Baptiſts are not ſo tenacious of the mode as of the ſubject of baptiſm. I had been convinced more than four years ago, in reading Dr. William's book, that immerſion was not eſſential to baptiſm; and though I preached ſince that period ſeveral baptiſing ſermons without ſaying a word about the mode, I never heard of any of our Baptiſt friends that ever obſerved that omiſſion; whereas, on the contrary, had I inſiſted on the mode, and omitted the ſubject, I have not a doubt but they would have noticed it in the firſt ſermon: And I remember ſome years back to have heard a Baptiſt miniſter ſay, that

the mode of baptiſm, by immerſion only, did not appear equally plain as the ſubject. Indeed I am perſuaded that if it can be made plain to the Baptiſts that it is wrong to reject an infant, they will ſoon give up the idea of immerſion only; and it is for this reaſon that I have been the more diffuſe on the ſubject, and ſhall now be ſhort on the mode.

All our knowledge of the manner of baptiſing, muſt, at this diſtance of time from the firſt inſtitution, be collected from the word "baptiſe," the circumſtances of baptiſm, and the alluſions of ſcripture to that ordinance: Theſe three I will endeavour to examine impartially, confining myſelf to ſcripture, and the word made uſe of in the inſtitute. The queſtion, on which this examination is to proceed, is this; Is the immerſion eſſential to baptiſm? or, in other words, is there no baptiſm but what is by immerſion? I ſhall begin the inquiry with that preciſe term which the ſcriptures always uſe when this ordinance is ſpoken of, namely *baptiso*, and examine thoſe places in which it occurs either as a noun or a verb, where the ordinance is not intended.

There is a word commonly introduced into this debate, *viz. bapto*, though it is never uſed in ſcripture, reſpecting this ordinance; and this being the fact, I ſee no great propriety in bringing it into the debate at all; for let it mean what it may, it can ſignify nothing to the queſtion in hand unleſs it had been uſed by the inſpired writers to expreſs this ordinance. I do not, however, ſhun this term becauſe it would be unfavourable to my ſentiment, but becauſe I judge it beſt to examine that word, and that only, which the Holy Ghoſt, when ſpeaking of this ordinance, has thought proper to adopt.

Nevertheleſs, that I may not omit it altogether, I would ſay thus much of the term *bapto*, that it is a term of ſuch latitude, that he who ſhall attempt to prove, from its uſe in various authors, an abſolute and total immerſion, will find he has undertaken that *which he* can never fairly perform. Of the truth of

this aſſertion I would give the plain reader a taſte in the following inſtances. The term *bapto* then is uſed to expreſs,

1. The throwing of a perſon into the mire. Job ix. 31. *en rōpō me ebapsas*, Thou ſhalt plunge, baptiſe, or make me foul in the mire.

2. A partial dipping. Matt. xxiv. 23. *O embapsas met emou en tō trublio teen cheira.* He that dippeth, baptiſeth, his hand with me in the diſh.

3. A ſtained garment. Rev. xix. 13. *imation Behammenon aimati.* A veſture dipped, baptiſed, ſtained with blood.

4. A human body wet with the dew. Dan. iv. 33. *apo tou drosou tou ouranou to soma autou ebaphe.* His body was wet, baptiſed by or from the dew of heaven.

5. The colouring a lake with the blood of a frog. Homer, *ebapteto de aimati limne.* The lake was baptiſed, coloured, or ſtained with blood.

6. The ſmearing of the face with colours or waſhes. Ariſtophanes, *baptomenos batracheioiv.* He baptiſed, ſmeared [his face] with tawney waſhes; ſpeaking of Magnes, the comedian, who uſed to colour his face inſtead of uſing a maſk.

7. The ſtaining of the hand by preſſing a ſubſtance, Ariſtotle, *Thlibomenos de baptei teen cheira.* Being preſſed, it baptiſes, ſtains the hand.

So various is the uſe of the term *bapto*, that we can only view it as a meaning to wet or ſtain, and that by whatever mode the nature of the thing to be wetted or ſtained may require. And I can truly ſay I have often been heartily ſick and ſorry when I have obſerved perſons of eminence for learning, eſpecially Dr. Gale, labouring, in oppoſition to the very inſtances which they themſelves had produced, to prove that this term intended immerſion, total immerſion, and nothing elſe. But as this word is never uſed with reſpect to the ordinance in queſtion, and can therefore give us no information concerning the mode of

it, I ſhall immediately diſmiſs it without further notice.

I come now to conſider the term *baptizo*, which is the only term made uſe of to expreſs this ordinance, and this I ſhall do by ſetting down thoſe places where it is uſed as a verb or a noun when the ordinance is not intended. Theſe places are as follow: Heb. ix. 10. "Which ſtood in meats and drinks and divers waſhings—*diaphorois baptismois*, divers baptiſms." Mark. vii. 4. "And when they come from the market, except they waſh, *mee baptisontai*, except they baptiſe, they eat not. And many other things there be which they have received to hold, as the waſhing, *baptimous*, baptiſms of cups and pots, brazen veſſels and of tables." Luke xi. 38. "And when the Phariſee ſaw it, he marvelled that he had not firſt waſhed, *ebaptisthee*, baptiſed, before dinner." The word in theſe inſtances, is uſed,

1. For thoſe various ablutions among the Jews, by ſprinkling, pouring, &c.

2. For a cuſtom among the Phariſees of waſhing before meals.

3. For a ſuperſtitious waſhing of houſehold furniture, cups, pots, &c.

With theſe inſtances in view I would propoſe to the reader two queſtions:

I. Is the word baptiſe uſed in theſe inſtances to expreſs immerſion only! The reader may obſerve that the very firſt inſtance proves it is not. The Apoſtle plainly expreſſes the Jewiſh ablutions by the term "baptiſms;" and any man, by looking into his Bible, and reading the account of the Jewiſh ſervice, may ſee what kind of baptiſms theſe were. Mr. Booth himſelf, in his anſwer to Dr. Williams, p. 347, will grant for the ſake of argument, that the apoſtle uſes the term baptiſms in this place to denote pouring and ſprinkling as well as immerſion; nor does he, in what he has advanced on the ſubject, deny this to have been the fact; and indeed a man muſt be very defective in point of modeſty who will even attempt to

deny this. Well then, if the word baptiſm is not uſeed in theſe inſtances, as it is certain it is not, to expreſs immerſion only, I aſk, in the next place—Is it uſed to expreſs any immerſion at all? I will apply this queſtion to each of the inſtances:

1. The Apoſtle ſpeaks of the Jewiſh ſervice, and ſays it ſtood in "divers baptiſms." I aſk whether immerſion of the whole body was any part of that ſervice? It is clear that the Apoſtle, by the word "baptiſms," intended ſprinkling and pouring; but I believe it is not clear from any part of the Jewiſh ſervice, that any one was ordered to immerſe himſelf, or to be immerſed by another. If this, however, can be proved, it muſt then be granted that the Apoſtle uſes the word "baptiſms" to denote immerſion as well as pouring and ſprinkling; but if this cannot be proved, it will then be evident that no immerſion at all is intended by the word baptiſms.

2. I will apply the queſtion to the ſecond caſe—the baptiſing before meals. It is ſaid, "that when they come from market, except they baptiſe they eat not;" and the "Phariſee marvelled that our Lord did not baptiſe (that is, himſelf) before dinner." I aſk, Is there any immerſion at all here? The Phariſee marvelled that our Lord did not baptiſe himſelf before dinner—did he marvel that he did not immerſe himſelf? The Phariſees when they come from market, except they baptiſe [themſelves] they eat not—did they too immerſe themſelves every time they came from a market? I know it is not an impoſſible caſe; but I am aſking whether it is at all a probable thing? And if it be not, then it is improbable that the word baptiſe in theſe places ſhould intend any immerſion at all. Perhaps ſome one will ſay that nothing more is intended than the waſhing of hands, as this is agreeable to the tradition of the elders mentioned in Matt. xv. 2. and it is well known that we dip our hands in order to waſh them. Suppoſing this to be the fact, I reply, that if we dip our hands in order to baptiſe [waſh] them, then it is certain, that

without any deſign of offence, call one the "Baptiſt alluſion," and the other the "Pædobaptiſt alluſion." —I begin with,

I. The Baptiſt alluſion. The reader will find this in Rom. vi. 4. "Therefore we are buried with him by baptiſm into death," &c. A ſimple phraſe occurs in Col. ii. 12. The Baptiſts think there is an alluſion in theſe words to the manner of baptiſing; and as the apoſtle ſpeaks of being buried with him, they conclude the mode to have been immerſion. On this concluſion of theirs,

1. I obſerve that theſe words are an inference from the third verſe, in which the apoſtle ſays, "Know ye not that ſo many of us as were baptiſed into Jeſus Chriſt were baptiſed into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptiſm." We have here three things; 1. a baptiſing into Jeſus Chriſt; 2. into his death; 3. into his burial: and the laſt is made the conſequence of the firſt. Therefore we are buried with him, becauſe we were baptiſed into him. To form the antitheſis, we muſt diſtinguiſh between the life and death of Chriſt; and then it will be, We are baptiſed firſt into the life of Chriſt, then into the death of Chriſt, and laſt of all into his burial. We are brought by baptiſm into his life, into his death, and into his burial. Now, if baptiſm bring us into each of theſe, and one of them, as the Baptiſts ſay, is an alluſion to the mode of baptiſing, then, for the ſame reaſon, ſo muſt the other two. That is, his life muſt allude to the mode, ſo muſt his death, and ſo muſt his burial: And the reaſon is, becauſe baptiſm unites us to him in each of theſe. And if all theſe are to allude to the mode, I ſhould be glad to know, what kind of mode it muſt at laſt be, which is to bear a reſemblance to every one. The life of Chriſt was action, his death was a crucifixion, his burial was the incloſing his body in a cavity of the rock. The mode, therefore, muſt be threefold; it muſt repreſent *action, crucifixion*, and incloſing in a rock; becauſe, to *purſue the* notion of the baptiſts, his life, death, and

burial, muſt all have an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm.

There is no ſect, I ſhould ſuppoſe, that uſe a mode of baptiſm to which all theſe will agree. The Romaniſts uſe ſalt, oil, and ſpittle; but whether they intend an alluſion to the life of Chriſt, I cannot take upon me to affirm. Yet, as they muſt have ſome alluſion, the ſalt may allude to his life of teaching; the ſpittle to his life of miracles; and the oil to his life of munificence. The clergy of the church of England uſe the ſign of the croſs: and this is to allude to the crucifixion of Chriſt. The Baptiſts uſe immerſion; and this is to allude to the burial of Chriſt. Now, if we could unite all theſe in one, we ſhould have a tolerable alluſion to our Lord's life, death, and burial; but when each is taken ſeparately, there is a deficiency in point of alluſion. The Engliſh clergy are deficient in alluding only to the crucifixion; but not to the life and burial. The Romaniſts are deficient in alluding only to the life and crucifixion; but not to the burial. The Baptiſts too are deficient in alluding to the burial only; but not to the life and crucifixion. I know not whether theſe different communities take their document from this part of holy writ; but certainly they have the ſame ground if they chooſe to reaſon in the ſame way. But as the Baptiſts avowedly do this, and are at the ſame time ſo deficient in the buſineſs of alluſion, it would become them to ſet about a reform in the mode of their baptiſm; it being at preſent wanting in two articles, *viz.* the life and crucifixion, *i. e.* the ſign of the croſs, and ſalt, &c.

That the abſurdity of ſuppoſing an alluſion in this place to the mode of baptiſm may appear in a ſtill ſtronger light, I would obſerve, that what the Apoſtle calls, in ver. 3, a being baptiſed into the death of Chriſt, he expreſſes in ver. 5, by being planted together in the likeneſs of his death. This will be evident to any one who examines the place. Now if *any man is diſpoſed*, after the method of the Baptiſts *to pick up alluſions* to the mode of baptiſm, here is

two topics ready at hand, and he may take both, or either, as he pleaſes. It is uſual with the Baptiſts, when contending for the mode of baptiſm, to affirm that the apoſtle calls baptiſm a burial; and hence they infer that immerſion muſt be the mode. This, however, is affirming what is not true; for the apoſtle never, in any of his writings, calls "baptiſm a burial." But on the contrary, he does in this verſe evidently ſpeak of it under the notion of planting and ſays, We are planted in the likeneſs of his death. Here then, upon the Baptiſt plan, are two alluſions—planting, and crucifixion. There are none, I believe, who make planting an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm; but ſhould this be attempted by any, they will have this one advantage which the Baptiſts are deſtitute of; and that is, that whereas baptiſm is no where called a burial, it is in this place plainly called a planting. Now, if we ſuppoſe a perſon reaſoning upon the plan of the Baptiſts, he will ſay, that as the apoſtle calls baptiſm a planting, he muſt allude to the mode in which that ordinance was adminiſtered; and every one, who is at all acquainted with the art of planting, will eaſily gueſs what kind of mode that muſt be, to which it alludes. Were this only adopted, and it may be adopted with greater advantage than the Baptiſt plan, we ſhould probably hear of ſome contention about the mode of baptiſm, between thoſe who immerſe and thoſe who only plant: And in this caſe I can clearly ſee that victory will crown the planters.

There is in the ſame way another alluſion in this verſe to the mode of baptiſm; I have mentioned it before, but do it again on account of its ſuperior evidence to that alluſion of the Baptiſts. The apoſtle ſays, we are planted, that is, baptiſed, in the likeneſs of his death. Now, taking this for an alluſion to the mode of baptiſm, the argument for the ſign of the croſs will be incomparably ſtronger than that of the Baptiſts for immerſion. I ſay incomparably ſtronger; for whereas it is only ſaid in the fourth verſe, We are buried with him *by* baptiſm; it is ſaid in this

verſe, We are planted [baptiſed] in the likeneſs of his death: there is nothing about ſimilitude mentioned in their alluſion; but here the word "likeneſs" is actually uſed. The argument, therefore, in favour of the ſign of the croſs, will, in the Baptiſt way of arguing, far outweigh that in favour of immerſion. And how much ſoever the Baptiſts may deſpiſe that ceremony, it is evidently better founded in this conteſt than their own. So that if their argument from this place be good for immerſion, the other is far better for the ſign of the croſs. Upon the whole, the examination of this place convinces me of nothing ſo much as this, that both the Baptiſts in general, and myſelf in particular, have been carried away with the mere ſound of a word, even to the neglect of the ſenſe and ſcope of the truth of God.

2. Leaving, therefore, the whimſical interpretation of the Baptiſts to itſelf, it may be obſerved, in order that we may the better enter into the Apoſtle's deſign, that when he ſays, "we are buried with him, by baptiſm," he makes baptiſm to be the inſtrumental cauſe of burial. This will appear plain by aſking this queſtion; By what are we buried with him? The anſwer is, By baptiſm. And indeed baptiſm is made the inſtrumental cauſe in each caſe. If we aſk, How are we brought into Jeſus Chriſt? Anſwer, By baptiſm: "Baptiſed into Jeſus Chriſt." How are we brought into his death? Anſwer, By baptiſm: Baptiſed into his death. How are we brought into his burial? Anſwer, By baptiſm: "Buried with him by baptiſm." If, therefore, the union in life, death, and burial, be brought about by baptiſm, then baptiſm is the inſtrumental cauſe of this union; and then the very idea of alluſion is entirely loſt, and they preſent themſelves to our view under the notion of cauſe and effect. Baptiſm is made the cauſe, and union in the life, death, and burial, the effect.

Now this being the caſe, inſtead of hunting after alluſions, by which baptiſm will be any thing or no-

thing; we muſt attend to that adequacy or proportion in the cauſe, by virtue of which this effect is to be produced. This adequacy is not formally in outward baptiſm, which is an emblem, and no more than an emblem, of the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit; but merely in the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit, of which the other is an emblem. 1 Cor. xii. 13. It is indeed, the nature and deſign of both to bring perſons into union with Jeſus Chriſt; But then, the union will be only of the ſame kind with the baptiſm. If the baptiſm be that of the Holy Spirit, it brings about an internal, vital union with Jeſus Chriſt; but if it be only an outward baptiſm, the union will only be viſible and external. But as the outward baptiſm is an emblem of the inward and vital, the judgment of charity preſumes, unleſs there be good proof to the contrary, that they who voluntarily receive the former, are alſo poſſeſſed of the latter. It is according to this judgment of charity, the apoſtle addreſſes the Romans: He ſuppoſes baptiſed perſons to be really baptiſed into Jeſus Chriſt; and then, by virtue of that union, they live, they die, they are buried, they are raiſed again, and walk with Chriſt in newneſs of life. All which the apoſtle expreſſes in theſe emphatic words: —Our old man is crucified with him, that the body of ſin might be deſtroyed, that henceforth we ſhould not ſerve ſin—Dead indeed unto ſin, but alive unto God through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord—Like as Chriſt was raiſed from the dead, by the glory of the Father, even ſo we alſo ſhould walk in newneſs of life. The ſcope of the apoſtle is to ſhow the vital influence of union with Chriſt, of which baptiſm is the emblem. And as ſoon as any one enters fairly into the apoſtle's ſcope, the inſignificant idea of alluſion to the mode of baptiſm diſappears, and, to uſe Mr. B.'s phraſe, hides its impertinent head.—Thus much for the Baptiſt alluſion. I ſhall next notice,

II. The Pædobaptiſt alluſion. According to this, *the mode of* communicating the grace of the Holy *Spirit to the* ſoul, and that of applying the baptiſmal

water to the body, are viewed as corresponding with each other. The considerations which lead to this, are such as follow:—1. They both agree in name. The influences of the Holy Spirit on the soul are called "baptism," and so likewise is the external application of water. The term baptism, when used to express the influences of the Holy Spirit, takes in both his extraordinary and saving influences, Acts i. 5. 1 Cor. xii. 13. And as these have sometimes taken place in the same persons, the term "baptise" has been used to express both, Acts x. 44—46, compared with Acts xi. 16—18. 2. They are often associated in scripture. How commonly do we read such words as these, "I indeed have baptised you with water; but he shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost." The reader will find this form of speech in the following places: Matt. iii. 11. Mark i. 8. Luke iii. 16. John i. 33. Acts i. 5.—xi. 16. 3. Their mode of communication is expressed in the same way: "I baptise you, *enudati*, with water, but he shall baptise you *en pneumati agiō*, with the Holy Ghost." And this is done in all the places, only with this difference, that Luke omits the preposition in one member, and there it is understood. 4. Baptism with water, is an emblem of baptism with the Holy Ghost. The application of water to the body, as noting the putting away the filth of the flesh, shadows forth the influence of the Holy Spirit, which, being imparted to the soul, produces the answer of a good conscience towards God.

Now, if these two pass under the same name; if both are frequently united in Scripture; if the one be an emblem of the other; and, if the mode of communication in each baptism be expressed in the same way; then, the way to arrive at a clear view of the mode of outward baptism, is to observe in what manner the baptism of the Holy Spirit is described. This will lead us to consult a lexicon of a very superior kind, a lexicon worth more than five hundred; and, what is more, it is the plain, unlettered man's lexicon, and its title is, "The lively oracl

of God." The article we are to ſeek for, is the term baptiſe. How does this lexicon define baptizare, to baptiſe? Anſwer—*Baptizare est supervenire, illabi, effundere*—plainly, to baptiſe is—to come upon, Acts i. 5.----to ſhed forth, Acts ii. 33.----to fall upon, Acts xi. 15.---to pour out, Acts ii. 17.---x. 45. That is, in this baptiſm the grace of the Holy Spirit comes upon----falls upon----is ſhed forth---is poured out, namely, on the ſoul. This is the account this lexicon gives of the word "baptiſe."

Mr. Booth, inſtead of paying a due attention to this lexicon, has adopted a method which, when properly adverted to, will do no credit to him or his book. His profeſſed deſign is to prove that the term "baptiſe" means immerſion, immerſion only, and nothing elſe. But how does he do it? Why, he quotes a number of authors, who, as he himſelf ſays, underſtood the term to mean immerſion, pouring, and ſprinkling; and theſe quotations he calls conceſſions. Conceſſions of what? That the word meant immerſion only? If ſo, he made them concede what they never did concede, and what they had no thought of conceding. If they made no conceſſion, as he acknowledges they did not, that the term baptiſe ſignified immerſion only, what honeſty could there be in producing them at all? Mr. B.'s talent is quotation, and therefore he muſt quote; but, at the ſame time, it is a ſhame to abuſe the living or the dead, and it is a bad cauſe that requires it: For what elſe is it but abuſing an author, when he is introduced as granting that which in fact he never did grant?

But had Mr. B. conſulted, as he ought, the lexicon I am ſpeaking of it might have freed him from the neceſſity of uſing that little art which one cannot obſerve in a diſputant with any degree of pleaſure. The authors he has conſulted, if they had been all on his ſide (and I queſtion whether any one was beſide the Quakers) could only have told him how men underſtood the word; but this lexicon would have ſhowed him how God himſelf uſes it; And if we received the witneſs of men, the witneſs of God is greater. I aſk,

What does God witneſs concerning the term baptiſe? Anſwer—From the paſſages before cited it is evident he witneſſes this—that the term ſtrictly and properly means to waſh, to purify. What does God witneſs concerning the mode of applying the purific matter? Anſwer—It comes upon, falls upon, is ſhed forth, is poured out.—Why then, as water baptiſm is an emblem of this, and as the mode of application in both caſes is expreſſed in the ſame way, we have a witneſs on the ſide of pouring and ſprinkling in baptiſm infinitely more certain than that of all the lexicographers and critics in the world. What are Mr. B.'s eighty abuſed critics, even ſuppoſing they had all been on his ſide, though I doubt whether he had one out of the eighty; and even ſuppoſe he had eight hundred more, what, I ſay, are all theſe when compared to the all-wiſe God expounding and defining his own words? Mr. B. has a Talmud of his own, in which he ſtudies circumciſion; and ill-treated critics, with whom he impoſes on the public in the article of baptiſm; and though perhaps he may not yet be aſhamed of his Talmud, or his treatment, I believe the time will come when he will be aſhamed of both.

Notwithſtanding the ſcriptures, when ſpeaking of the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit, make uſe of the phraſes come upon—fall upon—ſhed forth—poured out, Mr. B. to evade the force of this as it reſpects the mode of baptiſing, has recourſe to two miſerable ſhifts. In one caſe he would ſet alluſion to the mode, and in the other he would make it agree with immerſion; and as theſe are ſomewhat curious, I cannot very well cloſe the ſubject without taking notice of them.

1. To ſet aſide the alluſion, he takes the following courſe in his anſwer to Dr. Wiliams. Page 341. he ſays, "Dr. W. argues in favour of pouring and of ſprinkling from the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit. Thus ſpeaks: I ſcruple not to aſſert it, there is no object whatever in all the New Teſtament ſo frequently and ſo explicitly ſignified by baptiſm as theſe divine influ-

ences;" referring to Matt. iii. 11; Mark i. 8, 9. Luke iii. 16, 21, 22; and several other places. Mr. B. in answer, says, p. 342, "But those passages of scripture to which he refers, regard that copious and extraordinary effusion (effusion, *i. e.* pouring out) of the Holy Spirit which was received by the Apostles and first disciples of our Lord soon after his ascension into heaven." The truth is, the term "baptise," when applied to the Holy Spirit, is used to denote both his extraordinary and ordinary influences, even those by which the mind is renewed and united to Christ; and so baptism by affusion is the most expressive emblem of the communication of these influences, more especially as the mode of application is expressed in the same way, and the one is fairly an emblem of the other.

But Mr. B. does not seem willing to admit that one baptism is an emblem of the other:—I say, "seem willing," for I protest I do not know, though I have his book before my eyes, and have looked at it half an hour, whether he means to admit or deny it. That which seems the most evident is, he wishes, by any means, to get rid of it, lose it, put it out of sight, forget it himself, and make his reader do so too; but then how is this to be done? Done! why, by the assistance of his old impartial friends the Quakers. He suggests that our viewing water baptism as an emblem of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, will operate against its perpetuity. To evince this he introduces the Quakers as reasoning in the following manner: "Water baptism was divinely appointed, and continued in force till the death of Christ; but as that rite had for its object the descent of the Holy Spirit and his divine influences, no sooner was the promised Spirit vouchsafed to our Lord's disciples, than the obligation to regard water baptism entirely ceased. For baptism in water being only an emblem of the promised baptism in the Holy Spirit, why should the former be continued after the latter has taken place? This, he says, or something like it, if he mistakes not,

is the Quakers' principal argument; and, for aught he perceives, it is equally forcible with that of his opponent.

I confeſs I am not ſufficiently verſed in the Quakers' mode of reaſoning to know whether Mr. B. has done them juſtice. He firſt makes them ſay that baptiſm continued till the death of Chriſt, and then that the obligation to regard it ceaſed when the promiſed ſpirit was vouchſafed: So there are two periods for the expiration of baptiſm. But I have no diſpute with the Quakers; I know they are only brought in here as a blind, that Mr. B. by getting behind them might withdraw more eaſily. I am perſuaded he does not approve of their argument---he only wanted to get rid of the alluſion, and he has got rid of it; but it is in the ſame way as the Quakers get rid of the two ordinances: Nay, far worſe; for whereas they do this by arguments which they deem good, but Mr. B. has done it by ſuch reaſoning as he himſelf would be aſhamed to adopt. This is Mr. B.'s miſerable way of getting rid of the alluſion, *viz.* by giving the reader a Quaker's argument. I will now advert to his other ſhift, by which,

2. He attempts to make the alluſion agree with immerſion. The mode, as I have before ſaid, of communicating the influence of the Holy Spirit, is in ſcripture expreſſed by coming upon---falling upon---ſhedding forth---pouring out, and this mode of communication is expreſsly called baptizing. Now, while moſt perſons have conſidered the baptiſm of the Holy Spirit as favouring affuſion, Mr. B. will undertake to ſhow that it is expreſſive of that idea for which he contends, namely, immerſion. This is an attempt in which I could wiſh him much ſucceſs; for if he can make it appear that pouring out, and immerſing into, are the ſame thing, then neither will he have any reaſon to complain of thoſe that pour, nor will thoſe who pour have any reaſon to complain of him. I fear it will prove a hard taſk; let us hear him, however.

In vol. i. p. 101, he ſpeaks of "an electrical bath, ſo called, becauſe the electrical fluid ſurrounds the patient." Well, and what then? "This philoſophi-

cal document reminds me of the ſacred hiſtorian's language, where, narrating the fact under conſideration, thus he ſpeaks: 'And when the day of Pentecoſt was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place. And ſuddenly there came a ſound from heaven as of a ruſhing mighty wind, and it FILLED ALL THE HOUSE WHERE THEY WERE SITTING. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it ſat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Ghoſt.' Now, ſays he, if the language of medical electricity be juſt, it cannot be abſurd, nay, it ſeems highly rational, to underſtand this language of inſpiration, as expreſſive of that idea [immerſion] for which we contend. Was the Holy Spirit poured out? Did the Holy Spirit fall upon the apoſtles and others at that memorable time? It was in ſuch a manner and to ſuch a degree, that they were, like a patient in the electric bath, as if immerſed in it."

This electric bath is a pretty fancy, a happy invention for Mr. B. it is well he did not live before it was found out, for then what a fine thought would have been loſt. Though the Holy Spirit fell upon, was poured out, yet, ſays he, it was in ſuch a manner and to ſuch a degree, that they were, like a patient in the electric bath, as if immerſed in it, that is, immerſed in the Holy Spirit. Moſt perſons, I ſuppoſe, when they read of the Holy Spirit falling upon any one, underſtand it to mean the influence of that Spirit coming upon the ſoul; But Mr. B. ſpeaks as if the Holy Ghoſt, or his influence, fell on the outſide of the apoſtles, and ſo ſurrounded their bodies like an electric bath. And to ſhow he intended this, he has put theſe words in large capitals, it "FILLED ALL THE HOUSE WHERE THEY WERE SITTING." Then they were immerſed in ſomething which filled the houſe; I aſk, what was that ſomething? In Engliſh it is expreſſed by the pronoun "it"—it filled the houſe; the Greek has no pronoun. Well, what is the antecedent to "it?" I anſwer, the word "ſound."

The ſound, which was as a ruſhing mighty wind, filled all the houſe where they were ſitting. The word in the Greek is, *eechos*, an echo, a reverberating ſound. Mr. B.'s electric bath was, after all, nothing more than an echo. He has been very ſilent about this electric fluid; either he did not know what it was, or he was not complaiſant enough to tell us. The loſs, however, is not great; we have found it out without him, It was an echo, then, that filled all the houſe; and the apoſtles, being immerſed in ſound, were ſurrounded by the echo, like a patient in an electric bath. This is the beauty of ſticking cloſe to the primary meaning of the term, as Mr. B. calls it; and ſo tenacious is he of his primary meaning, that he does not care in what people are immerſed, ſo they are but immerſed in ſomething.

To be baptiſed by the Holy Spirit is to receive his influence on the heart and mind; but this baptiſm, according to Mr. B. is to have the body ſurrounded by an echo. Is then the influence of the Spirit falling upon the heart, and a reverberating ſound ſurrounding the body, the ſame thing? Mr. B. is a dreadful confounder of things that differ! He ſaid once that an obedient ſubject of the civil government and a complete church member were the ſame thing; does he think too that the influence of the Holy Ghoſt is nothing more than an echo?—So much for the electric bath and the Quaker's argument! Theſe are Mr. B.'s two miſerable ſhifts, by which he would evade the argument from the Holy Spirit's baptiſm in favour of affuſion; and miſerable ones they are as ever made their appearance in public.

I ſhall now cloſe what I mean to ſay on the mode, by collecting the particulars, and placing them in one view. The word *baptizō*, uſed for this ordinance, means waſhing only, but not any mode of waſhing: It means neither dipping, pouring, nor ſprinkling; for theſe are only different ways of waſhing, *i. e.* baptiſing. They, therefore, who ſay that the word

rantiſm [ſprinkling] is not the ſame as baptiſm, ſay nothing but what is very right; for rantize differs from baptiſe, as the manner of doing differs from the thing done: And the ſame is true of immerſion and pouring. Yet, at the ſame time, it muſt be obſerved that the word baptiſm is uſed in Scripture where pouring and ſprinkling are evidently intended; while it cannot be proved that it is ever uſed either in the New Teſtament or in the Septuagint where immerſion took place. The New Teſtament I have examined; I will here juſt notice the two places where it occurs in the Septuagint. 2 Kings v. 14. *kai katebee Naiman kai ebaptisato en to Iordanee*—And Naaman went down and baptiſed in Jordan. The Engliſh has it "dipped," and this is the only place where baptiſe is tranſlated "dip;" but whether there was an immerſion of the whole body, or any part of it, is altogether uncertain. All we can be certain of is, that the prophet ordered him to waſh, his ſervant adviſed him to waſh, and he went down, and *ebaptisato kata to reema Elisaie*, baptiſed according to the word of Eliſha. Now there are two reaſons which induce ſome to think he applied water to one part of his body only: 1. As he expected the prophet to ſtrike his hand over the place, and recover the leper, they conclude he was leprous only in one part of his body, and that the water was applied to that part. 2. The command to waſh ſeven times, they conſider as referring to that part of the law of cleanſing in which the leper is ordered to be ſprinkled; but, for my own part, I think it impoſſible to ſay in what manner he baptiſed. The other is merely figurative, expreſſive of a ſenſe of God's anger, and occurs in Iſaiah, xxi. 4. *kai ee anomia me baptizei*—And ſin baptiſes me; meaning the puniſhment due to ſin, which is expreſſed by pouring out anger, fury, &c. on a perſon. From theſe premiſes the unforced concluſion is this: That, on the one hand, as the word baptiſe is expreſſive of no particular mode, nothing can be concluded from it in favour of one more than another;

ſo, on the other hand, as the word has certainly been uſed for pouring and ſprinkling, while there is no proof of its ever being uſed in Scripture for immerſion, it does more naturally aſſociate itſelf vith affuſion and aſperſion. With regard to the circumſtances of baptiſm, they afford no certain proof on either ſide. We can do no more than preſume, and this may be done on both ſides: There is preſumption for or againſt, and fancy, as it may happen to favour any one ſide, will form the concluſion; but as the circumſtances carry us no farther than preſumption, no certain concluſion can be formed either for immerſion or againſt it. The alluſions, I obſerved, were of two kinds; the one I have called Baptiſt alluſion, the other Pædobaptiſt alluſion. The Baptiſt alluſion is entirely founded in miſtake, and that through a non-attention to the deſign and ſcope of the apoſtle; for in the ſame way as the Baptiſts make an alluſion to immerſion, the context will furniſh alluſions to other modes: and diſputants, were they ſo inclined, might plead with more advantage for the ſign of the croſs, &c. than the Baptiſts can for immerſion. The Pædobaptiſts' alluſion conſiſts in this: They conſider the two baptiſms, the material and the ſpiritual, as being the one a ſhadow or figure of the other, and the mode of the material as reſembling that of the ſpiritual. And, therefore, as divine influence in ſpiritual baptiſm is ſaid to come upon—fall upon—to be ſhed forth—poured out, and as material baptiſm is to be a ſignificant emblem of this, the alluſion is decidedly in favour of pouring and ſprinkling. And that this is the true ſtate of the matter appears by this: That the Scriptures commonly join material and ſpiritual baptiſm together as counterparts of each other, and expreſs them by the ſame word, and deſcribe them, as to their mode, in the ſame way. The conſequence then is, that as the baptiſm of the Spirit is pouring, ſhedding, &c. and as the baptiſm of water is to repreſent that, and is deſcribed, as to its mode, in the ſame way, that mode muſt of neceſſity be pouring or ſprinkling.

OF THE USE OE INFANT BAPTISM.

AS I have often heard it aſked, What is the uſe of infant baptiſm? I think it neceſſary, before I conclude, to ſay ſomething in anſwer to that queſtion. With regard of the uſe of baptiſm I conſider it in the light of a mean of grace and I view it in the ſame way when applied to infants. I do not ſuppoſe that infants, properly ſpeaking, receive any preſent benefit by being baptiſed, but that this is deſigned the more to engage the attention of parents, and others to the riſing generation. I view infants, when baptiſed, under the notion of perſons entered into a ſchool; and, therefore, I conſider parents, paſtors, and deacons, and church-members, at large, as brought under an additional obligation to inſtruct thoſe children who are become ſcholars, as they become able to learn, in the peculiar truths of the religion of Chriſt. Viewing the matter in this light, it aſſumes an importance exceedingly grand; and infant baptiſm is far from being that unmeaning thing, which it appears to be, when the views are extended no farther than helpleſs infancy.

We may illuſtrate this by taking a view of circumciſion. Circumciſion brought perſons under an obligation of conforming to the revealed will of God; he who was circumciſed became a debtor: And as this was the nature of the inſtitute, the obligation devolved on all who received it. But for as much as perſons cannot actually conform before they are brought to underſtand, and, in order that they may underſtand, they muſt be taught, we are, therefore, to conſider circumciſed infants as ſtanding in the place of ſcholars or diſciples to be inſtructed in that ſyſtem to which they were bound to conform. If then circumciſion brought an obligation on ſome to learn, it muſt, at the ſame time, bring an obligation on others to teach; becauſe uſually perſons do not learn with-

out being taught: and hence parents, prieſts, and people, came under their reſpective degrees of obligation to ſee the riſing generation inſtructed in that religion into which they were initiated as ſcholars or diſciples. When I conſider this divine inſtitute as calculated to fix the attention of the people on their riſing offspring, with reſpect to their inſtruction in the things of God, I cannot ſufficiently admire that poor heatheniſh notion of circumciſion which Mr. Booth has ſomewhere picked up, or rather invented himſelf, than which, I am perſuaded, the moſt ignorant Jew never entertained a meaner.

It is for want of viewing the matter in this way, that an inſtitute, adminiſtered to an infant, appears ridiculous to any. When the attention is fixed on the infant only, whether it be a circumciſed or a baptiſed infant, without conſidering any thing further, we may well ſay, as the Baptiſts do, What can an infant know? What can an infant do? What uſe can it be to an infant? In ſuch a caſe, it is very true, it would be a difficult thing to diſcern any wiſdom in the adminiſtration of an inſtitute of any kind to an infant. And I remember once converſing with a Baptiſt upon infant baptiſm, who, among other things, obſerved what a filly thing it was to baptiſe an infant. As I perceived his views extended no farther than helpleſs infancy, I aſked him, whether, if he had ſeen it done, he would not have thought it a very filly thing to circumciſe an infant: "That I ſhould indeed," ſaid he, "indeed I ſhould;" theſe, as well as I can recollect, were his very words. But when, on the contrary, our views take in the grand deſign of engaging the attention the more fixedly to the riſing race, all the ſuppoſed fillineſs vaniſhes away, and it appears a plan worthy the wiſdom and kindneſs of God.

I was led more particularly to view the matter in this point of light, by conſidering that commiſſion given to the apoſtles by the riſen Saviour, reſpecting

the Gentile nations, Matt. xxviii. 18, 19, 20. "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and, *matheeteusate*, diſciple all nations, baptiſing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt; *didaskontes*, teaching them to obſerve all things whatſoever I have commanded you, &c." Here we have the whole plan juſt as I have ſet it down in the caſe of circumciſion; They are ſent to make diſciples (ſcholars;) for *diſcipulus* in Latin, and ſcholar in Engliſh, are juſt the ſame; they are to enter ſuch as are made ſcholars by baptiſm; they are to inſtruct theſe ſcholars in the things of Chriſt, in order that they may obſerve them. Our bleſſed Lord, by making uſe of the words *matheeteusate*, make diſciples, and *didaskontes*, teaching, carries our views immediately to *matheetai*, *diſcipuli*, ſcholars, and *didaskaloi*, *præceptores*, ſchoolmaſters; and thus we are preſented with a Chriſtian ſchool with ſcholars and maſters.

According to this view of the ſubject, and to this our Lord's words naturally lead us, there appears not only a grandeur of deſign, but likewiſe an exact ſymmetry in the different diſpenſations of God—I mean that attention to the riſing offspring, which had ſhown itſelf in a former diſpenſation, and, no doubt, in all. It is to be obſerved that our Lord uſes a term, a ſchool term, which will agree to an infant as well as an adult, for the word *matheetees*, a ſcholar, of which the word uſed by our Lord is the theme, does not neceſſarily intend previous learning nor preſent learning, but only learning in deſign. We call thoſe ſcholars, who have done learning, and ſo we do thoſe who are now at their ſtudies, and ſo likewiſe thoſe who have not yet begun to learn, provided they are entered for that purpoſe: ſo that the idea of learning does not neceſſarily annex itſelf to the term *matheetees*, ſcholar, any farther than to denote a perſon who is entered into a ſchool with a view to learn.

But here it may be aſked, What propriety can there be, in calling a perſon a diſciple or ſcholar, who is

yet incapable of learning? I reply, he is properly ſo called, becauſe he is entered with that deſign. *e. g.* Numbers iii. 28, "In the number of all the males, from a month old and upwards, were eight thouſand and ſix hundred, keeping the charge of the ſanctuary." Can any body tell me how a child of ſix weeks old could be a keeper of the charge of the ſanctuary? Certainly he could no otherwiſe be called a keeper, but as one deſigned and appointed to that ſervice. Juſt with the ſame propriety, an infant, who, by circumciſion or baptiſm, was or is publicly entered into a religious ſchool, may be called a diſciple in a religious ſenſe. And it is a very general opinion, that infants are actually ſo called in Acts xv. 10. "Why tempt ye God to put a yoke on the neck of the diſciples?" That infants are called diſciples will appear plain, if we aſk, On whoſe neck was this yoke to have come? Every one knows, who knows the manner of Moſes reſpecting circumciſion, that it would have come on adults, but chiefly on infants; and then it is evident, that as part of thoſe, on whom the yoke would have come, were infants, it is as evident, that thoſe infants were called diſciples: But whether this be ſo or not, the word made uſe of by our Lord will agree to infants as well as adults.

The apoſtles are to make diſciples—that is all *matheeteusate* imports. But ſtill the queſtion is, How are they to make them? I anſwer, By teaching; for neither adult nor infant can be made a diſciple without. And herein the Baptiſts are very right, and I agree with them, that adults and infants muſt be made diſciples by teaching, or they will not be made ſo at all. But then how can an infant be made a diſciple by teaching? I reply, not directly, but indirectly; that is, the parents, being won over by teaching to embrace the truth, they preſent their infants to the Chriſtian ſchool to be trained up in the ſame truth; and thus they become diſciples. *e. g.* Joel is to ſanctify a faſt, and call a ſolemn aſſembly, to gather the *people, elders, children, and* thoſe that ſuck th

breaſts. But how is he to aſſemble them? He is to blow a trumpet in Zion. But what does a ſucking child know about the ſound of a trumpet? I anſwer, he knows nothing at all about it. How then are ſucking children to be brought together by the ſound of a trumpet, ſeeing they know nothing of the trumpet or its ſound? I reply, In the ſame way as infants are made diſciples by teaching. But how is that? Every one knows how it is, who knows any thing; and this I have already explained. If the trumpet had not been ſounded, the ſucklings would not have been collected, and if men were not taught, infants would not become diſciples: So then infants as well as men are made diſciples by teaching, as elders and ſucking children are brought to the faſt by the ſound of a trumpet.

Viewing baptiſm as introducing infants into a viſible ſtate of diſcipleſhip, we are to conſider others as teachers and overlookers of theſe diſciples: And then the uſefulneſs of ſuch an inſtitute will diſplay itſelf before us. We ſee an infant baptiſed.—If our views terminate there, alas! what is it? Infant ſprinkling only, the baptiſm of a baby. Things which are little in themſelves, become great by their connexion with, and relation to, others. We ſee an infant baptiſed.—What does it import? He is received into diſcipleſhip. *i. e.* to be a ſcholar in a Chriſtian ſchool. Now carry your views into the department of parents, paſtors, deacons, and members; and liſten to the ſilent language of this inſtitution. "Parents, paſtors, and people, pray for us; during our tender infancy, pray for us. And when matured by age, cauſe the doctrine which you profeſs, to drop upon us as the rain, to diſtil as dew, as the ſmall rain upon the tender herb, and as ſhowers upon the graſs. Watch over us with united care, and bring us up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." It is a diſpenſation grand and merciful, which is calculated more powerfully to turn the attention of men to the concerns of thoſe who *are riſing into* life, and poſting into eternity.

There is one fault among others in the Baptiſt ſyſtem, that it places the riſing generation ſo entirely out of ſight. I do not mean that the Baptiſts themſelves do this; for their conduct in this reſpect is much better than their ſyſtem; but their ſyſtem places them out of ſight. And in this, it differs from all the diſpenſations of God, of which we have any particular knowledge; which alone would lead to a preſumption, that it is not of God.

To what I have ſaid concerning the uſe of infant baptiſm, under the idea of an inſtitution ſuited to draw the attention more powerfully to the immortal concerns of the riſing generation (and he muſt be very inattentive to human nature, who does not ſee a beauty and bleſſedneſs in ſuch a contrivance) there is no objection that can be brought by a Baptiſt, but may be retorted. He may ſay, Cannot all this be done without baptiſing infants? Retort: Cannot men be built up in faith and love, without either baptiſm or the Lord's ſupper?---Are not many baptiſed infants as deſtitute of real religion as others? Ret.---And are not many baptiſed adults, as deſtitute of religion as heathens? Are not many unbaptiſed infants brought up in Chriſtian knowledge equally as well as the baptized ones? Ret.---And are not many, who have not been baptiſed in adult age, as gracious and holy as thoſe who have? In this way every objection which can be broght may eaſily be retorted on the bringer.

But the truth is, that the enjoyment of ordinances is to be conſidered only as a mean of grace; they are well ſuited as ordinances to impreſs the mind; but then, it is very certain, they effect nothing, unleſs God is pleaſed to give the increaſe. The poſſeſſion of the word of God, the enjoyment of preaching, baptiſm, the Lord's ſupper, are good things in themſelves, though many are never the better for them; but we are to eſtimate theſe things not by the advantage which ſome receive, but by their own ſuitableneſs to promote, as means, ſome great ends.

When we conſider infants under the notion of diſciples, or ſcholars, the idea ſuggeſts to us a noble kind of diſcipline in the church of God. It ſuggeſts, that all thoſe infants who were baptiſed, ſhould be formed, as they become capable, into ſocieties, for the purpoſe of Chriſtian inſtruction: And ſo every church ſhould have its ſchool. That there ſhould be in churches, not only *poimenai*, paſtors, but *didaskaloi*, ſchoolmaſters, Eph. iv. 11. That the miniſter, and other fit perſons, ſhould preſide over theſe little diſciples; and parents who bring their children to baptiſm, ſhould conſider themſelves as bound in conſcience to ſee them forth-coming to this ſociety at all appointed ſeaſons. That all the members ſhould watch over them, with reſpect to their morals, and likewiſe their Chriſtian learning. In ſhort, the whole ſhould be a church buſineſs, regulated in the manner of doing according to the wiſdom of each Chriſtian ſociety. For as the infant is received by the church as a diſciple in its baptiſm, the church becomes bound to regard that infant as ſuch; and to ſee that it is treated as a ſcholar of Chriſt. To all this, it is plain the idea of diſcipleſhip leads; and in this view it becomes greatly important, as its tendency is to draw the cares and prayers of the whole Chriſtian church towards the riſing generation.

There are many ſpecial uſes connected with this grand leading idea, which the limit of this eſſay will not permit me to mention. I cannot ſay how far the leading idea itſelf is attended to by thoſe who adopt infant baptiſm; if it be not, it is ſo much the more to be lamented, that in this, as well as in other things, the ſpirit of an inſtitute is not followed up to its proper ſcope. It is ſufficient, notwithſtanding, to my preſent purpoſe, in ſhowing the uſefulneſs of an ordinance, if there be a natural fitneſs, in the ordinance itſelf, to promote the great end I have mentioned. And as every ſyſtem we embrace is likely to impreſs our minds according to its nature; that ſyſtem muſt be eminently good and uſeful, which is calculated,

moſt of all, to bring the riſing generation, and their everlaſting concerns, to our mind; to hold them up perpetually before our eyes; and to fix them habitually upon our hearts.—All this the admiſſion of infants by baptiſm to a ſtate of diſcipleſhip in the church of God, is evidently calculated to do; and herein I judge its main uſefulneſs conſiſts.

THE END.

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